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And although it may, perhaps, seem an uneasy reflexion to 
some, that when they have taken a circuit through so many  
refined and vulgar notions, they should at last come to think 
like other men: yet, methinks, this return to the simple dictates 
of Nature, after having wandered through the wild mazes of  
philosophy, is not unpleasant. It is like coming home from  
a long voyage: a man reflects with pleasure on the many diﬃcul-
ties and perplexities he has passed through, sets his heart at ease, 
and enjoys himself with more satisfaction from the future. 
 
                         —   Bishop Berkeley (: ) 
       
             
           We shall not cease from exploration 
                               And the end of all our exploring 
                           Will be to arrive where we started 
                          And know the place for the first time. 
 
                                  —   T. S. Eliot (: ) 
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Abstract 
 
This thesis develops a general theory about the nature of conscious visual experience. 
My starting point is with the naïve realist theory of visual perception. Whilst naïve 
realism is by no means universally endorsed, I begin with the assumption that we 
have good reason to accept it. The central question that the thesis then pursues is 
how to integrate naïve realism into a general theory of visual experience as such. 
 One of the first main claims the dissertation argues for is that visual experience is 
presentational in nature. The rest of the dissertation is then concerned with develop-
ing a presentationalist theory of visual experience that is compatible with naïve real-
ism and that can handle the problems of illusion and of hallucination that naïve re-
alists face. The resulting view I call ‘Austinian Disjunctivism’, inspired as it is by cer-
tain central ideas from J. L. Austin’s () Sense and Sensibilia. Essentially, this is 
the view that whilst genuinely perceptual experiences consist in the visual presenta-
tion of the external items that the subject sees, hallucinatory experiences consist  
instead in the visual presentation of sense-data, conceived as sui generis mental items 
that depend for their existence on the mind of the hallucinating subject. 
 The central claim that the dissertation advances is that naïve realists both can 
and should endorse Austinian Disjunctivism. It is my view that by adopting this 
theory, naïve realists end up with a plausible and attractive view of visual experience, 
which, moreover, should be taken just as seriously as any other theory about the na-
ture of visual experience that is discussed in the contemporary perception literature. 
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  
Chapter  
Naïve Realism and Experience 
 
 
[There are] multiple ways [that] a disjunctivist might endorse 
the idea that Good and Bad cases are diﬀerent…Some of these 
ways are theoretically mild, others are theoretically severe… 
 
                            —   Sturgeon, S. (: ) 
 
 
This dissertation takes as its starting point the naïve realist theory of perceptual  
experience.1 This view is by no means universally endorsed; however, I believe that 
there is good reason to accept it. Indeed, I believe that naïve realism ought to be 
taken as our point of departure when theorising about visual experience. 
 As will emerge, naïve realism is not a general theory of visual experience, but 
rather a theory about a certain sub-class of visual experiences, namely, those in-
volved in veridical perception. However, naïve realists also have good reason for 
wanting to embed their theory within a general view of visual experience as such—
that is, a view that includes illusory and hallucinatory experiences as well. In this 
thesis, my central aim is to develop precisely such a general view, albeit in light of an 
important constraint, which I shall make explicit as we proceed. Essentially, this 
constraint amounts to the thesis that all experiences are presentational in nature. 
 In this chapter, I first outline the naïve realist theory of perception, and then 
explain why I believe that we are justified in taking this view as our point of depar-
ture when theorising about experience (..). I then outline the connection be-
tween naïve realism and disjunctivism (..), before explaining why naïve realists 
should want to embed their theory within a general theory of visual experience as 
such (..). The final section of the chapter then oﬀers a suggestion as to how naïve 
realists might incorporate their view into precisely such a general theory, namely, by 
means of adopting a disjunctivist view known as ‘Austinian Disjunctivism’ (..).  
 
                                                   
 1 In this dissertation I am concerned exclusively with conscious visual experience. Thus, all talk 
of ‘experience’ is to be taken as referring to conscious visual experience, unless otherwise indicated.  
  
.   The Starting Point 
 
I begin this section by setting out the two main claims that naïve realism is commit-
ted to (..). I then explain why it seems reasonable to take naïve realism as our 
starting point when theorising about visual experience as such (..).  
 
.. The View 
 
Naïve realism, in the first instance, is a theory regarding the metaphysical nature of 
veridical perceptual experience. It is committed to two central claims.  
 The first is that veridical perceptual experiences, i.e. those experiences involved 
in cases of veridical perception, consist exhaustively in the visual presentation of or-
dinary external things to the percipient. The external objects that one sees therefore 
partly constitute one’s experience. In short, for naïve realists, a perceptual experience 
just is a complex, relational event ‘built out of’ the relevant external things standing 
in the visual presentation relation to the subject. The first core claim of naïve real-
ism, therefore, is that there is a psychologically basic relation called ‘visual presenta-
tion’, (whose converse can be thought simply as the relation of ‘visual awareness’ or 
‘acquaintance’), whereby the experiences involved in veridical perception just are 
instances of ordinary external things standing in this distinctive relation to subjects. 
  Naïve realists thus endorse a radically externalistic view of perceptual experi-
ence. For such experiences are taken to be complex wholes partly constituted by the 
very external items that the subject sees (cf. Campbell: : ; Jacovides ; 
Johnston : ; Snowdon: : —). Thus, our perceptual experiences 
literally include the external items that we see as components or parts. It follows, as 
Logue (: ) puts it, that for naïve realists, our perceptual experiences ‘literally 
extend beyond the subject’s head, to encompass what the experience is of’.  
 The second core claim of naïve realism concerns the phenomenal character of 
veridical perceptual experience. In particular, it concerns what might be called the 
grounds of perceptual phenomenology. The idea is that when it comes to perceptual 
experiences, these have their distinctive phenomenal characters in virtue of the qual-
itative natures of the external items they present. Thus, if I am veridically perceiving 
  
some orange flowers, say, then for naïve realists, my experience has the character it 
does in virtue of the nature of the flowers I perceive (cf. Martin : ). More 
generally, naïve realists maintain that the phenomenal character of a veridical per-
ceptual experience is constitutively determined by the qualitative natures of its ob-
jects. As Kalderon (a: ) puts it, on the naïve realist view of perception, the 
phenomenal character of a veridical perceptual experience ‘depends on, and derives 
from’, the qualitative natures of the external items it presents. 
 As I note elsewhere, one interesting upshot of this latter commitment is that na-
ïve realists must accept a correspondingly ‘naïve’ view about perceptible reality  
(Moran a: ). That is, they must accept a view on which, as on our naïve 
conception of things, the sensible qualities are to be located in the external world, 
rather than ‘kicked upstairs, into the mind’. For as Campbell (: ) explains, 
naïve realism ‘depends on the idea that qualitative properties are in fact characteris-
tics of the world we observe’, since according to naïve realism, ‘our [perceptual] ex-
periences have [their] qualitative characters…in virtue of the fact that they are rela-
tions to those aspects of the world’. After all, if perceptible reality did not contain 
the relevant external things, instantiating the relevant sensible qualities, then the 
second core claim of naïve realism could not be true, i.e. the phenomenal character 
of a perceptual experience could not be determined by what its objects are like. 
 The above conception of naïve realism, as committed to the two main claims 
just outlined, is nicely captured by Martin () in the following passage: 
 
According to naïve realism, the actual objects of perception, the external things such 
as trees, tables, and rainbows…and the properties which they can manifest to one 
when perceived, partly constitute one’s conscious experience, and hence determine the 
phenomenal character of one’s experience. (: —)  
 
As this passage makes clear, naïve realists hold two main claims. The first claim is 
that, at least in veridical perception, one’s visual experience is constituted by the ex-
ternal items that it presents; that is, it consists in the presentation of those items. 
The second claim is that in veridical perception, one’s experience inherits its phe-
nomenal character from the qualitative nature of the external items it presents. 
 
  
.. Why Naïve Realism? 
 
I have thus far set out the naïve realist view of veridical perception. The question 
now is what reason there is to endorse it. In fact, various arguments for naïve real-
ism have been presented in the recent literature.2 I will also add a further argument 
for naïve realism in chapter . In this chapter, however, I would like simply to set 
out the main initial source of motivation for that view. The central thought is that 
we should accept naïve realism because it captures our pre-theoretical conception of 
what veridical perceptual experience is like. The thought, in other words, is that na-
ïve realism deserves the name: it is the view that best captures our naïve conception 
of the kind of experience that we enjoy when undergoing veridical perception. It is 
also part of the thought that we should accept naïve realism for that reason. Thus as 
Martin (: ) explains, the main initial source of motivation for naïve realism 
is that it oﬀers ‘the best articulation of what we all pre-theoretically accept concern-
ing…veridical perception’, namely, that in such cases ‘we are aware of mind inde-
pendent objects, and that the kind of experience we have of them is relational, with 
the objects of sense being constituents of the experiential episode’.   
 It is widely accepted in the literature that naïve realism best captures our pre-
theoretical view of what veridical perceptual experience is like. Nor is it hard to see 
why this is so. Take the first core naïve realist claim, to the eﬀect that veridical per-
ceptions consist simply in the presentation of the external objects that one sees. This 
is surely the most natural view of such experience to take. As Alston writes:  
 
The most intuitively attractive way of characterising [perceptual] experience is to say 
that it consists in the presentation of physical objects to consciousness. Upon opening 
one’s eyes one is presented with a variegated scene, consisting of objects spread out in 
space, displaying various characteristics, and engaging in various activities. To deliber-
ately flaunt a controversial term, it seems that these objects are given to one’s aware-
ness. It seems for all the world as if I enjoy direct, unmediated awareness of those ob-
jects. There is, apparently, nothing ‘between’ my mind and the objects I [perceive]. 
They are simply displayed to my awareness. (:  cf. Johnston : ) 
 
 
                                                   
 2 See e.g. Brewer (); Campbell (, ); Martin (); and Travis (, ). 
  
When characterising veridical perception, it is natural to say that one’s experience 
consists solely in the visual presentation of the external things one sees. One is visu-
ally aware of certain external items; these are the things the experience presents. The 
experience then consists in the presentation of those external items to the mind. 
 Consider now the second core naïve realist claim, namely that it is the very ex-
ternal objects seen, and their qualitative natures, that constitutively determine the 
phenomenal character of one’s experience. This idea would also seem to be a part of 
our naïve view of veridical perceptual experience. As Kalderon explains: 
 
According to the naïve conception of experience, the phenomenal character of colour 
experience is determined by the qualitative character of the perceived colour. When 
Norm perceives a red tomato, the phenomenal character of his colour experience is de-
termined, at least in part, by the qualitative character of the redness manifest in his 
experience of the tomato. What it is like for Norm to see the redness of the tomato 
would depend on what the redness of the tomato is like. (: , cf. Campbell 
:  and Robinson : ) 
 
This passage, of course, is concerned with colour experience in particular. However, 
the point easily generalises. For in general, our naïve view seems to be that the phe-
nomenal character of a veridical perceptual experience is grounded in the qualitative 
nature of the external objects it presents. One is aware, in such experience, of certain 
external objects, which manifest certain visual qualities; the character of the experi-
ence is then inherited from the manifest nature of these external things.3 
 Indeed, it is arguable that we do not have two separate ideas here, but rather one 
united thought, containing both key ideas: in conceiving of experience as consisting 
in the presentation of the external items that we see, we are thereby conceiving of the 
phenomenal character of the experience as determined by the nature of those very 
items. This is nicely brought out by Langsam (), who notes that on our naïve 
view of perception, when I perceive a red tomato, say:  
 
…the tomato itself is not merely causing me to have an experience the nature of 
which is independent of it…Rather, the experience itself consists in my being related 
                                                   
 3 Compare Pautz (manuscript-a), who argues that we all share a ‘general naïve intuition’ to the 
eﬀect that it is the external objects seen that determine the phenomenology of perceptual experience.  
  
to the tomato in a certain way, specifically, in a way that enables the properties of the 
tomato to determine the phenomenal character of the experience. (: ) 
 
We can agree, therefore, that naïve realism is the theory that best articulates our pre-
theoretical conception of what veridical perceptual experience is like. The idea is 
that this fact provides initial motivation for accepting the naïve realist view. In fact, 
it seems to me that this idea gives us reason to take naïve realism as our starting 
point when theorising about experience in general. Here I rely on a general and 
broadly Moorean methodological principle, to the eﬀect that we should begin by 
holding the most natural or intuitive view regarding the relevant subject-matter, and 
abandon that view only given suﬃcient argumentative pressure. Compare for in-
stance the debates concerning free will or scepticism about knowledge. The most 
intuitive views here are that we have free will, and that contra the sceptic, we do 
have knowledge of the external world. We should, therefore, begin not with agnos-
ticism, but rather with the beliefs that we are free and that scepticism is false. Only 
suﬃcient argumentative pressure should then convince us otherwise. What I am 
claiming is that the same thing is true regarding naïve realism. This is the view of 
perceptual experience that we should start out with. In this respect it is like the be-
lief that we are free, or that we can know things about the external world. We 
should abandon the idea that we are free, or can know things about external reality, 
only if we are forced to do so by argumentative pressure. The same is true, I want to 
say, regarding our pre-theoretical beliefs about veridical perceptual experience, 
which, as we have already argued, are captured by the naïve realist view.   
 One way to emphasise the point here is to consider something that Martin 
() says when discussing naïve realism in relation to other theories of experience. 
What Martin claims is that since naïve realism best articulates our naïve conception 
of experience, it follows that other theories of experience, which are incompatible 
with naïve realism, must amount to error-theories. As Martin writes: 
 
Taking [naïve realism] seriously forces us to acknowledge that [alternative] theories of 
perception amount to error-theories of…experience. For if ordinary reflection leads to 
the acceptance of Naïve Realism, then such ordinary reflection cannot disclose the real 
nature of sense experience according to these [alternative] views. (: ) 
  
 
It would be entirely unnatural to hold an error-theory about some specific subject-
matter, such as the claim that we do not have free will, or cannot know propositions 
about external reality, prior to philosophical inquiry. Nor does this mean that prior 
to inquiry we should remain agnostic. Rather, we should begin by accepting the 
most intuitive or commonsensical view, and we should only abandon this view in 
favour of some error-theory about the relevant subject-matter in light of further 
theoretical considerations. Hence, it is plausible to take naïve realism as our point of 
departure when theorising about experience. We should begin by holding this view, 
and reject it for an error-theory only if further theorising forces us to do so.  
 
.. Conclusions 
 
Thus far, I have explained what naïve realists are committed to. On a naïve realist 
view, our perceptual experiences, in cases of veridical perception, consist in the 
presentation of the very external items seen. The phenomenal character of the expe-
rience is then determined by the qualitative nature of the presented objects.  
 I have also set out the initial reason that we have for accepting naïve realism. The 
reason is that naïve realism captures the most natural conception of what veridical 
perceptual experience is like. The claim is that this fact gives us reason to take naïve 
realism as our starting point when theorising about visual experience as such. 
 This is, in fact, precisely what I propose to do in this dissertation. That is, I will 
be taking naïve realism as my point of departure; from here, I will build a general 
theory of visual experience as such. As this suggests, even if we accept naïve realism 
we do not yet have a general theory of visual experience. For naïve realism concerns 
veridical perception, and it cannot be fully generalised to cover all cases of visual 
experience. I will explain why this is so in the following section. This will bring out 
the connection between naïve realism and the doctrine known as ‘disjunctivism’. 
Having set out this thesis, I then explain why naïve realists cannot rest content hold-
ing a view known as ‘disjunctive quietism’ but must instead put forward a general 
view of visual experience as such, so as not to be at a dialectical disadvantage. 
 
  
. Disjunctivism Introduced 
 
This section is concerned with naïve realism and disjunctivism. I begin by explain-
ing the sense in which naïve realists have to be disjunctivists (..), before elucidat-
ing some further claims that I believe disjunctivists ought to endorse (..). 
 
.. Disjunctivism 
 
Many theories of perceptual experience apply to all cases of visual experience, 
whether veridical, illusory, or hallucinatory (cf. ..). However, it seems clear that 
the naïve realist theory cannot be a general theory of visual experience in this way. 
Indeed, initially at least, it would seem inapplicable both as regards illusory and hal-
lucinatory experience. Consider illusion. Whilst one can plausibly be said to be see-
ing the external object in such cases, meaning that we can perhaps respect the first 
naïve realist claim, i.e. that the experience consists in the presentation of the seen 
object to the subject, the object also appears, in one’s experience of it, to have cer-
tain qualities it lacks. Thus it is hard to see, as per the second core naïve realist 
claim, how the qualities of the object could constitute its phenomenal character.4 
 As for hallucinatory experience, neither of the core naïve realist claims would 
seem to apply. For, whatever else is true of hallucinatory experience, being the sub-
ject of such an experience is not, it would appear, a way of being acquainted with 
external things. Accordingly, one cannot say that the experience involved in halluci-
nating consists in the visual presentation of ordinary external items. Yet if one can-
not say this, then evidently one cannot say that the hallucinatory experience inherits 
its distinctive phenomenal character from the external items it presents.  
 The fact that naïve realism cannot easily be generalised to cases of illusion and 
hallucination may not, at least initially, appear to constitute any kind of problem. 
After all, naïve realism is just a view about the fully veridical cases, and not about 
visual experience in general. It seems clear, however, that if naïve realism is to be a 
viable theory, it must be capable of being integrated into a total theory of visual ex-
                                                   
 4 There is also the traditional worry about whether the first naïve realist claim applies. For the 
traditional ‘argument from illusion’ aims to demonstrate that illusory experiences in fact present 
mind-dependent sense-data rather than external things (cf. chapter  for a reply to this argument). 
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perience as such. Given that, what the above shows is that if naïve realists wish to 
end up with a general theory of visual experience, and thus a viable theory even of 
veridical perception, something must be said about illusion and hallucination.  
 In chapter , I take up the question as to what naïve realists can say regarding 
illusory experience. I will argue that despite the initial diﬃculties, naïve realists can 
extend their basic view about the veridical cases to illusory experience as well. On 
the resulting picture, we can be naïve realists not only about those visual experiences 
involved in fully veridical perception, but also regarding those experiences involved 
in illusion. Realising this then constitutes an important step towards the goal of 
embedding naïve realism within a general theory of visual experience as such. 
 Suppose we grant that naïve realism holds not just of fully veridical perceptual 
experiences but also regarding illusory perceptual experience as well. Even if this is 
so, there remains a question regarding the nature of hallucinatory experience. For 
these experiences seem clearly not to involve the presentation of any external ob-
jects, and hence not to derive their distinctive phenomenal characters from the qual-
itative natures of external things. Therefore, there is no real possibility of developing 
a naïve realist view of hallucination. Rather, the most that one can do is combine  
naïve realism with a diﬀerent theory of hallucinatory experience. This last point is 
often captured by saying that naïve realists must be disjunctivists. The idea is that 
naïve realists must say that genuinely perceptual experiences, whether veridical or 
illusory, have a diﬀerent mental nature to hallucinatory experiences.5  
 Given this definition of disjunctivism, one could, strictly speaking, be a disjunc-
tivist even without adopting naïve realism. For within logical space, there is room 
for holding that although naïve realism is false, nevertheless, perceptual experiences 
have one nature whereas hallucinatory experiences have another. For present pur-
poses, however, it will be useful if we think of disjunctivism as entailing naïve real-
ism. In this dissertation, therefore, we can think of ‘disjunctivism’ as standing for 
the idea that whereas perceptual experiences consist in the presentation of external 
items, and, moreover, derive their phenomenal characters therefrom, hallucinatory 
                                                   
 5 There are in fact certain naïve realists who have considered the view that even in total halluci-
nation we are presented with external particulars, such as the air or space in front of one (Alston 
; Langsam ), or one’s own brain or ‘internal condition’ (Johnston manuscript-a). However, 
these are radical and seemingly implausible views, which I shall set aside in this dissertation.  
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experiences have a diﬀerent psychological nature, due to the fact that they do not 
consist in the presentation of external things. This way of thinking about disjunc-
tivism is very much in line with the views of Snowdon (a). He writes: 
 
[Disjunctivism] represents the thought that the experience in a genuinely perceptual 
case has a diﬀerent nature to the experience involved in a non-perceptual [i.e. halluci-
natory] case. It is not exhausted, however, by the simple denial of a common nature, 
but involves also the characterisation of the diﬀerence between the perceptual and 
non-perceptual in terms of the diﬀerent constituents of the experiences involved. The 
experience in a perceptual case in its nature reaches out to and involves the perceived 
external object, not so the experience in the non-perceptual [i.e. hallucinatory] case. 
(a: —, cf. Fish : — and Martin : .) 
 
It is of note that to accept this kind of view is to accept a fairly minimal form of dis-
junctivism, given the much more radical meanings that disjunctivism has come to 
take on in the literature. Accepting this view means holding simply that while per-
ceptual experiences have one nature (namely the nature that naïve realists ascribe to 
them), hallucinatory experiences have a diﬀerent nature (one that does not involve 
the presentation of external things). Clearly, however, accepting this view is quite 
consistent with being neutral about the nature of hallucinatory experience. 
 
.. Phenomenology 
 
The key disjunctivist commitment, then, is that perceptual experiences and halluci-
natory experiences have diﬀerent psychological natures, since naïve realism is true of 
perceptual but not of hallucinatory experiences. However, it would appear that this 
is not yet the whole story. This is because it seems at least possible for there to be 
two subjectively indistinguishable experiences, i.e., two experiences that it would be 
impossible to tell apart, just by means of introspective reflection, whereby the first  
experience is a genuine perception whereas the other is an hallucination. The point 
is that in light of this, disjunctivists must make the further commitment that even 
subjectively indiscriminable experiences can diﬀer in nature. 
 In fact, it seems that disjunctivists must go even further. For intuitively, if two 
experiences are subjectively indistinguishable, then this is so in virtue of the fact that 
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they are phenomenologically the same, i.e. in virtue of the fact that they are phe-
nomenally identical, meaning that they have the same phenomenal character. After 
all, if two experiences just cannot be told apart from one another, on the basis of 
introspective reflection alone, then we face an important explanatory question, 
namely, why can’t these experiences be told apart? The idea, recall, is not that these 
experiences cannot be told apart by some particular subject due to some cognitive 
limitation on her part. Rather, the idea is that it just isn’t possible to know, by 
means introspective reflection alone, that the one experience is distinct from the 
other. The present point is that if two experiences cannot be told apart in this im-
personal sense, then there must be some explanation as to why. Yet, the most natu-
ral explanation here would be that the relevant experiences are indistinguishable in 
virtue of sharing their phenomenal properties, making them phenomenally the same 
(cf. Farkas ; Hawthorne & Kovakovitch: ﬀ; Tye : ). 
 There are doubtless further things that could be said here (see e.g. Martin , 
). For my part, however, I am willing to grant that there could be two experi-
ences, whereby one is perceptual and the other hallucinatory, such that these two 
experiences are not only subjectively indiscriminable but also phenomenologically 
the same. Indeed, it seems to me very natural to think that whenever two experienc-
es are reflectively indiscriminable, then this is so precisely because they are phenom-
enologically the same; that is, because they have the same phenomenological charac-
ter. In what follows, therefore, I will assume not only that a perceptual experience 
and an hallucinatory one could be phenomenally the same, but also that this is 
something that naïve realists and disjunctivists both can and should allow. 
 In allowing that a perceptual experience and an hallucinatory one could be phe-
nomenally alike, I clash with various naïve realists including Martin (); Phillips 
(); and Soteriou (). For on their view, while naïve realists can allow that 
there could be a perceptual and an hallucinatory experience that are introspectively 
indistinguishable from one another, they must deny that any perceptual experience 
is phenomenally the same as any hallucinatory experience. This is because, on their 
view, phenomenally identical experiences are always ‘experiences of the same fun-
damental kind’ and hence always have the same psychological nature. For obviously, 
if sameness of phenomenology entailed sameness of mental nature, then disjunc-
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tivists could not agree that any perceptual experience has the same phenomenal 
character as any hallucinatory experience. For that would allow for cases where a 
perceptual experience and an hallucinatory one have the same mental nature—
contrary to what disjunctivists want to maintain. And so to paraphrase Phillips 
(: ), the whole possibility of a disjunctivist approach would depend on the 
possibility of denying that introspective indistinguishability entails sameness of phe-
nomenology. Relatedly, disjunctivists would have to deny that any perceptual expe-
rience has the same phenomenal character as any hallucinatory experience (and vice 
versa). Yet, it seems to me, as against these philosophers, that naïve realists need not 
accept that sameness of phenomenology always entails sameness of mental nature. 
Nor need they deny that there could be pairs of experiences that are phenomenally 
the same, whereby one is perceptual and the other is hallucinatory. 
  In short, naïve realists need not make the rather unintuitive claim that two or 
more experiences, despite being reflectively indiscriminable from one another, 
might still diﬀer in phenomenal properties, nor need they deny that perceptual and 
hallucinatory experiences can have the same phenomenal character.6  
 Suppose we grant that a perceptual experience and an hallucinatory one might 
be not just subjectively indistinguishable, but also phenomenally the same. Given 
this claim, disjunctivists have to maintain not only that there could be introspective-
ly indistinguishable experiences with the same mental nature, but also that there 
could be phenomenally identical experiences that have diﬀerent mental natures. On 
this kind of disjunctive view, therefore, I could be having a perceptual experience as 
of an oasis in the distance, whilst you are having an hallucinatory experience that is 
experientially just like my own. Due to sharing their phenomenal properties, our 
experiences would then be introspectively indistinguishable. However, they would 
also diﬀer in terms of their mental nature. For whilst my experience would consist 
in the presentation of a genuine oasis, your experience would not. (Perhaps your 
hallucinatory experience would consist in the presentation of something, such as a 
mental sense-datum. Otherwise, it might present nothing at all. What is certain is 
that it wouldn’t present an ordinary external item such as an oasis in the distance.) 
                                                   
 6 Cf. here Crane (), who distinguishes between two experiences being of the same phenom-
enal kind, and having the same psychological nature. The idea is that two experiences may be phe-
nomenally the same (i.e., of the same phenomenal kind) while being distinct in their mental nature. 
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 A further claim that disjunctivists must endorse, therefore, is that there could be 
two experiences as of an oasis, for example, which are reflectively indiscriminable 
and have the same phenomenal character, and yet which still diﬀer in their nature. 
This is again nicely captured by Snowdon: 
 
...the claim that it looks to P as if R should be treated as being true in virtue of two 
distinct sorts of states of aﬀairs: either there is an object which looks to be an oasis to P 
(this is the case where an object is seen), or it is to P as if there is something of that 
sort happening (P is hallucinating an oasis). It is allowed that the two cases which are 
described in the same way – or which ground the same description – might be quite 
diﬀerent in nature. (: , cf. Millar : ; Martin : ) 
 
The idea is that even if two people are having what might be called ‘oasis-
experiences’—whereby the fact that these experiences both satisfy that description is 
meant to imply that these experiences are phenomenally the same—it need not fol-
low that these experiences have the same mental nature entirely. For it might be so 
that one oasis-experience is perceptual, and, accordingly, consists in the presentation 
of a genuine oasis, while the other oasis-experience is hallucinatory, and thus has 
some other nature (since it does not present anything from the external world).  
 Is this further commitment of disjunctivism coherent? Here is one worry worth 
addressing. According to naïve realism, the phenomenal character of a perceptual 
experience is determined by the nature of the external items it presents. So if I have 
an experience as of an oasis, and if this experience is a genuine perception, then the 
character of my experience is determined by what the presented external scene is 
like. But now consider the hallucinatory counterpart of this experience, which is 
phenomenally the same. This hallucinatory experience does not consist in the 
presentation of an oasis. Thus it does not derive its phenomenal character from the 
manifest qualities of the oasis it presents. But then how could it have the same phe-
nomenal character as my experience, given that my oasis-experience does inherit its 
phenomenal character from the features of the oasis it visually presents?  
 At this point, we must remember that the phenomenal character of an experi-
ence is a property of it, namely, that property which characterises what it is like to 
have it. Thus, in cases wherein what it’s like to undergo x is precisely the same as 
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what it’s like to undergo y, we say that x and y have the same phenomenal character. 
We can also speak of specific phenomenal properties, so as to speak of particular 
aspects of the total phenomenal character of an experience. The phenomenal charac-
ter of a given experience can then be viewed as a conjunctive property comprised of 
its specific phenomenal properties (cf.  Fish : ch. ; Speaks ). 
 Once we are clear that the phenomenal character of an experience is a property 
of it, we can then note that this property is plausibly viewed as multiply realisable. 
That is, we can point out that this property is plausibly seen as the kind of property 
that distinct experiences can have for diﬀerent reasons. Compare here the property 
of being red. Two distinct things can be red, yet in virtue of diﬀerent factors, e.g. x 
can be red in virtue of being scarlet, whilst y can be read in virtue of being crimson. 
Here both x and y are red, but they are red for diﬀerent reasons. Thus, being red is 
multiply realisable. The present thought is that things might be the same when it 
comes to phenomenal properties. Two experiences may have the same phenomenal 
properties, and yet have those properties for diﬀerent reasons. 
 It seems to me that disjunctivists should view phenomenal properties, as well as 
the phenomenal characters that are (identical to) certain conjunctive phenomenal 
properties, as multiply realisable in just this sense. For, given this view, naïve realists 
can then easily claim that when a perceptual experience has a certain phenomenal 
character, it has this character in virtue of presenting such and such items manifest-
ing such and such qualities, whilst allowing that there can be perceptual experiences 
and hallucinatory ones that have the same phenomenal character. Indeed, given this 
view, naïve realists can retain the plausible thought that in general, an experience 
has the character it does in virtue of something concerning its fundamental psycho-
logical nature. To make this work, naïve realists need only claim that in the relevant 
cases, as Logue (a: ) puts it, ‘although the facts in virtue of which the expe-
riences have [their] phenomenal characters are diﬀerent’, nevertheless, ‘the experi-
ences are phenomenally the same’. I see no obvious problems with this view of mat-
ters. Therefore, I will assume in what follows that naïve realists can adopt this this 
view, and hence also the general disjunctivist position that I have just described.7 
                                                   
 7 While I find this view unproblematic, Martin (: ) has a complex argument against a 
rather similar view. While there is not space to discuss this argument here, we can note that Martin’s 
  
. Against Disjunctive Quietism 
 
In principle, naïve realists do not have to say anything about the nature of what 
Snowdon calls the ‘non-perceptual cases’. Since we are assuming that naïve realism 
can be extended to cover illusory as well as veridical perception, this amounts to say-
ing that in principle naïve realists do not need to say anything about the nature of 
hallucinatory experience. Following Sturgeon (), let us refer to those naïve real-
ists who say nothing about hallucinatory experience as ‘disjunctive quietists’. In  
essence, as Sturgeon (: ) writes, fans of this view first adopt naïve realism, 
yet remain ‘studiously silent’ about the nature of hallucinatory cases. 
 What might induce a naïve realist to be a disjunctive quietist? Snowdon () 
oﬀers one plausible suggestion. As he puts it, many ‘defenders of naïve realism’ 
focus on supporting their view, and see no need to turn to the non-perceptual cases: 
 
The reason, I conjecture, is that defenders of naïve realism put their intellectual eﬀorts 
into denying that the analysis of experience that [their opponents] were arguing for 
was correct for the perceptual case. Having successfully, as they saw it, held the line 
over that, there was no need to say much about the non‐perceptual cases. They could, 
as it were, be analysed as one wished. (: ) 
 
Another suggestion, not necessarily in conflict with Snowdon’s, is the idea that na-
ïve realists cannot really say anything about the mental nature of hallucination, since 
this would leave them facing the so-called ‘screening oﬀ problem’, which they 
would then be unable to answer. This seems to be Martin’s idea when he writes that 
proponents of naïve realism ‘ought to resist any attempt to give a general account’ of 
the nature of hallucinatory experience (Martin : , fn. ; cf. Soteriou ). 
The reason for this, says Martin, is the following: ‘[We] should accept that the prox-
imate causes of a veridical perception are the same as those which can bring about 
an hallucination; if such causes are suﬃcient to bring about a certain type of mental 
state, hallucination, then they should suﬃce even in the case of veridical perception, 
                                                                                                                                        
argument turns on the idea that we can only view phenomenal character as being multiply realisable 
in the way that I suggest if we hold that the phenomenal character of an experience is a determinable 
property such that diﬀerent experiences can share it, yet have it in virtue of having diﬀerent determi-
nates of it. This assumption, however, is left unargued for by Martin, and in my view can be denied.  
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so whatever occurs when one hallucinates will also occur when one perceives. The 
naïve realist can block this by denying that there is any general kind of mental state 
for which those immediate causes are suﬃcient’ (ibid). In short, the idea is that  
naïve realists should refrain from giving any general account of the nature of hallu-
cinatory experience in order to avoid the ‘screening oﬀ problem’, by blocking the 
result that there is a distinctive type of mental state, namely, the kind involved in 
hallucination, which is present also in the case of veridical perception.8   
 Fortunately, as we will see in chapter  below, we can in fact solve the screening 
oﬀ problem in a much less drastic way; a way that’s consistent with adopting a non-
quietist position, but that does not force us into the eliminativist position about hal-
lucinatory experience that Martin gestures towards in the above paragraph.9 So this 
motivation for quietism can be set aside. As for Snowdon’s suggestion, I shall try to 
show is that naïve realists cannot aﬀord to simply put their ‘intellectual eﬀorts’ into 
defending their view of the good cases and then leave it at that. Whatever reasons 
there might be to be tempted by quietism, the reasons to avoid a quietist position 
are more powerful. One main reason for this is that given disjunctive quietism, na-
ïve realists would be at a major dialectical disadvantage to their ‘conjunctivist’ rivals.  
 
.. Conjunctivism 
 
It has been common for philosophers, when theorising about experience, to proceed 
by means of a certain methodology. This involves beginning with a non-veridical 
case—in the broadest possible sense, so as to include both illusion and hallucina-
tion—before generalising the account given of this kind of case to every visual expe-
rience, thus ending up with a total theory of visual experience as such (cf. Johnston 
; Martin: ; Snowdon ).10 Consider, for example, the following argu-
                                                   
 8 Cf. Soteriou (: ), who writes that in light of the screening oﬀ problem, ‘disjunctivist[s] 
must reject the assumption that it is possible to provide a positive, non-derivative account of the kind 
of experience involved when a subject hallucinates’. This seems to me misguided both as a strategy 
for handling the screening oﬀ problem (cf. my b and chapter ) and also because it entails dis-
junctive quietism. (See Snowdon b: ﬀ for further criticisms of this approach.) 
 9 Interestingly, this is distinct from the view that Martin develops in his (, , ) in 
response to same problem (the screening oﬀ problem). I discuss Martin’s views here in chapter . 
 10 This is of course in stark contrast to what appears to me to be the right approach, which in-
volves beginning with reflection on veridical perception, and taking this view as one’s starting point. 
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ment in favour of the sense-datum theory, which I shall refer to here as the Simple 
Argument from Hallucination. This has two main premises, namely, the: 
 
Sense-Datum Claim 
 If a visual experience is hallucinatory, then it consists exhaustively in the visual  
 presentation to the subject of some mind-dependent sense-datum.  
 
And the, 
 
Common Kind Claim 
 Every visual experience has exactly the same metaphysical nature, (regardless of  
 whether it is involved in veridical perception, illusion, or hallucination). 
 
The standard argument for the Sense-Datum Claim is primarily phenomenological. 
The idea is that there is obviously something present to consciousness in hallucina-
tion, but that it’s hard to see what this could be if not a mind-dependent thing (cf. 
Dicker : ).11 As for the second core premise, namely the Common Kind 
Claim, the idea has generally been that it’s plausibility speaks for itself. Indeed, 
throughout the history of analytic philosophy of perception, the truth of the Com-
mon Kind Claim has rarely been challenged (Martin , ). The driving 
thought is that regardless of whether the subject is veridically perceiving, undergo-
ing illusion, or hallucinating, she is still having a visual experience, i.e. certain type 
of mental event common to all of these cases. As Martin writes, the idea is that: 
 
Whatever kind of mental episode…is occurring when I am veridically perceiv-
ing…that same kind of episode can occur when I am merely having an hallucination, 
as when my optic nerves are suitably artificially stimulated. [So whilst] there can be all 
the diﬀerence in the world between a situation in which I am seeing an orange and 
one in which I am…hallucinating one, there need not be a diﬀerence in the kind of 
experience or mental episode which occurs in both cases. (manuscript: ch. , ) 
                                                   
 11 It is, in fact, only in the recent literature that the term ‘sense-datum’ has come to be synony-
mous with the term ‘mental item’. This is how it is used, for instance, by Jackson () and Robin-
son (). Yet, when Moore () introduced the term ‘sense-datum’, it was meant to stand simp-
ly for whatever the object presented in experience turned out to be (see Price , cf. Martin ).  
In this thesis, I use the term ‘sense-datum’ in its contemporary sense, unless otherwise indicated. 
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Now suppose one grants both the Sense-Datum Claim and the Common Kind 
Claim. The sense-datum theory of visual experience then immediately follows. For 
on the sense-datum theory, every experience consists solely in the presentation of 
some mind-dependent sense-datum. So if, by the Sense-Datum Claim, hallucinato-
ry experiences consist in the presentation of sense-data, and if, by the Common 
Kind Claim, hallucinatory experiences have the same mental nature as perceptual 
experiences, then it follows that all visual experiences, regardless of whether they are 
involved in cases of veridical perception, illusion, or hallucination, consist solely in 
the presentation of sense-data, just as the sense-datum theorist maintains. 
 Although it still has some supporters, the sense-datum theory is generally reject-
ed by contemporary philosophers.12 Many philosophers worry about its ontological 
commitments, especially its commitment to mind-dependent entities, which is 
widely taken to be incompatible with a plausible physicalist ontology. Another 
complaint is that the sense-datum theory deprives us of genuine perceptual access to 
external reality. The thought is that if it is true that even in cases of perception, our 
experiences consist solely in the presentation of mind-dependent things, then these 
items will form a kind of barrier, or ‘veil of appearances’, blocking us oﬀ from the 
external world. Whether these complaints are valid is another matter. The present 
point is that many philosophers are moved by at least one of these general worries 
about the sense-datum theory, and therefore seek to endorse an alternative view. 
 However, while few philosophers are now attracted to the sense-datum theory, 
and while many would now wish to reject the Simple Argument, many philoso-
phers, even in the contemporary literature, remain attracted to the Common Kind 
Claim. Indeed, many philosophers still take the general methodology sketched at 
the outset of this sub-section to be a valid one. This methodology, however, clearly 
presupposes the Common Kind Claim. For otherwise, the generalising step, which 
generalises some claim about a particular bad case (or some set thereof) to all cases 
of visual experience, will be unwarranted. After all, without the Common Kind 
                                                   
 12 Contemporary sense-datum theorists include Bermúdez: (); Foster (); Gandarillas 
(); García-Carpintero (); Jackson (); O’Shaughnessy (, ); Robinson ().  
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Claim in the background, we have no guarantee that the relevant claims about the 
relevant bad case(s) will generalise to all visual experiences in the required way. 
 Now the Simple Argument for the sense-datum theory is valid. Accordingly, 
since many philosophers would wish to hold on to the second premise, i.e. to accept 
the Common Kind Claim, the upshot is that these philosophers have to reject the 
Sense-Datum Claim in order to have a coherent view. In turn, this means that they 
must provide an alternative account of hallucinatory experience to that which the 
sense-datum theorist oﬀers. Given their acceptance of the Common Kind Claim, 
moreover, this account must then generalise to all visual experiences.  
 Following Johnston (), let us refer to any theory of visual experience that 
accepts the Common Kind Claim as a conjunctivist theory.13 Aside from the sense-
datum view, there are two other main forms of conjunctivism that have been  
defended in the perception literature, namely, adverbialism and intentionalism (or 
representationalism). What these two views have in common, despite their diﬀer-
ences, is a desire to avoid postulating sense-data as objects of awareness that partly 
constitute our experiences, yet while still accepting the Common Kind Claim. 
 The sense-datum theorist endorses a presentationalist view of visual experience 
(cf. chapter ). For on their view, every visual experience consists in the presentation 
of something to the subject; the phenomenal character of each experience is then in-
herited from or determined by the qualitative nature of whatever is thereby made 
visually present. In contrast, adverbialists and intentionalists deny that we should 
think of visual experience presentationally. That is, these theorists deny that our ex-
periences consist in the presentation of objects of awareness to their subjects.  
 According to adverbialists, our experiences are subjective modifications of con-
sciousness. To have a visual experience, on this view, is to instantiate some monadic 
property, whereby instantiating this property is a matter of experiencing in a certain 
manner. For example, to have a visual experience as of a red item is to experience-
redly. Just as one dances a waltz not by standing in the dancing relation to an item 
called a waltz, but rather by means of dancing in a certain manner, i.e. the manner 
called waltzing, just so, for adverbialists, one has a visual experience as of a red item 
not by standing in some awareness relation to a red item, but rather by experiencing 
                                                   
 13 Such views are sometimes called common factor theories or common kind views.  
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in a certain manner, namely, in the manner called experiencing-redly. In short, as 
Ducasse (: —) puts it, when articulating his version of the adverbialist 
view, ‘to sense blue is to sense bluely, just as to dance the waltz is to dance waltzily 
(i.e. in the manner called to waltz) and to leap is to jump leapily…etc.’.14 
 In short then, just as dancing a waltz would seem to involve the instantiation of 
some monadic property, viz. that of dancing in manner D, rather than standing in a 
relation to an item w that has the property of being a waltz, so too, having an expe-
rience as of a red item involves instantiating a monadic property, viz. that of experi-
encing in manner M, rather than standing in some relation of awareness to some red 
item or other, such as a red sense-datum, or even an ordinary red thing. This, at 
least, is the key claim that lies at the heart of the adverbialist view of experience. 
 Like the sense-datum theory, adverbialism has also fallen out of favour amongst 
contemporary philosophers. Thus, many contemporary philosophers tend to reject 
both the sense-datum theory and adverbialism. Moreover, in place of these theories, 
they tend to endorse one or another form of intentionalism instead. Broadly speak-
ing, what intentionalists maintain is that each visual experience is a sui generis kind 
of propositional attitude. That is, the idea is that to have a visual experience is to 
represent the world as being a certain way, by means of standing in a certain inten-
tional (/representational) relation to a proposition. In short, as Logue (: ) 
explains, what intentionalists believe is that having a visual experience is essentially a 
matter of ‘representing [the] environment as being a certain way’.15 
 To bring the intentionalist view more clearly into focus, consider what might be 
called the ‘standard philosophical picture of belief’. According to this view, beliefs 
are propositional attitudes, which consist in the subject standing in the belief rela-
tion to a proposition (Crane: ). The idea is that in standing in the belief rela-
tion to a proposition, one thereby enters into a representational state of a distinctive 
kind, one that says of the world that it’s the way this proposition says that it is. The 
reason it is useful to consider this view is that for intentionalists, visual experiences 
                                                   
 14 Following Ducasse (), who is concerned with avoiding the kind of presentational or act-
object model of experience in set out in Moore (), various other versions of adverbialism have 
been developed by Chisholm (); Sellars (); Pendlebury (); and Tye (). Arguably, a 
kind of proto-adverbialism can be found in the work of Thomas Reid (Martin : , fn. ). 
 15 This view comes in various flavours and various subtle distinctions can be made. Cf. Chalmers 
(); Crane (); Pautz (). Here I am just setting out the main contours of the theory.  
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have a similar structure. For they are also a kind of propositional attitude, i.e. men-
tal events or states that one enters into is by standing in some relation to a proposi-
tion. In this case, however, the relevant relation is distinct from belief. Moreover, it 
is a relation for which ordinary language has no name, and which has to be under-
stood as a theoretical posit (cf. ..).16 Following Johnston (), we might refer 
to this relation as ‘visually entertaining’. Having a visual experience would then be a 
matter, on the intentionalist theory, of visually entertaining a certain proposition. 
Intentionalists would thus be claiming that by virtue of standing in this relation to a 
proposition, the subject thereby enters into a distinctive sort of representational 
state, which ‘says’ of the world that it is a certain way, i.e. the way that the relevant 
proposition says that it is. So, according to intentionalism, just as one can believe a 
proposition and thereby enter into one kind of representational mental state, in the 
same way, one can visually entertain a proposition and thereby enter into a diﬀerent 
kind of representational mental state, one that is belief-like without being belief. 
This would be a state of visually entertaining a proposition. The view, in short, is that 
visually entertaining a proposition is what it is to have a visual experience.17 
 The three main conjunctivist theories of visual experience, therefore, are the 
sense-datum view, adverbialism, and intentionalism. What these views have in 
common is their commitment to the Common Kind Claim: that is, to the idea that 
all visual experiences have precisely the same mental nature, whatever that may be. 
 It is worth noting that since these views all endorse the Common Kind Claim, 
they face a challenge as to how, and in what sense, external entities get to be objects 
of perception. For naïve realists, to be an object of perception is to be what C. D. 
Broad (: ﬀ) would call an ‘objective-constituent’ of the relevant perceptual 
experience. (In general, x is an objective-constituent an experience e just in case e is 
a complex, relational event consisting in the presentation of x to the relevant subject 
y.) According to conjunctivist theories, however, external things are never objective-
constituents of our experiences. (For sense-datum theorists, it is the sense-data we 
                                                   
16 This is explicit in the works of many intentionalists. See, for example, Byrne (, ); 
Millikan (); Pautz (, , ); and Searle (). 
 17 The visually entertaining relation is generally taken to be non-factive, so as to allow for cases of 
misrepresentation in experience. However, for an intentionalist view where the relevant intentional 
relation (or ‘mode’ or ‘attitude’) is factive see McDowell (). (Since McDowell views the inten-
tional relation that is involved in good cases as factive, he is a non-standard intentionalist who rejects 
the Common Kind Claim. In this thesis, I set aside this non-standard intentionalist view.)  
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sense that play this role. For adverbialists and intentionalists, our experiences lack 
the kind of structure necessary to have objective-constituents at all.) Thus, one 
might well wonder what it takes, besides simply having a visual experience, for that 
experience to be perceptual, or to be a perception of some particular external thing. 
Having the experience cannot itself be suﬃcient, since one could have this same  
experience even in hallucination. Thus, all conjunctivists face the question as to 
what makes a given visual experience a perception rather than an hallucination. 
  The standard answer here invlves claiming that causation plays a central role. 
For, what many conjunctivists claim is that what it is for O to be an object of per-
ception relative to some experience e just is for O to cause e in the appropriate way.18 
Now in fact, I am sceptical that any merely extrinsic connection between O and e 
will be suﬃcient to make some O an object of perception relative to e (though I 
agree that such a connection may be necessary, cf. chapter ). Hence, I believe the 
question that we have just raised poses a deep problem for conjunctivist theories of 
experience. That being said, I will not press this issue here. (However for relevant 
critical discussion see Alston : ﬀ and Johnston : , : ﬀ). 
 
.. Against Quietism 
 
With the above in mind, we can now turn to what seems to me the main argument 
against disjunctive quietism. This turns on the fact that prima facie, conjunctive 
theories of experience would seem to be considerably more explanatory than naïve 
realism. They explain more than naïve realism explains, since they concern all visual 
experiences, whereas naïve realism only concerns a certain sub-class of such experi-
ences, namely, those experiences that are involved in genuine perception.  
 Now I do not say that this constitutes an argument for accepting a conjunctivist 
theory over naïve realism; not given the evident possibility of building a general dis-
junctivist theory of visual experience, such as the one that this dissertation develops. 
What I do claim, however, is that since conjunctivism at first appears considerably 
more explanatory than naïve realism—conjunctivists can explain more due to not 
limiting their focus only to perceptual experience—naïve realists, it seems, must in-
                                                   
 18 Another view is that a diﬀerent kind of extrinsic connection will do—say counter-factual de-
pendence in place of causation—connecting O to e. See Lewis (), cf. Johnston (: n. ). 
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tegrate their theory into a total view of visual experience as such. In short, if naïve 
realists want to compete with conjunctivists, then they must say something about 
the nature of illusory and of hallucinatory experience. This is, I think, the central 
argument against resting easy with disjunctive quietism, and for wanting to inte-
grate naïve realism into a general disjunctivist theory of visual experience as such. 
 Of course, since the naïve realist rejects the Common Kind Claim, she is not 
obliged to say that exactly the same thing is true about veridical perception, illusory 
perception, and hallucination. The point is rather that if naïve realists are to avoid 
ending up at a significant dialectical disadvantage as compared to rival conjunctivist 
positions, they must engage with cases of illusion and hallucination.  
 We can emphasise the point by focusing explicitly on the contrast between in-
tentionalism and naïve realism. For in the current literature, it is widely accepted 
that these are the two main theories between which we must choose (cf. Crane 
). The present point is that in light of this, the fact that intentionalists oﬀer a 
general theory of visual experience, whilst naïve realists do not, cannot aﬀord to be 
ignored. For, evidently, this point counts in favour of the intentionalist theory and 
against naïve realism. The upshot is that if naïve realists remain ‘disjunctive quiet-
ists’, then the playing field is uneven at the outset. Moreover, the only way to level 
the playing field would be for naïve realists to oﬀer a general disjunctivist theory of 
visual experience as such, and thus to abandon disjunctive quietism.  
 It is the aim of this dissertation to oﬀer a naïve realist, disjunctivist theory of 
visual experience of the kind that is required. In this way, the playing field between 
naïve realists and intentionalists, and indeed, more generally, between naïve realists 
and all other conjunctivists, will be levelled out. In fact, whilst I do not argue for 
this claim in this dissertation, I think the disjunctivist theory developed here is pref-
erable to the other conjunctivist theories currently on oﬀer. For it is just as explana-
tory as these other theories, yet it also embeds naïve realism as a component, and 
hence fully respects our naïve conception of what perceptual experience is like. 
 In summary, then, naïve realists ought not to be—they cannot aﬀord to be—
disjunctive quietists. That is, they cannot simply put forward a view about veridical 
perception, which can perhaps then be extended to illusory perception, and leave 
things there. Rather, a total theory of visual experience, including hallucinatory ex-
  
perience, is required. For without such a total theory, naïve realists are left at a sig-
nificant dialectical disadvantage as compared to conjunctivist views.  
 This is, I take it, the key idea at the heart of the following passage from Dancy: 
 
The disjunctive account of perception really says there are two quite diﬀerent sorts of 
oasis-experience…The first is the genuine article, and the second, though it is indistin-
guishable, has nothing in common with the first other than the fact that they are both 
oasis-experiences. In the standard formulation of the account, misleadingly, this is  
explicitly the way in which the second disjunct is characterized: we characterize it sole-
ly by saying that it is like what it is not. Presumably, however, there may be available a 
more direct characterization of the second disjunct, and in a totally explicit version of 
the theory it would indeed be characterized in that better way. The current characteri-
zation is just a sort of place-holder, showing what has to be said about the relation be-
tween first and second disjunct. (: ; cf. Sturgeon , ).  
 
The central point here is this. Ultimately, the disjunctivist is only oﬀering a view 
about perceptual experiences. About hallucinatory experiences, the disjunctivist 
makes only the negative claim that these are not the same in nature as perceptual 
ones. Yet, there would seem to be a clear need to say something positive about the 
hallucinatory cases as well. For if one does not say something more, then one lacks a 
total theory of visual experience as such. However, this is precisely what I have been 
urging against here. If we are to be naïve realists, we must avoid quietism and devel-
op a general account of experience as such.19 
 There is reason, therefore, to think that naïve realists must provide a total theory 
of experience, i.e. to put forward a general theory of visual experience as such. 
Accordingly, the question arises as to what kind of theory naïve realists should 
adopt. This dissertation will defend a specific answer to that question. To bring the 
view into focus, we must engage once more with the Simple Argument. 
 
 
 
                                                   
 19 Martin (: —) represents himself as disagreeing with Dancy here. However, Martin 
then goes on to develop a substantive disjunctivist theory: Evidential Disjunctivism (Martin ). 
Accordingly, it is in fact unclear to me whether there is really any substantive disagreement here. 
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. Austinian Disjunctivism  
 
Recall the Simple Argument from Hallucination, which turns on two main premises, 
namely, the: 
 
Sense-Datum Claim 
 If a visual experience is hallucinatory, then it consists exhaustively in the visual  
 presentation to the subject of some mind-dependent sense-datum.  
 
And the, 
 
Common Kind Claim 
 Every visual experience has exactly the same metaphysical nature, (regardless of  
 whether it is involved in veridical perception, illusion, or hallucination). 
 
We know by now what naïve realists will say in response to this argument: they will  
reject the Common Kind Claim, since they are disjunctivists who think that not all 
experiences have the same mental nature. Specifically, they will insist that perceptual 
experiences and hallucinatory ones have diﬀerent natures, since while perceptual 
experiences consist in the presentation of external objects, hallucinatory ones do 
not. This response, however, leaves us facing a question regarding what to say about 
the Sense-Datum Claim. As it happens, many naïve realists, at least in the contem-
porary literature, reject this claim as well as the Common Kind Claim. However, we 
should keep in mind that accepting the Sense-Datum Claim is at least an option for 
naïve realists; it represents a coherent possibility. After all, rejecting the Common 
Kind Claim is suﬃcient for rejecting the Simple Argument, and so naïve realists 
would seem to be free to accept the Sense-Datum Claim.  
 This point was first brought out by J. L. Austin () in his posthumous Sense 
and Sensibilia, (comprised of lecture notes first given in Oxford in ). In reply to 
(what is essentially) the Simple Argument, Austin says the following:  
 
  
[E]ven if we were to make the prior admission…that in ‘abnormal’ cases we perceive 
sense-data, we should not be obliged to extend this admission to the normal cases 
too…(: )  
 
Similar claims were later made Hirst () and Pitcher (). According to Hirst, 
we can ‘escape’ the Simple Argument by claiming that ‘the objects of consciousness 
in hallucination diﬀer from those in perception’ (: ). Similarly, Pitcher ar-
gues that we can avoid the Simple Argument by saying that even if we are presented 
with sense-data in hallucination, still ‘sense-data are not involved in normal percep-
tion’ (: ). Like Austin, however, neither Hirst nor Pitcher claim that we 
should accept premise () whilst rejecting premise () of the Simple Argument, i.e. 
that we should deny the Common Kind Claim but accept the Sense-Datum Claim. 
Rather, the idea here seems to be this: if we were forced to admit that in hallucina-
tion we are presented with sense-data, we could still say that in perceptual experience 
we are presented with ordinary external items.20 Ultimately, therefore, it is not 
claimed by these philosophers that we should actually accept that in cases of hallu-
cination we are presented with mind-dependent sense-data. 
 It is my view, however, that as naïve realists we can and should go further here. 
That is, I believe that whilst we should reject the Common Kind Claim, we ought 
to accept the Sense-Datum Claim.21 The then results in a theory known as ‘Austini-
an Disjunctivism’ (see Byrne & Logue ). The name is apposite, for Austin is, in 
a perfectly genuine sense, the originator of the main idea that drives the view. 
 The rest of this section brings the Austinian Disjunctivist view more clearly into 
focus, beginning by distinguishing between two forms of disjunctivism, the latter of 
which tends to be rejected, if not sidelined entirely, by naïve realists in the current 
literature (..). I then argue that Austinian Disjunctivism has been unduly ne-
glected in the recent literature (..), before setting out some initial reasons why 
                                                   
 20 Austin is quite clear that while we could avoid the Simple Argument even while granting the 
Sense-Datum Claim, this would involve a concession we have ‘no good reason to make’ (: ). 
(Cf. Martin : , who writes that since naïve realism is a view ‘about genuine perception’,  
naïve realists could insist that ‘when hallucinating…we are aware of some mind-dependent entity’. 
Martin is then quite clear that in his view, naïve realists should not accept this kind of position.) 
 21 Johnston (: ) says that ‘we need not insist, in the teeth of the phenomenology, that 
hallucination acquaints us with nothing’. I agree. In particular, I deny that naïve realists must insist 
that hallucinations present us with nothing, rather than being just as relational as perceptual ones. 
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naïve realists might in fact want to endorse this view (..). The final sub-section 
closes with a sketch of what is to come in the rest of the dissertation (..). 
 
.. Two Disjunctivisms 
 
One way to bring the Austinian Disjunctivist view into focus is to notice that there 
are in fact two diﬀerent kinds of disjunctivist theory that one might adopt, which 
we might refer to as object-level and structural-level disjunctivism respectively. To 
bring out the distinction, consider first structural-level disjunctivism. According to 
this view, perceptual experiences and hallucinatory experiences are radically diﬀer-
ent. For while perceptual experiences are presentational in nature—that is to say, 
they consist in the presentation of qualitative items (in this case external objects) 
manifesting qualitative features, and thence derive their phenomenal characters 
therefrom—hallucinatory experiences have a diﬀerent structure entirely. For such 
experiences are non-presentational in nature: that is to say, they do not consist in 
the presentation of any object. To help fix ideas, note that one popular version of 
structural-level disjunctivism is the ‘Evidential Disjunctivism’ that Mike Martin 
(, , ) defends. This combines naïve realism about perception with the 
so-called ‘epistemic view of hallucination’, according to which hallucinatory experi-
ences are nothing more than certain negative epistemic states, which do not, there-
fore, consist in the presentation of any object to the hallucinating subject.22 
 What the object-level disjunctivist maintains, essentially, is that our perceptual 
and hallucinatory experiences have the same presentational structure, despite also 
diﬀering in nature. Since they share a presentational structure, the diﬀerence, on 
this view, between perceptual experiences and hallucinatory ones consists in the 
kind of object that is presented. Specifically, object-level disjunctivists will say that 
while perceptual experiences present ordinary external things, hallucinatory experi-
ences instead present items of some other kind. Accordingly, commitment to ob-
ject-level disjunctivism does not all by itself specify what kind of object hallucinato-
                                                   
 22 Martin refers to this view as Evidential Disjunctivism in Martin (). Other proponents of 
this view include Brewer (); Campbell (); Nudds (); and Soteriou (). For critical 
discussion of this view see chapter  below as well as my (b) and my (manuscript-a). 
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ry experiences present. However, such items will definitely not be ordinary external 
things from the environs of the subject. They will have to be items of another sort.23 
 Now the former view, structural-level disjunctivism, appears to me the be the 
more radical theory, since it entails that perceptual experiences and hallucinatory 
ones are very diﬀerent in nature, rather than just diﬀering in their objects. And yet, 
structural-level disjunctivism is also the most widely held form of disjunctivism in 
the literature. This may explain why the distinction is rarely mentioned or discussed. 
Talk of ‘disjunctivism’ is usually just talk of ‘structural-level disjunctivism’ That be-
ing said, there is room to for naïve realists to hold an object-level disjunctivist. view. 
Indeed, Austinian Disjunctivism is precisely such a view. For on that view, in per-
ceptual cases we are simply presented with ordinary external things. Whereas in hal-
lucinatory experience we are presented with mind-dependent sense-data. Thus, the 
experiences are diﬀerent in nature, due to the fact that they present diﬀerent kinds 
of object, rather than diﬀering in terms of their experiential structure.  
 
.. Undue Neglect? 
 
Like Austinian Disjunctivism, object-level disjunctivism is rarely discussed in the 
current literature (but see Fish : — and Sturgeon : —).24 In-
terestingly, however, the sense-datum philosophers of the early twentieth century 
seem to have taken view seriously when discussing naïve realism and arguing against 
it. For example, in Ayer (: —, : —); Broad (: —); and 
Price (: ﬀ), one finds discussions of, and various objections raised against,  
object-level disjunctivism, whereby this view is construed as the only view that naïve 
                                                   
 23 Note that object-level disjunctivism is a genuine form of disjunctivism. For a diﬀerence in the 
ontological nature of the item presented should suﬃce for a diﬀerence in the nature of the experi-
ence, at least given that the experience is a relational complex consisting in the presentation of an 
object to a subject. Cf. Johnston (: ), who notes that (given a presentationalist framework) 
‘act[s] of awareness are plausibly individuated by the types of object that they present to the subject’. 
 24 One might think that McDowell (: ) holds something like an object-level disjunc-
tivism (cf. Thau ). For in his view, we should maintain that while ‘[t]he object in a deceptive 
[hallucinatory] case is a mere appearance…we are not to accept that in the non-deceptive cases too 
the object of experience is a mere appearance, and hence something that falls short of the fact itself’. 
Indeed, if ‘mere appearances’ here are taken to be ‘sense-data’ in the sense of mental objects of 
awareness, then McDowell seems like an Austinian Disjunctivist. However, McDowell is ultimately 
an intentionalist, who denies that experience is presentational. Thus, his claim that the object of hal-
lucination is a ‘mere appearance’ is not to be read as entailing a sense-datum view of these cases. 
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realists can adopt in order to block various arguments from hallucination and/or 
illusion. Relatedly, G. E. Moore wrestled for much of his philosophical career with 
the question as to whether the data of sense that are presented to him in non-
delusory cases are external objects or not, meaning that he took object-level disjunc-
tivism entirely seriously. Thus, as Snowdon explains, when Moore is talking about 
sense-data, he is not talking about one single kind of thing. Rather, for Moore, 
 
…in supposing that an item qualifies as a sense-datum, nothing more is being sup-
posed about it other than that it is available for unmediated thought in virtue of [be-
ing experienced by the] subject. There is no commitment as to its nature or existence 
conditions. Indeed, it would not even be legitimate to assume in advance that all 
sense-data have the same nature, or existence conditions. (: ) 
 
In this thesis, I will take the coherence of object-level disjunctivism for granted. 
Given this background assumption, I then develop the central claim that this disser-
tation defends, namely, that naïve realists both can and should accept the specific 
form of object-level disjunctivist theory know as Austinian Disjunctivism.25 
 Before sketching what is to come in the rest of the thesis, I want to present an 
initial argument for the Sense-Datum Claim. Again, it has been commonplace to 
reject this claim, but naïve realists do not have to, and I believe that they should 
not. The point of discussing the Sense-Datum Claim derives from the fact that Aus-
tinian Disjunctivism is essentially the combination of naïve realism with that claim. 
For this means that in beginning to motivate the Sense-Datum Claim, we begin to 
motivate the idea that naïve realists should accept the Austinian Disjunctivist view. 
 
.. An Initial Argument 
 
In the recent perception literature, it has become commonplace to reject premises 
such as the Sense-Datum Claim, holding that hallucinations do not present any-
thing to the subject, despite in some sense appearing to do so. This now widely-held 
attitude is nicely summarised by Bernecker () in the following passage: 
                                                   
 25 It would, in fact, be more accurate to say that I defend in this thesis the idea that naïve realists 
both can and should defend a specific form of Austinian Disjunctivism; namely the package of views 
about visual experience (veridical, illusory, and hallucinatory) that this thesis defends (cf. . below). 
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[T]here is no reason to suppose that in cases of hallucination, there must be some ob-
ject present that actually has the experienced qualities. Why couldn’t the victim of hal-
lucination simply be in a state of seeming to experience such and such an object with-
out the object actually being there? (: ) 
 
That said, it was not always so. Indeed, before the rise of reductive materialism in 
the second half of the twentieth century it was widely taken for granted that any 
plausible ontology must make room for so-called ‘wild’ sense-data—that is, those 
objects of hallucination, whatever they may be, that are given in hallucinatory cas-
es.26 The following passage from H. H. Price () sums up this kind of attitude: 
 
Odd, abnormal and illusory sense-data…certainly do exist. And a theory which fails to 
find a place for them…is perfectly worthless. Even the ‘wild’ ones have their corner, in 
the real universe, humble though it may be. (: ) 
  
A similar idea is echoed by Bertrand Russell (: ), who tells us that 
‘[p]hantoms and hallucinations [are] on exactly the same level as ordinary sense  
data’, since ‘they have the most complete and absolute and perfect reality that any-
thing can have’. In short, it was once widely accepted that the objects of awareness, 
even in hallucination, are perfectly real. The challenge then was to explain how these 
items fit into external reality and more generally into a respectable ontology as such.  
 Now Bernecker is in fact right, as against Price (: ), that we do not have 
to accept that something is presented to us in hallucinatory experience, i.e., it is co-
herent to maintain otherwise. However, it does not follow that ‘there is no reason to 
suppose that in cases of hallucination, there must be some object present that actu-
ally has the experienced qualities’. Quite the contrary: I believe we should take issue 
                                                   
 26 Here, as in the Price and Russell quotes below, the term ‘sense-datum’ is being used in a neu-
tral sense, so that sense-data are merely whatsoever is given to the mind in a given case of experience. 
Again, the neutral use of the term ‘sense-datum’ traces back to Moore (). See also H. H. Price 
(: —), and for discussion, see Martin (); Snowdon (, ). As for the term 
‘wild’ sense-datum, this is attributed by Price () to Broad, but it is in fact due to Russell (). 
It is meant to stand for sense-data that are distinct from material things or proper parts thereof. 
(Note also that in this thesis, when talking about sense-data and the sense-datum theory, I usually 
have in mind the contemporary sense of term, so that sense-data are viewed as mental entities.) 
  
with that claim. This thesis will oﬀer various reasons to think this. But here I wish 
to oﬀer just one initial reason, based on broadly phenomenological considerations. 
 What I want to say, or perhaps better, simply just remind the reader of, is that it 
just seems deeply intuitive to think that in hallucination something is given to the 
mind. As Dicker writes: 
 
From a purely phenomenological point of view, a hallucination isn’t an experience of 
nothing at all. Rather, in a hallucination there is manifestly something present to con-
sciousness. (: ) 
 
The thought is a plausible one, but I believe that in contemporary philosophy it gets 
swept aside all too swiftly. As I said above, one can coherently avoid saying that hal-
lucinations present anything at all. But as I also said, it does not follow that this is 
necessarily the best view of matters to take. Indeed, I would argue that, to the con-
trary, the best view of matters is that hallucinatory experiences have genuine objects. 
This then suggests an argument for accepting the Sense-Datum Claim: 
 
 () There is something present to the mind in hallucination. 
 () If something is present to the mind in hallucination, then what is presented  
  is a mind-dependent sense-datum.  
  Hallucinatory experiences consist in the presentation of mind-dependent  
  sense-data. 
 
Or, in other words, the Sense-Datum Claim is true. 
 Below, I mainly focus on (); my justification for () will come in chapter . 
However, I do explain below that it is natural to accept () once () is granted.  
 I believe, in line with premise (), that there is something present to the mind in 
hallucination. Of course, we do not want to say that whenever one hallucinates an 
F, there is an actual F of which one is aware, where potential values of ‘F’ are unre-
stricted. If I hallucinate some elephants, for example, we do not want to say that 
there are some actual elephants of which I am aware. It does not follow, however, 
that nothing is present to the mind in such cases. Rather, the most natural thing to 
do in this kind of case is to ‘existentially retreat’. If you falsely believe that you are 
  
perceiving some elephants when you are really hallucinating, then you might mis-
takenly judge that your experience consists in the presentation of elephants. (For 
again, initial reflection on experience suggests that naïve realism is true: that our 
perceptual experiences consist in the presentation of external objects.) Upon learn-
ing that you are in fact hallucinating, however, you would deny that your experi-
ence consists in the presentation of elephants, and hence you would retract your ini-
tial claim about the nature of your experience. Despite this, however, it would still 
be plausible to think that your experience presents something or other to the 
mind—e.g. an item that has at least a certain colour and shape. As Pautz explains:  
 
If I knowingly had a vivid hallucination of elephants, I would of course deny that I am 
aware of elephants. But I would, I think, find it undeniable that there are certain 
shades of grey of which I am aware. In short, I would find it undeniable that there are 
some items, in a broad sense of ‘items’, of which I am aware. (: ) 
 
When knowingly hallucinating elephants, I would not want to say that I am aware 
of elephants. But it would still be very tempting to say that I am aware of some-
thing. More generally, whenever one is undergoing an hallucinatory experience, it 
would seem natural to think that this experience involves the presentation of some 
object or other, which shares the same basic visual qualities as the apparent objects 
of hallucination (e.g. some elephants, a tomato) would seem to have.27  
 One way to see the force of the above is to reflect on an actual hallucinatory ex-
perience. Of course, one cannot easily induce in oneself a full-blown hallucination. 
However, one can easily induce in oneself an after-image. Now even on a non-
presentationalist theory of experience, there will appear to be something present to 
you when after-imaging. Yet in reality the experience will not consist in the presen-
tation of anything to the mind. Something might seem to be present to the mind, 
but here the appearances will mislead as to its real nature. The present point is that 
this claim seems to be at odds with the phenomenology. Consider for instance Fig. 
                                                   
 27 In eﬀect, I am relying here on the idea that introspective reflection on hallucination can be a 
reliable guide to its nature. Soteriou () takes issue with that, but I believe the more natural view 
is that while hallucination can mislead us as to the nature of its objects, it does not mislead us as to 
its structure. Nor can we validly infer that since hallucination can mislead us as to the kind of objects 
it presents it follows that it cannot reliably inform us that it presents any objects at all. 
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. below. If you stare at the black dot in the red box for thirty seconds, and then 
look at the white box to the right, you will experience a certain after-image. In par-
ticular, you will (seem to) see a rectangular, cyan-blue patch, perhaps slowly moving 
across the page. Since there is something that you ‘see’ here, your experience is not, 
to echo Dicker, ‘an experience of nothing’. Rather, there is ‘something manifestly 
present to consciousness’ when one has this experience. Introspective reflection on 
one’s experience therefore suggests that something is present to the mind here, viz., 
 
 
      Fig.  (from Phillips ) 
 
something that is rectangular and cyan-blue—despite the experience in this case be-
ing non-perceptual. In turn, this supports the contention that even non-perceptual 
experience is presentational. Yet this conflicts with non-presentationalist views of 
experience, which imply that hallucinatory experiences do not present any objects. 
 In addition to this fairly general point, we can also make some additional, more 
specific claims about hallucinatory experience, which further the case for thinking 
that hallucinatory experiences are presentational in structure. Indeed, if hallucinato-
ry experiences were not presentational, and so failed to have any object, it would be 
hard to see how these features of hallucination could be explained. 
 
 REFERENCE AND THOUGHT 
One seems able to demonstratively pick out the object of hallucination—that 
is, the particular item that is presented to one in hallucinatory experience. 
When I have an after-image as of the cyan-blue rectangle, I can apparently 
give it a name, and think and speak about it; in this way, my hallucinatory 
experience provides for me a new topic for thought and talk. However, it 
seems quite hard to see how this could be the case, i.e. how I could refer to an 
  
object in hallucination and thereby end up with a new item to think and 
speak about—if there were no object actually presented to me, and so if hallu-
cination were non-presentational. In short, it seems to me as if I can single 
out the object of my hallucinatory experience. Yet, surely the simplest way to 
account for this is to say that in such cases there really is some object present-
ed to me. Indeed, this is arguably the only way to account for this.28 
 
  MENTAL RELATIONS 
It also seems possible to stand in various mental relations to the object of hal-
lucination. One can, for example, attend to the object of an hallucination or 
an after-image, and one can scrutinise its features. One can concentrate on the 
seemingly presented item, wonder about it, and compare it to other objects—
perhaps to other things in the presented scene, or to items that one has seen 
on other occasions. Once more, however, it appears diﬃcult to see how any of 
this could be possible were there nothing actually presented in hallucination. 
As Smith (: ) rhetorically asks: ‘A hallucinating subject may…be 
mentally focusing on one element in a hallucinated scene, and then another, 
describing in minute detail what he is aware of….[H]ow can this be [if there 
is no] object of awareness?’29 
 
 SENSORY INFORMATION 
In a case of hallucination, one apparently gains information about an object 
of experience. Indeed, one learns about the features of the presented object in 
just the same way as one can learn about the features of presented external 
things in cases of genuine perception. (E.g. in the case of having the after-
image that I can induce in myself via Fig. , I can learn that the object is cy-
an-blue, and rectangular in shape.) As Koons & Pickavance () explain:  
                                                   
 28 One might be tempted to follow Evans () in arguing that in cases of hallucination, one 
only seems to be achieving reference to an object. However, even if there are genuine cases in which 
one seems to be referring but in fact is not, it seems implausible to view hallucinations in this way. As 
Koons & Pickavance (: ) point out, ‘…hallucinatory experience isn’t anything like unwit-
tingly using a name that happens to lack a denotation’ (cf. Smith : ). 
 29 Cf. Snowdon (: ), who notes that even if we cannot refer to the apparent object in 
these cases, ‘there are certain psychological attitudes we can have towards [them]’; for instance, ‘[w]e 
can be interested by, concentrate on, be distracted by, scrutinise and attempt to describe them’. 
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[T]here seems to be something before us when we hallucinate…This thing that 
presents itself to us in hallucination can persist, move, and undergo chang-
es…When Macbeth hallucinates the knife, there is something that is the object 
of his sensory awareness, something apparently knife-shaped and blood-
red…(: ) 
 
The crucial point is that it’s diﬃcult to see how one could gain information 
about something in hallucination in this manner if one denies that hallucina-
tory experience presents a genuine object. So once again, the presentational 
analysis provides the simplest explanation of the facts. We have to view hallu-
cination as presentational in order to explain how in hallucination we can 
gain sensory information about the experienced object. (How could the object 
be merely apparent if one can acquire information about it in this way?) 
 
Thus, there are at least three further, more specific features of hallucination, which 
we can learn about by means of introspection, that further encourage the thought 
that hallucinatory experience is presentational; that it presents something to the 
mind. These are: . that we can refer to and think about the object given in halluci-
nation; . that we can stand in certain mental relations to that object, including 
those of attention and concentration; and . that we can gain sensory information 
about the object of hallucination. The question is how any of this could be so were 
there no object actually present in hallucinatory experience. Certainly, the supposi-
tion that there is a presented object in such cases makes it much easier to explain 
these facts about hallucination. So there is a strong initial case for thinking of hallu-
cinatory experience presentationally, contrary to what many recent philosophers of 
perception have claimed. Of course, this does not yet show that what is presented is 
a sense-datum, conceived as a mental object, as per the Sense-Datum Claim. Yet it 
is reasonable to think that this inference is plausible, if not quite logically valid). (I 
will say more about this, if not in the detail that I would like, in chapter  below.) 
Thus, there is some prima facia force to the argument set out above, which moves 
from () and () to the result that we are presented in hallucination with sense-data. 
  
 There is a final point to make here. Recall now the initial argument for naïve 
realism in chapter . The reason to take this view as our starting point is that we 
want to avoid an error-theory of experience. But it would seem that if we do not 
embrace a presentationalist conception of the bad cases as well, we fall into error-
theory once again. Now one might think that this is inevitable, and hence that the 
naïve realist does best overall by at least respecting good-case if not bad-case phe-
nomenology. This seems to be Martin’s idea when writing that ultimately, ‘there is 
no way of taking introspection of our experience at face value’ (: ). Howev-
er, I believe even as naïve realists, we can respect a good deal about the phenome-
nology of hallucination. For, by being object-level disjunctivists, naïve realists can 
accept that there is something present to the mind in hallucinatory experience. 
Thus, while naïve realists have to grant that hallucinations sometimes mislead us as 
to the real nature of their objects, they need not say that hallucinations mislead us as 
to their fundamental structure. On the contrary, it can be granted that hallucinatory 
experiences, just as much as perceptual ones, have a presentational structure, just as 
introspective reflection on hallucinatory experience would seem to show.30 
 In short, then, there is an initial reason, broadly phenomenological, to think 
that something is presented to the mind in cases of hallucination. And it is natural 
to think that if something is given to the mind in hallucination, it must be a mental 
item, something created by the mind of the subject. (After all, mere brain stimula-
tion of the sort that could induce hallucination has to be suﬃcient for the existence 
of that item; along with Martin , I think this provides further reason for think-
ing that if anything is presented in hallucination, it is a mind-dependent thing.) 
Thus, we have some initial reason for wanting to accept the Sense-Datum claim. In 
turn, this then provides some initial motivation for being Austinian Disjunctivists. 
 
 
                                                   
 30 Note that this line of thought also undermines an important line of objection from Knight 
(). For, in his view, naïve realists who deny that we are aware of anything in hallucination are 
subject to a kind of ‘methodological inconsistency’, since ‘[t]he very [appeal to] phenomenology that 
supports the naïve realist view of the “good” disjunct undercuts the same theories of the “bad” one’ 
(Knight : ). I am sympathetic to this objection. However, it has no force against object-level 
disjunctivist views that respect premise (), such as the Austinian Disjunctivist theory I defend. 
  
.. An Outline of What Follows 
 
The plan for the rest of the thesis is as follows. The next chapter argues in favour of a 
presentationalist conception of experience in general (chapter ). The following 
chapter then develops a naïve realist view of illusion that is compatible with presen-
tationalism, and in particular with the associated Phenomenal Principle, which in 
my view has been unfairly maligned over the years (chapter ). In the fourth chapter 
I deal with the so-called ‘screening oﬀ problem’ that all naïve realists face, and 
which, moreover, arguably constitutes the central reason that contemporary naïve 
realists have felt it impossible to endorse any ‘positive’ form of disjunctivism such as 
Austinian Disjunctivism (chapter ). The final chapter of the dissertation then 
sketches out and defends a sense-datum theory of hallucinatory experience. Com-
bining this view with naïve realism then leaves us with Austinian Disjunctivism. 
 Two final things should be noted. First, that the title of this thesis is telling. The 
principal aim is to defend Austinian Disjunctivism, not motivate it from the ground 
up. I will argue, and have to some extent already argued, that something must be 
present in hallucinatory experience. But I eﬀectively assume, along with philosophi-
cal tradition, that this item would have to be a mind-dependent sense-datum; alt-
hough some brief reasons for this assumption are given (cf. chapter ). 
 It should also be, that this is a project in systematic metaphysics. Whilst argu-
ments are indeed often oﬀered for my central claims throughout the dissertation, 
the principal aim of this thesis is to sketch what is in my view a wrongly  
neglected theory of visual experience. Given the nature of the project many of the 
details of the theory will have to be filled in elsewhere and on another occasion. 
Much emphasis will be placed on its explanatory power, on the work that it can do.  
  
Chapter  
Presentationalism Defended 
 
 
When I see a tomato there is much that I can doubt…One 
thing however I cannot doubt: that there exists a red patch of a 
round and somewhat bulgy shape, standing out from other  
colour-patches, a having a certain visual depth, and that this 
whole field of colour is directly present to my consciousness. 
 
                       —  Price, H. H. (: ) 
 
 
Traditional sense-datum theories of experience are committed to two main ideas. 
The first is that every experience consists in the presentation to the subject of some 
object of sense, i.e. something manifesting at least certain basic visual qualities. The 
second is that every experience inherits its distinctive phenomenal character from 
the qualitative nature of the items it presents. As Martin explains: 
 
Sense-datum theorists claim that when someone senses, he or she is ‘given’ a sense-
datum in their experience…So if it now looks to me as if there is a brown expanse  
before me as I stare at the table, then an actual brown expanse must exist and be 
sensed by me. This is so even if we consider a case in which I am misperceiving a white 
object as brown, or even suﬀering an hallucination or delusion of the presence of 
brown tables when none are in the vicinity. (: —) 
 
In this passage, the term ‘sense-datum’ again functions as a ‘neutral term’, standing 
for whatsoever is presented to the mind (cf. ., fn. ). The key idea is that when-
ever one has an experience, there is an item that one apprehends, or that is present-
ed or given to one. The qualitative nature of that item then determines the phenom-
enal character of the experience that one enjoys (cf. Martin : ). 
 Let us say that the above passage expresses a ‘presentationalist’ conception of 
experience. On this conception, every experience is presentational in nature. That is, 
every experience consists in the presentation of some sensory object, whose manifest 
or qualitative nature constitutively determines its phenomenological character. 
  
 Closely connected to the presentational conception of experience are two main 
principles. The first is the so-called: 
 
Phenomenal Principle 
 If it visually appears to S as if there is some item x with basic visual quality F,  
 then there is some actual item, y, such that (i) y is F and (ii) S is having an exper- 
 ience that consists in the presentation of this item as the F-object that it is.1 
 
The second we might call the: 
 
Inheritance Principle 
 If S has a visual experience consisting in the presentation of some object, x, as  
 the F-item that it is, then that experience inherits its phenomenal character from  
 the qualitative nature of x, i.e. the nature that x has by virtue of being F. 
 
In fact, the presentationalist conception of experience can be conceived as the con-
junction of these two principles. Perhaps there are other ways of thinking about this 
conception, but this at least is how I shall be thinking about it here.2  
  In this chapter, my central aim will be to defend the presentationalist concep-
tion of experience (so conceived). I will also explain how we can hold this kind of 
view about experience consistently with being naïve realists and disjunctivists.  
Indeed, I will later argue that we can take presentationalism about experience as a 
premise, and then use it to argue for the naïve realist theory. As we will see, this  
allows us to retain what is right about presentationalism while avoiding an implau-
sible ‘qualitative-surrogate’ view about perceptual experience (cf. .). 
 The first section of the chapter presents a general argument in favour of accept-
ing the presentationalist conception of experience; one that I hope will be persuasive 
regardless of one’s antecedent views about experience, and, hence, regardless of 
whether or not one is antecedently a naïve realist (.). Building on this, the follow-
                                                   
 1 The restriction to basic visual qualities is important if we are to avoid irrelevant and distracting 
counter-examples (as we find for example in Austin :  and Pitcher : —).  
 2 It seems to me that this captures exactly the conception of experience the early sense-datum 
theorists, including Moore, Russell, Price, Broad, Ayer, and Prichard, were operating with.  
  
ing section then develops a novel argument for naïve realism, which takes presenta-
tionalism as one of its major premises (.). I conclude the chapter with some gen-
eral remarks pertaining to the perception debate over the last century (.).  
 
. Experience and Depictive Knowledge 
 
This first section sets out a general argument in favour of the presentationalist con-
ception of experience, according to which every experience consists in the presenta-
tion of some qualitative item from which its phenomenal character is inherited.3 The 
first part of the argument turns on a simple thought concerning what ‘experience 
can teach us’ (as Lewis  might have said). The idea is that having an experience 
as of an object that is F can teach us what F-things are like, in such a way, as John-
ston (manuscript-c) puts it, that we can thereby gain the capacity to ‘depict’ what F-
items are like; a capacity which we may well have lacked before. 4 Let us refer to this 
kind of knowledge, the kind that experiences as of F-things are in principle able to 
provide for their subjects, as ‘depictive knowledge’. The second part of the argument 
turns on a claim about what best explains why our experiences can provide ‘depic-
tive knowledge’ of the qualities that they seemingly present things as having. The 
claim will be that the best way to explain this is to suppose that the Phenomenal 
Principle is true. The final stage of the argument turns on the claim that given the 
Phenomenal Principle, we have good reason to accept the Inheritance Principle as 
well. For once we grant that any experience as of an object that is F really presents 
an object that is F, we can provide an excellent answer to a fundamental question 
regarding why our experiences have the distinctive phenomenal characters that they 
do. Specifically, we can say that an experience as of an F-item has the phenomenal 
character that it does because it actually presents an item that is F and can, there-
                                                   
 3 The argument owes a great deal to recent work by Johnston (manuscript-b, manuscript-c).  
 4 Throughout this chapter, I am operating what with Pautz (manuscript-b) refers to as a ‘simple 
semantics’ for visual quality terms, so that e.g. colour-terms like ‘red’ pick out the manifest or sensu-
ous properties that seem to be features of perceptible things, but which other philosophers might 
take to be qualia or properties of some other kind. Thus as I am using the term, ‘red’, to take that 
example, stands for a ‘simple qualitative property, with a distinctive sensuous nature’. (This, accord-
ing to Chalmers : , captures our naïve conception of redness. Compare here the notions of 
‘colour-as-we-see-it’ in Mackie : ch. , of ‘phenomenal colour’ in Strawson : , and of  
‘sensuous colour’ in van Cleve : .) In short, my aim is to use quality-words in such a way 
that they pick out those qualities that our experiences, naïvely construed, present things as having. 
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fore, inherit its distinctive phenomenal character from the nature of that item. Once 
we have argued for these two principles, i.e. the Phenomenal Principle and the  
Inheritance Principle, we will have argued for the presentationalist conception that 
we set out to establish (again conceived as the conjunction of these principles). 
 I begin, in the next sub-section, by explaining why I will be focusing on basic 
visual qualities only (i.e. the various lower-level qualities such as colour and shape).5  
With this explained, the rest of the section then presents what we might call the  
Argument from Depictive Knowledge for the presentational conception of experience. 
 
.. Basic Visual Qualities 
 
As a necessary preliminary to what follows, this section explains why I will be limit-
ing my focus to what we can refer to as the basic visual qualities. As we will see, the 
reason we must focus on these qualities, and not on higher-order visual qualities 
such as being a tree, being a rock, being an apple, and so on, is that my argument 
aims to apply to all cases of visual experience and, accordingly, to hallucinatory ex-
perience as well. Yet it appears that in hallucinatory experience, we can only gain 
novel depictive knowledge of basic visual qualities and not of higher-order, non-
basic qualities. It follows that we must limit our claims to basic visual qualities. 
 The main point here follows from a related point that Johnston () empha-
sises about the diﬀerence between perceptual experience and hallucinatory experi-
ence. In fact, there are two points that Johnston emphasises. The first is that in cases 
of perceptual experience, we can encounter particular objects for the first time. We 
can become acquainted in perception with particular objects that we had not yet 
seen, and in this way acquire novel topics for thought and talk. Thus: 
 
[A]lthough we can hallucinate real things…no….hallucination could be an original 
source of de re thought about…particular things. In this way, hallucination diﬀers 
from veridical sensing, which characteristically provides new particulars as topics for 
                                                   
 5 Consider here the well-known dispute, usually cast in representationalist terms, about whether 
sensory experience represents only the lower-order or basic sensory qualities, or whether the content 
of sensory experience also contains the higher-order or non-basic sensory qualities (cf. Siegel ). 
This dispute is relevant because we can think of the basic visual qualities as being a sub-set of the 
lower-order sensory qualities, namely those that are visual, i.e. those that can be visually experienced. 
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thought and talk…Hallucination does not introduce particular topics for thought and 
reference. Hallucination of a specific [particular] object is parasitic upon antecedent 
singular reference to that mother or that [object] (: ) 
 
This is one way, according to Johnston, in which hallucination diﬀers from veridical 
perception. Moreover, Johnston seems entirely right. However, there is another way 
in which perception and hallucination diﬀer, namely, in that perceptual experience 
can constitute a novel source of acquaintance with higher-order qualities, whereas 
hallucinatory experience cannot. I can learn what it is like for something to be a pig, 
for example, by means of having a veridical perception (at least so long as I have the 
requisite conceptual capacities). The same is not true, however, of hallucinatory ex-
perience. (The same distinction may hold of illusory experience as well—but we can 
focus on hallucinatory experience for now.) This point is important, since it entails 
that one could not gain what I am calling novel depictive knowledge of higher-order 
qualities by means of hallucinating something that has those qualities. For like hal-
lucinating particular things, hallucinating higher-order qualities depends on an an-
tecedent grasp on those qualities due to having had the relevant perceptual experi-
ences. After all, if a subject cannot be acquainted with a higher-order visual quality 
in hallucination precisely because she has not already been acquainted with that 
quality in perception, then even if she has an hallucinatory experience as of some 
object having that higher-order quality QH, that experience could not have the 
property of potentially supplying for its subject novel depictive knowledge of QH. 
(Again, to gain novel depictive knowledge of a quality is to come to know what it is 
like for something to have it.) In short, in order to even be able to have an halluci-
natory experience of QH, the subject would have had to have first had a perceptual 
experience of QH. But then it will have been in this original perception, and not in 
the hallucination, that the subject first gained depictive knowledge of QH. 
 This is the negative point that needs to be stressed. There is also a positive point 
that we must stress which Johnston makes elsewhere. This is that there are certain 
important commonalities between perceptual and hallucinatory experience, in terms 
of the qualities that they can present. Consider, for example, the following sugges-
tive passage from Johnston (): 
 
  
There is obviously a common factor as between smelling a rose and merely smelling a 
smell that is indistinguishable from the smell of the rose. The common factor is a 
smell of a certain sort. The same with tasting a chop, touching an airplane, hearing a 
car crash...The common factors are the taste that is the taste of the chop, the feel that 
is the feel of the airplane, the sound that is the sound of the crash. (a: )6 
 
Were Johnston focusing on visual experience, therefore, he could have given as an-
other example of an experiential common factor between a perception and an hallu-
cination the redness of the rose when someone has a perception of a red rose and a 
corresponding hallucination as of a red rose. What Johnston brings out here there-
fore is the important claim that perceptual experiences and hallucinatory ones share 
an important commonality, since they can both constitute an original source of 
knowledge of basic visual qualities. This may be taken as a sort of counter-point to 
the negative claim above, to the eﬀect that perceptual experiences can acquaint us 
with higher-order qualities for the first time while hallucinatory experiences cannot. 
 Can we really gain novel knowledge of qualities, can we come to be acquainted 
with them for the first time, in hallucination? There is in fact empirical evidence in 
favour of a positive answer, at least where the qualities are basic visual qualities. 
Consider for instance the case of supersaturated red. As Johnston (: —) 
notes, one can only become acquainted with this shade of red by after-imagining, 
 
Supersaturated red is a missing shade of red, which you can only after-image, i.e., can 
never see but only have presented to you [in non-perceptual cases]. (: ) 
 
Thus, far from it being the case, with the colours at least, that one has to see the col-
our in order to visually hallucinate it, it seems that certain colours and shades can 
only be visually hallucinated. Given this, it would then be natural to generalise and 
make a claim that is intuitive anyway, namely, that all basic visual qualities can be 
hallucinated even if they have not yet been perceived. (After all, the only alternate 
                                                   
6 The common factors here are experiential common factors—qualities that one can be aware of 
in both an experience of the perceptual kind and an experience of the hallucinatory kind. What 
Johnston brings out here is that it is consistent to be a disjunctivist, and thus to reject a common 
factor or conjunctivist view of experience, and yet still believe in experiential common factors. 
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account would be that supersaturated red is a very special quality indeed, being the 
only basic visual quality that can be hallucinated having not been perceived.) 
 In what follows, I focus on basic visual qualities only. This will enable the central 
points to apply to hallucinatory experiences as well as to veridical perception. (I also 
assume that what goes for veridical perception applies to illusory experience as well.) 
Notably, I shall mostly focus on colour in what follows. However, further premises 
will allow us to generalise to other basic visual qualities (such as shape and size). 
 
.. Depictive Knowledge 
 
This section argues for the first main premise in the ‘Argument from Depictive 
Knowledge’. Let us refer to this premise as Depictive Knowledge. This states that any 
experience as of some item having basic visual quality F is such that it could supply 
its subject with a conception, potentially for the first time, of what F-things are like. 
That is, the experience would have the complex property of being able to supply for 
its subject depictive knowledge of Fness; this being a property that the experience 
would have regardless of whether or not the actual subject of the experience already 
knew what F-things were qualitatively like. To clarify this claim, I will contrast it 
will a similar thesis that Johnson () uses when arguing for his view of hallucina-
tory experience. As we shall see, these two theses correspond to a fundamental dis-
tinction between learning higher-order truths about certain qualities on the one 
hand, and what it is like for particular items to have those qualities on the other.  
 
...   Disclosure and Depictive Knowledge 
 
We can distinguish two senses in which it is possible to gain novel knowledge of 
what certain qualities are like by means of experience. On the one hand, we might, 
via experience, learn certain higher-order truths about the qualities we are presented 
with. We might learn, for instance, by having an experience of vermillion and then 
cinnabar, that vermillion has the second-order property of being brighter than cinna-
bar. However, the sense of knowing about a given quality that I have in mind with 
the thesis of Depictive Knowledge does not involve learning any second-order truth 
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about the quality one is presented with. Rather, it is a matter of knowing what it is, 
or would be, like, for certain particular objects to possess the quality. Thus, one has 
depictive knowledge of a quality iﬀ one can form a conception of an item having 
that quality. One can then visualise what an item with the quality would be like (in 
virtue of having it). That is why I refer to this knowledge as ‘depictive’. When one 
acquires depictive knowledge of some basic visual quality Q, one could paint a pic-
ture, say, of an item exemplifying Q, or form an image in the mind of something 
being that way. Thus in gaining novel depictive knowledge of a quality, one acquires 
these abilities having previously lacked them. In what follows, the central thought I 
will be leaning on is that any experience as of an item having some basic visual qual-
ity Q could, in principle, supply its subject with depictive knowledge of Q.  
 The distinction between knowing higher-order truths about a quality, and gain-
ing what I am calling depictive knowledge of that quality, comes out clearly when 
we contrast the way in which Johnston () argues for his view of hallucination. 
As I understand him, Johnston begins by arguing that experience can provide us 
with knowledge of certain second-order features of the sensible qualities and rela-
tions that the object one is hallucinating appears to have. He then uses this claim to 
help motivate a certain conception of sense-experience which I set out below. Let us 
begin with the argument for the first claim, which turns on an example involving 
Jackson’s ‘Mary’, a brilliant colour scientist who has never had an experience of red, 
until she steps out of her black and white room for the first time (Jackson , 
). In the standard version of the story, Mary steps out of the room and sees an 
actual red thing. However, we could also suppose that Mary’s first experience of red 
is hallucinatory. She does not need to leave her room; rather, she has an hallucinato-
ry experience as of something red. As Johnston explains: 
 
Frank Jackson’s Mary could come to know what red is like by hallucinating a red 
thing or by having a red after-image…Here we have all the signs of de re knowledge of 
what certain qualities are like, and so one is able to place them in a quality-space with 
other qualities of the same family. (: —)7  
                                                   
 7 A similar point is emphasised by Wittgenstein (-: ) in the Blue Book. He writes:  
‘Suppose I said “Exerting a pressure on your eye-ball produces a red image”. Couldn't the way by 
which you first became acquainted with red have been this?’ 
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Johnston also maintains that this fact tells us something important about the nature 
of hallucinatory experience: 
 
The fact that hallucination can provide us with original de re knowledge of quality  
reinforces the case for the act/object account of hallucination. If I acquire original de 
re knowledge doesn’t there have to be a res from which I acquire it? (: ) 
 
In short: if I can learn what the sensible quality, red, is like by means of undergoing 
experience, must there not be some item I am aware of, from which I gain this 
knowledge? That is the key idea that Johnston is relying on at this point. 
 Johnston goes on to develop a specific view of sense-experience. This is a form of 
object-level disjunctivism whereby naïve realism is correct of the cases of perception, 
whilst what Johnston calls the sensible profile view is true of cases of hallucination. 
What this view states is that in hallucination, instead of being aware, as in percep-
tion, of various objects instantiating various properties and relations, one is simply 
aware of the properties and relations themselves; these being ‘pure universals’, that 
is, universals that are not instantiated by anything in the scene before the eyes: 
 
When we see, we are aware of instantiations of sensible profiles. When we hallucinate, 
we are aware merely of the…sensible profiles [themselves]…In hallucination, we are 
not aware of the visible instances which seeing presents…We are instead aware of a 
proper part of what we are aware of in the corresponding case of seeing, a sensible 
profile that is no more than a certain layout of qualities. (: —) 
 
When I perceive an external item, I am aware of various external things instantiating 
certain properties and relations. However, when I have a ‘matching’ hallucination , I 
am simply aware of the properties and relations involved in the corresponding per-
ception but not of those properties and relations as being instantiated by anything. 
The ‘sensible profile’ I am aware of is the sum of these properties and relations: a 
complex or structural universal. This view is sometimes misleadingly expressed as 
the theory that we are presented with ‘uninstantiated universals’ in hallucination. 
Indeed, Johnston himself often talks in this way. He is also careful to note, however, 
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that this idea must be understood properly. For if I have an hallucination as of a red 
apple, say, then at least some of the properties I am presented with will be instanti-
ated by other things (and so instantiated simpliciter). Thus, what Johnston really 
means to say is that the properties and relations that I am presented with in halluci-
nation are not uninstantiated simpliciter but rather not instantiated by anything in 
the scene before the eyes. One way to capture this would be to say that we are present-
ed in hallucinatory experience with pure universals. Perceptual experiences present 
external things instantiating universals, whereas hallucinations present pure univer-
sals that are not instantiated by any particular thing the subject senses. 
 Johnston’s more general view of sense-experience can be stated thus. In percep-
tion, the subject is presented with an entire state of aﬀairs, consisting in certain ex-
ternal objects exemplifying certain properties and relations.8 At the same time, the 
subject is also having a ‘smaller’ experience, directed only at the universals involved 
in that state of aﬀairs; this is an experience of the kind that one could have in hallu-
cination. Indeed, the idea is that were you to ‘transition’ from having this perceptual 
experience to having a phenomenally indistinguishable hallucination, you would 
simply move from having one ‘big’ experience directed at an entire state of aﬀairs, 
which would have a ‘smaller’ experience, directed only at the universals involved in 
the state of aﬀairs, as a proper part, to having only the ‘smaller’ experience, consist-
ing only in the presentation of the ‘pure universals’ involved in the state of aﬀairs 
which is, in turn, involved in the corresponding case of perception.  
 To argue for his conception of sense-experience, Johnston relies on two main 
premises. The first idea is that experience can disclose truths about the second-order 
qualities that its apparent object manifests. This can be stated more precisely thus: 
 
 Disclosure 
  For any experience, e, any subject S, and any basic visual quality, F, if S has  
  an experience as of an item being F, then, were S never to have had an expe- 
  rience as of an item being F before, S would acquire, in virtue of having e,  
  novel knowledge of at least some aspect of the qualitative nature of F. More  
                                                   
 8 The view of perception is similar to that of Armstrong (: —), who holds that 
‘[e]ven in our most basic, most elementary, perceptions we are aware of particulars, though of course 
particulars as having certain properties and relations, that is: particulars in states of aﬀairs.’ 
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  generally, any experience as of an item instantiating basic visual quality F 
   has the property of being able to disclose to its subject at least an aspect of  
  the qualitative nature of F.9   
 
The argument for Disclosure is involves two steps. In the first step, we argue as fol-
lows. A restricted form of Disclosure is true of hallucination. For instance, in having 
an hallucination as of a red item, Mary could come to learn what red is like, whereby 
this means that Mary could come to learn various higher-order truths about that 
quality. But then (so the thought goes), if this is true of hallucination, it is also true 
of perception. Whether Mary has a veridical perception of a red tomato (as the red 
tomato that it is), or an illusory perception of a non-red tomato in abnormal cir-
cumstances, (so that it appears red to her), she could come to learn the relevant 
truths regarding what red is like; the same truths she could learn about that quality 
via having an hallucination as of a red tomato (or indeed any other red item). 
 The second step of Johnston’s argument is to argue that the best way to explain 
why Disclosure is true is to suppose that every experience involves the presentation to 
the subject of the relevant qualities, conceived as universals—so that each experience 
presents at least those universals whose qualitative natures could be disclosed to an 
experiencing subject. The idea, then, is that the best view to adopt, given the facts 
about what experience can teach us regarding the second-order qualities of qualities, 
(plus further considerations that motivate naïve realism over conjunctivism), is a 
mixture of naïve realism and the pure universals view of hallucination.10   
 Perhaps, as Johnston would maintain, Disclosure is true. Perhaps not. The im-
portant point for present purposes, however, is that there is a further, related claim 
about experience which is similar to Disclosure, and that I believe we should accept, 
but which requires us to model hallucination, and indeed, experience as such, not in 
                                                   
 9 Note that this thesis is much weaker than the thesis that Johnston () calls Revelation, a 
thesis first endorsed by Russell (), which says that in experience the full qualitative nature of 
certain sensible qualities can be revealed to us, so that having an experience of a certain quality could 
reveal the nature of the quality in question ‘perfectly and completely’ (Russell : ). 
 10 We should rather say that this is one main part of Johnston’s () argument for his view of 
sense-experience. For Johnston also advocates his ‘sensible profile account’ at least partly because he 
finds compelling the idea that whenever one has a perceptual experience, one also has the kind of 
experience involved in hallucinating. We will consider the argument for this premise in chapter  
and try to undermine it. (As to why this premise should help to motivate the sensible profile account 
of hallucination and sense-experience as such, this is a complex matter that we can set aside here.) 
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terms of the presentation of pure universals, but rather in terms of the real presence 
of objects actually instantiating the relevant qualities. This is the thesis I have called 
Depictive Knowledge. This thesis might be expressed more precisely as follows: 
 
 Depictive Knowledge 
  For any experience, e, any subject S, and any basic visual quality F, if S has  
  an experience as of an item being F, were S to have never seen an item with  
  F before, S would acquire, in virtue of having the experience, novel depictive  
  knowledge of F, that is, knowledge of what it is like for something to be F.  
  Thus, any experience as of any item with basic visual quality F is capable of  
  providing for its subject novel depictive knowledge of the qualities that it  
  seems to present things as having, i.e. knowledge of what particular items  
  with those very qualities would be like (precisely in virtue of having them).11 
 
Why should we accept this claim? The answer is that it just seems to be evidently 
true: having an experience as of an item being F (i.e. any basic visual quality) really 
does seem to supply us with a capacity to conceive of what it is like for an item to be 
F. Consider, relatedly, the below passage from Hawthorne & Kovakovich (): 
 
If someone had never actually seen a real red thing but had hallucinated a red tie, then 
doesn’t it seem right to say that the person had encountered redness in experience? 
Prior to the hallucination the person may not have had a grip on what redness was 
like. But doesn’t naïve common sense tell us that the person got a good long look at 
redness during the hallucination—such a good look that he now knows what it is like 
for something to be red? (: ; my italics) 
 
At first glance, the point being made here seems very similar to Johnston’s point 
concerning ‘hallucinating Mary’ and what she could come to know in hallucinating 
                                                   
 11 Alford-Duguid & Arsenault () claim that appeals to principles like Depictive Knowledge 
or Disclosure when arguing for theses like presentationalism are dialectically ineﬀective, given that 
these are claims non-presentationalist views cannot respect and so are going to deny. (Pautz  
also attributes a similar line of response to Mike Martin based on personal correspondence.) It seems 
to me, however, that this line of thought is in fact misguided. For if, intuitively, some proposition p 
is the case, one does not beg any questions against views that are unable to accommodate the truth of 
p just by using p as a premise in arguments against such views. Accordingly, along with Pautz, I see 
no deep problem in relying on such principles to argue for substantive views about experience. 
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redness. However, there is a crucial diﬀerence. For the claim here is that hallucinat-
ing Mary, to focus on that case, would, as Hawthorne and Kovakovich in the above 
passage bring out with their final sentence, learn what it is like for something to be 
red. So, perhaps one of the things that Mary lacks knowledge of in her black and 
white room is what experiences of red are like; this is the point that most of the lit-
erature linking this case to the problem of physicalism focuses on. And perhaps 
Mary lacks knowledge of what redness itself is like—i.e. of truths about certain 
higher-order features of redness. A further crucial point, however, is that in her 
black and white room, Mary does not yet know what it is like for a particular item 
to be red. Accordingly, when Mary does have an hallucination of redness—whereby 
this constitutes her first encounter with redness in experience—she learns not only 
certain higher-order truths about a quality, but also gains a conception of what it 
would be like for a particular to have that quality. For our present argument, it is 
the second point that is key. For it is this claim that motivates Depictive Knowledge.  
 Note, moreover, that Mary need not encounter redness for the first time in hal-
lucination. Mary may have had a veridical experience of a red thing, or an illusory 
experience of a non-red thing that happens to look red. All of these experiences 
would seem to be suﬃcient to supply Mary with novel depictive knowledge of red; 
that is, knowledge of what it would be like for particular items to have that quality. 
 Note also that we can give a kind of practical demonstration as to why Depictive 
Knowledge is true. Suppose that you had never been visually presented with the 
shade of blue we call ‘cyan’. Given this, when asked to imagine a cyan-blue thing, 
you would be entirely at a loss. Consider now Fig. . again (cf. ..): 
 
 
      Fig.  (from Phillips ) 
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Again, if you stare at the black dot in the red box for thirty seconds, and then look 
at the white box to the right, you experience a certain after-image. My point is that 
once you undergo this experience, if you did not have a conception of what cyan-
blue things were like, you would now have that conception. You could frame a 
mental image of cyan-blue things; or perhaps even draw them; you could select  
cyan-blue objects from among objects that are of other shades of blue (at least so 
long as the shades were not too similar). In short, you would gain what I am calling 
depictive knowledge of cyan-blue just by having the experience in question (at least 
given that you were to have certain cognitive, for example recognitional, capacities). 
 In short, if you did not yet know what it is like for something to be cyan-blue, 
you would now know, on the basis of having had the after-image experience in-
duced by Fig. . However, any experience as of an item having that very quality 
would have that same property. That is, any experience as of a cyan-blue item would 
have the property of being able to provide for its subject novel depictive knowledge 
of that shade (this being a property of the experience itself, one that the experience 
would have, and that experiences of that type would have, regardless of the 
knowledge state of the particular subject or subjects in question.) The same thing 
goes for Mary in her black and white room. Any experience, whether perceptual or 
hallucinatory, veridical or illusory, so long as that experience is as of a red object, 
would allow Mary to learn what red items are like. So Depictive Knowledge is true.  
 A final point is worth making. I have focused on colour. Thus one might think 
that I have only really proven a restricted version of Depictive Knowledge, namely, a 
version of that thesis as confined to the colours. However, it seems to me that simi-
lar considerations to those advanced above will show that Depictive Knowledge is 
true just as much as the restricted version focused only on colour. That is, the basic 
points can be extended to the other basic visual qualities as well. For instance, we 
could have focused not on the cyan-blue colour of the after-image but on its rectan-
gular shape. And we could have noted that having that experience could have pro-
vided one with depictive knowledge of that shape.12 Thus we can proceed, in what 
                                                   
 12 I believe this claim is most persuasive when we note that we are conceiving of the basic visual 
as manifest qualities (cf. fn.  above). Consider, for example, Johnston regarding manifest shape: 
 
  
follows, with the supposition that Depictive Knowledge is true: whenever one has 
an experience as of some basic visual quality F, then that experience has the capacity 
to provide for its subject potentially novel depictive knowledge of that quality, be it 
a colour, or a shape, or else some other basic visual quality, such as some (relative) 
size, or a certain visual depth.13 
 
...   Physicalism and Mary 
 
Before moving on, I want to make a comment about Depictive Knowledge and its 
connection to the ‘Knowledge Argument’ against physicalism (see Jackson , 
). For one might think that the thesis of Depictive Knowledge has a bearing on 
the question as to whether that argument, involving Mary the colour scientist whom 
we have discussed, is sound. After all, does the thesis of Depictive Knowledge not 
imply, in eﬀect, that Mary would learn something new when leaving her black and 
white room? For she would gain novel depictive knowledge of redness when leaving 
her room, and, therefore, knowledge that could described, or so I’m happy to allow, 
as propositional knowledge. (“This is what it is like for things to be red”.) The trou-
ble, of course, is that Mary knew all of the physical facts in her black and white 
room, or so many seem to maintain, and thus if in leaving her room she learns a 
new fact then by elementary logic these facts cannot be physical. Thus, physicalism, 
defined as the thesis that all facts are physical facts, ends up being false. Yet that is a 
result we might have hoped to avoid. (Many of us, I suspect, are physicalists, at least 
                                                                                                                                        
Just as Jackson's Mary had to have experience of red to know what it was like there is no way of knowing 
what these shape qualities are like without seeing or feeling them. (manuscript: ch. : ) 
 
This claim, it seems to me, is plausible, yet only given an antecedent distinction between manifest 
and quantitative shape. In short, we have to conceive of the qualities as manifest qualities if we are to 
plausibly hold that in order to have a conception of them and the things that have them we must 
first experience them. (For more on the notion of manifest shape see Broad : ﬀ and Straw-
son : —. Note also that in light of these reflections, Dennett :  seems wrong to 
dogmatically assert that ‘[Jackson] wouldn’t [get] far with a thought experiment about Mary the ge-
ometer who was prevented from seeing or touching triangles’, due to the fact that after all, ‘what it is 
like to see triangles can be conveyed in a few dozen words’. This is mistaken, I want to say, if we are 
concerned with what I am calling, following Johnston, manifest shape, and relying on a distinction 
between manifest and physical shape that traces back to Broad and also the work of P. F. Strawson.) 
 13 I speak of relative sizes because as Phillips (: —) argues, it would seem that we do not 
see metrical properties. Phillips (: ) also argues that insofar as we see things as having sizes we 
really ‘see things as having sizes relative to our own bodies’. However, it seems we also see things as 
having certain sizes due to the relations they stand in to the various other things we concurrently 
sense, and also, perhaps, due to the relations they stand in to things that we remember seeing.  
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in some minimal sense. And I later argue that even given its commitment to sense-
data, Austinian Disjunctivism is compatible with a physicalist view.)  
 Fortunately, there is a way out.  For we can deny the premise that Mary is in a 
position to know all of the physical facts while in her black and white room, de-
prived of the capacity to have experiences as of the colours. (This premise is rarely 
denied in the literature, but it seems to me the most natural one to query.) Here is 
one schematic way to develop this idea. Suppose you endorse a non-reductive form 
of physicalism whereby we can include knowledge about the manifest qualities such 
as those that our experiences can provide depictive knowledge of, redness say, as in 
the case of Mary, as knowledge of physical truths (cf. ..). The right way to reply 
to Jackson, then, in my view, is to say two things. First, we should deny that Mary 
is in a position to know all the physical facts. Second, we should follow Crane in 
claiming that the real conclusion here is not that physicalism is false, but rather that 
‘certain kinds of propositional knowledge’, e.g. this is what red things look like,  
‘require a specific [kind of] experience…to be [gained]’ (Crane forthcoming: ). 
After all, physicalism is not incompatible with the claim that we can only know cer-
tain propositions by having certain distinctive experience-types, or by means of hav-
ing experiences as of certain distinctive qualities, which the propositions concern. 
 
.. The Explanatory Claim 
 
Having argued for Depictive Knowledge, I now argue that the best way to explain 
why this thesis is true is to maintain that the Phenomenal Principle is true. Call this 
the Explanatory Claim. My strategy will be to consider two other accounts, which 
will be found wanting. Since I see no better contenders, and since the presentation-
alist explanation I am oﬀering seems compelling, we will have good grounds for 
moving from Depictive Knowledge to the Phenomenal Principle.  
 Let us begin by noting that the presentationalist explanation of experience does 
indeed constitute one good explanation—even if there are other good explanations—
as to why Depictive Knowledge is true. Again, Depictive Knowledge says that each 
experience as of some object having some basic visual quality F has the property of 
being able to imbue its subject, in principle for the first time, with knowledge of 
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what it is like for a particular object to have F, and, hence, to gain ‘depictive 
knowledge’ of F. My present claim is that if indeed some experience as of some ob-
ject having some basic visual quality F consists simply in the presentation of an item 
manifesting F, as the Phenomenal Principle would entail, then this would explain in 
a compelling manner why having that experience has the property of being able to 
provide its subject with depictive knowledge of F. After all, if it is true that, when-
ever I have an experience as of an item that appears to have quality F, I am actually 
confronted in experience with an item that instantiates quality F, then that is surely 
suﬃcient to explain why I would come to know what things with that particular 
quality are like. There should be no doubt, then, that for Depictive Knowledge to 
hold, the truth of the Phenomenal Principle is suﬃcient. The central question, then, 
is whether accepting this principle is the best way of explaining Depictive 
Knowledge. I argue that it is. I am also assuming here that if Depictive Knowledge 
is indeed true, then this requires an explanation. Compare here Johnston: 
 
Imagine yourself as a neophyte in painting class who learns after ten minutes just how 
to paint [a certain] shape and colour. This acquisition of knowledge of color and shape 
on the part of the viewer needs to be accounted for. (manuscript-c: ) 
 
Johnston focuses here on shape and colour, and I agree with what is claimed. How-
ever, I also believe that the same thing is true for all basic visual qualities. We have 
to explain how it is possible to gain novel depictive knowledge of these qualities in 
experience. What I claim is that the best way to do this is to adopt the Phenomenal 
Principle, according to which any experience as of an item x having basic visual 
quality F consists in the presentation of some item y that really has quality F. The 
idea is that this claim, which earlier we called the Explanatory Claim, in conjunc-
tion with Depictive Knowledge, provides strong reason to accept the Phenomenal 
Principle. Once we have argued for the Phenomenal Principle, we will then be able 
to argue for the presentationalist model of experience as such, by arguing for the 
Inheritance Principle as well. (For again, accepting the presentationalist conception 
of experience just is a matter of accepting these principles.) 
  
 As I say, we will consider two alternative models of experience that might ex-
plain why Depictive Knowledge obtains.14 On one view, we need not be presented 
with items that instantiate the relevant qualities—we need only be presented with 
the qualities themselves, conceived as universal properties. On another view, we are 
to accept an intentionalist view of experience, and explain Depictive Knowledge in 
terms of people visually entertaining contents involving the relevant qualities. I shall 
argue that both of these options are problematic. The universals view is problematic 
as a view of experience, and intentionalism, even if it is coherent as a view of visual 
experience, nevertheless fails to properly explain why Depictive Knowledge is true. 
 
...   Pure Universals 
 
The presentationalist about experience says that Depictive Knowledge obtains  
because in having an experience of basic visual quality F, one is thereby presented 
with an actual item that really has F. The idea is that in being presented with an 
item that is F, if one were lacking in a conception of what F-things are like, one 
would thereby gain such a conception. There is, however, an alternative view availa-
ble. Johnston, for example, would presumably say that all that is necessary for gain-
ing novel depictive knowledge of a quality is acquaintance with the relevant univer-
sal quality itself. The idea is that one can learn what F-items are like just by being 
presented with the universal being red. The same would go for all basic visual quali-
ties, conceived as general properties or ‘pure universals’ that no item in the experi-
enced scene in fact instantiates, as on Johnston’s account of hallucinatory cases of 
experience. Of course, Johnston restricts the view that our visual experiences consist 
in the presentation of pure universals to hallucination. Others, however hold that all 
experiences—both perceptual and hallucinatory—have this nature. This is the view, 
                                                   
 14 I assume that adverbialists have no putative explanation of the relevant facts here. As Johnston 
(: ), notes: ‘If I acquire original de re knowledge [of redness] doesn’t there then have to be a 
res from which I acquire it? The Adverbial Theorist will insist that the only res in play is an experience 
of a certain type. But the de re knowledge which hallucination can provide seems to be de re 
knowledge of a quality, and not necessarily of any experience type. I need not focus on any experi-
ence type as such. Indeed, I need not conceptualize my hallucinatory experience in any way…Still, I 
can learn from my hallucination what a certain shade of red is like. How can I do this unless my hal-
lucination involves awareness of that shade, unless that shade is an object of my awareness?’  
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for example, that Forrest () and Foster () hold, among others. So this view 
could be generalised so as to try to account for Depictive Knowledge.15 
 The core idea here would be that to come to know what it is like for something 
to be red, you need not be presented with something red. Likewise, to come to 
know what it is like for something to have some manifest shape, the kind of shape 
we see objects as having, we need not actually see or be presented with a particular 
that has that shape. All that you need, to come to know what it like for something 
to be square, is to be presented with or directly aware of the relevant universal prop-
erty, namely, being square. The same would go for the other relevant cases.  
 The key problem with this account, as I see it, is that the universals view of expe-
rience does not itself stand up to scrutiny. That view says that at least some of our 
experiences consist solely in the presentation of universals. It would also be part of 
the view, I imagine, that experiences derive their phenomenal character from the 
universals presented—but even without this addition the view seems problematic. 
For it is hard to make sense of how a subject could be presented in experience with a 
pure universal, i.e. a universal that nothing instantiates. I just do not see how an 
experience could consist in the presentation of a pure property in this way—not in a 
thing having that property, but somehow just in the presentation of the property 
itself. I also fail to see how the experience could derive its phenomenal character 
from the pure property that it presents—a universal that nothing in the scene before 
the eyes instantiates. The worry, in short, is that an explanation of Depictive 
Knowledge in terms of the awareness of pure universals cannot succeed, because the 
theory of experience that this explanation presupposes must be rejected.  
 The initial intuition, to the eﬀect that no experience could consist solely in the 
presentation of a pure universal, is well brought out by Papineau in the following 
passage. Here Papineau is reacting to the suggestion from intentionalists like 
                                                   
 15 Cf. Bealer (); Dretske (, ); McGinn (); and Tye (). As Pautz (: 
) notes, ‘although they disagree on some issues’, the awareness of pure universals, at least in the 
case of some experiences, if not all kinds of experience as with Forrest and Foster, seems to be essen-
tial to the account of experience that these philosophers oﬀer. (Note, however, that given their inten-
tionalism, we can read Dretske and Tye as non-presentationalists, who hold that ‘being aware of a 
universal but nothing that has it’ is nothing more than visually entertaining a content to the eﬀect that 
something has that universal, when nothing in the scene before the eyes actually does have it. On this 
view, we lack genuine acquaintance with ‘pure universals’; we just visually entertain contents involv-
ing them. In short, we can read Tye and Dretske as adopting a deflationary reading of the idea that 
we can be aware of universals, distinct from the more full-blooded claim at issue in the main text.) 
  
Dretske and Tye that in hallucination we are presented with universals; however, 
the point easily generalises to any proponent of a ‘pure properties’ view: 
 
It is one thing for yellowness to contribute to…my experience in virtue of being  
instantiated before my eyes. It [is] another for it somehow to enter into my conscious-
ness even though nothing in my field of view [is] actually yellow… 
 Somehow the representationalists are thinking that the yellowness is ‘present in’ my 
experience, not because it is instantiated there, but in some other way. My mind 
reaches out and grasps the property yellowness itself, the property that is sometimes 
instantiated, in lemons and other things, but is not, let us take it, currently being in-
stantiated in or around me – and this grasping is somehow supposed to be responsible 
for the distinctive feel that characterizes our visual experiences as of yellow things. As I 
say, I find this suggestion diﬃcult to understand. (: ) 
 
Papineau is rightly puzzled about how an experience could be the taking in or ap-
prehension of a universal—as opposed to something instantiating that universal. I 
would argue, moreover, that we can see more clearly why it is correct to be puzzled 
about this view when we do a little work in ontology. For we need only think about 
what universals are to see the problem here. What, after all, is the property of being 
red, say, or of being square, where these are conceived, not as quality-instances, but 
as universals nothing instantiates? Well, very plausibly, the items picked out by ca-
nonical property-designating phrases like being F are general ways of being (cf. Arm-
strong : —, : —; Dodd : ; Johnston , manuscript-c; 
Heil : ; Levinson , ; : ).16 They are ways for things to be; 
general conditions that objects can be in. When we say that an item is red, we are 
saying that it is a certain condition, the one that all and only the red things are in. 
This condition we then call being red. The property called beingred just is a general 
condition that things can be in. The same thing goes for other properties. The prop-
erty of being F just is a certain condition things can be in, a way things can be.  
 The key question now is how an item that just is a general condition for things 
to be in could be an object of sense. It is one thing to be visually presented with an 
item that instantiates the property of being red. There may even be sensible items 
                                                   
 16 Note that this and the points that follow hold regardless of whether one thinks of universals as 
‘immanent’ or ‘transcendent’. (On this distinction see Armstrong  and van Inwagen .) 
  
that are instances of the relevant universals that we can become acquainted with, 
whereby these items are distinct from the objects that have the universals (cf. my 
discussion of ‘sensible quality-instances’ in chapter ). What seems impossible, how-
ever, is for a person to be presented with a universal ‘all by itself’. After all, such 
universals lack a sensible nature. The property of being red, for instance, does not 
have the property of being red—nor any other property we see things as having. 
How, then, could such a thing be an object of sense? This point, moreover, easily 
generalises. Properties, conceived of as universals, are mere conditions that things 
can be in, and so are not the kind of thing that can be sensed. They lack a sensible 
nature, and, therefore, they are essentially invisible. The idea that we can be present-
ed with a pure universal makes about as much sense as the idea that one might be 
presented with a number or a set—or anything else lacking a sensible nature.17 
 A related point here is that, contra Cutter (: ) and Tye (: ), we 
cannot view the phenomenal character of any experience as grounded solely in the 
‘pure’ or ‘uninstantiated’ universals it presents, in the same way as naïve realists or 
sense-datum theorists think of the phenomenal character of certain experiences as 
being grounded in the manifest nature of their presented objects. For on these latter 
views, the items presented are sensory items that manifest actual visual qualities. 
Whereas the same is not true of pure properties like being red. Therefore, it is mis-
taken to think that the phenomenal character of an experience could somehow be 
‘inherited from’ the properties it presents, whereby those presented properties are 
not taken to be instantiated by anything one is aware of. It follows that, if being 
presented to a subject in an experience, i.e. an experience that has a presentational 
structure, entails that the experience’s phenomenal character is constitutively deter-
mined, at least in part, by that object, then universals cannot be objects of sense. 
 There are reasons, then, to reject the ‘pure universals’ conception of experi-
ence—even if such a view were to be limited to just hallucinatory cases. But given 
this, it follows that we cannot explain why Depictive Knowledge holds in terms of 
the presentation of pure universals. The upshot is that anyone wishing to resist a 
full-blooded presentationalism, whereby each experience consists in the presentation 
                                                   
17 Cf. Pautz (), who argues against the idea that we can be aware of pure properties on the 
basis that seen things are always extended but that no property is extended. (For possible replies see 
Johnston :  and Conduct . For a worry about Johnston’s reply see Crane a: .) 
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of some sensory item, manifesting at least certain basic visual qualities, must look 
elsewhere for an explanation for why Depictive Knowledge holds. 
 One final problem for the universals-awareness view, which turns on the case of 
supersaturated red from Johnston (). Again, this colour can only be after-
imaged. So if one believes that one is presented when after-imaging that shade not 
with a particular that is supersaturated red, but rather with the quality of super-
saturated itself, it follows that there are no possible instances of superstatured red. 
But then, it follows that the universals-awareness view contravenes Armstrong’s 
plausible stricture that every property is instantiated, at least somewhere in modal 
space. This is the “Principle of Instantiation”. Essentially, taking this principle as a 
premise enables us to undermine the universals-awareness view. 
 I have claimed that we cannot be aware of pure properties—that is, aware of a 
property without thereby being aware of anything that instantiates it. It should be 
noted, however, that from this claim, it does not follow that we are never aware of 
the properties of things in perception. I deny that we can be aware of being red, say, 
all by itself, i.e. unless via being aware of something that is red. Yet it does not fol-
low from this that we never see red things, or that there is no sense in which we can 
have acquaintance with redness. Indeed, I think it’s fine to say that when I see a red 
thing I have acquaintance, if derivatively, with the property of being red. 
 Ever so strictly speaking, however, I deny that properties, conceived as univer-
sals, are ever among the items we sense. For I take the objects of sense to be particu-
lars and particulars only. However, I don’t assume that we are only ever aware of 
ordinary external things like tables, apples, the moon, and so on. For I also count 
among the objects of sense items that I will later call sensible quality-instances, which 
are just as particular as the objects just listed, although they fall under the category of 
attribute. I thus agree with Prichard (: ) that experience acquaints us only 
with particular things (cf. Kalderon c).18 As regards the universals that percep-
tible things instantiate, these we learn about via abstraction from experiences of the 
particulars in question, not by means of visual acquaintance (cf. Russell : ). 
 
                                                   
18 Prichard (: ) puts the point by saying that there is ‘no way of distinguishing perception 
and conception as the apprehension of diﬀerent realities except as the apprehension of the individual 
and the universal respectively’ (cf. Wilson : ).  
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...   Entertaining Contents 
 
There is a second possible explanation as to why Depictive Knowledge holds that I 
want to consider. According to Pautz (, ), we can explain why something 
like Disclosure holds by adopting an intentionalist view and holding that the relevant 
higher-order truths about, say, redness that one could gain from a red-experience 
could be gained by having an experience conceived as the visual entertaining of a 
propositional content involving the property of being red as a constituent. Thus one 
might think that visually entertaining this content could supply one with novel de-
pictive knowledge of the quality, red, in the same way.19 
 I grant that the intentionalist view is a coherent theory of experience. The ques-
tion we must face, therefore, is whether intentionalism is able to explain, in a com-
pelling manner, why Depictive Knowledge holds. The answer I oﬀer is ‘no’. The 
basic trouble is that the primitive notion of visually entertaining a content is made to 
do too much explanatory work; more explanatory work than it can handle.  
 Consider a particular case. Suppose that you are like Mary: you have an experi-
ence of red for the first time. You thus gain novel depictive knowledge of redness. 
You gain a conception, for the first time, of what red things are like. You can now 
depict red things, and visualise red entities in thought. Yet you could do none of 
this prior to having the relevant experience as of a red item. 
 The question is whether the intentionalist model of experience allows us to  
explain why your experience as of a red item has the property of being able to sup-
ply you with the relevant depictive knowledge of redness. Call this property Φ. 
(Again, this is a property that the experience would have had regardless of whether 
its subject had or did not have depictive knowledge of redness prior to having the 
experience.) Again, intentionalist say that experiences of red consist in visually en-
treating a content containing red. The basic intentionalist thought is that by visually 
entertaining a content involving redness, one thereby comes to know what it is like 
for things to have that feature, thus gaining a conception of what red things are like. 
                                                   
 19 Perhaps the content need not have the relevant property as a constituent: the content might be 
associated with the relevant property in some other way. I ignore this complication in what follows, 
however, since I would argue that regardless of how a given intentional content is connected to the 
relevant quality, Q, visually entertaining that content could not provide depictive knowledge of Q. 
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 Here is one thing we can bring out immediately, namely, that merely entertain-
ing a content involving the property of being red is not suﬃcient for gaining novel 
depictive knowledge of redness.20 Let us modify the case a bit, and suppose that you 
have a prior conception of redness, due to having experienced it before. You can, 
therefore, form beliefs about redness and  form beliefs concerning various red 
things. So suppose you form the belief that this object is red. On the standard philo-
sophical construal of belief, this is a matter of entertaining a content to the eﬀect 
that some object has the property of being red. It thus involves the entertaining of a 
content involving the property of being red. Yet it is clear that this belief about a red 
object, unlike an experience of red, does not have Φ. Indeed, what seems more plau-
sible is that one already has to have an experience of redness, or at least some con-
ception of what red things are like, in order to have the relevant belief. Thus, the 
belief could not have Φ, it could not provide novel depictive knowledge of redness.  
 Accordingly, the intentionalist faces a question. One cannot simply entertain a 
content involving the property of being red and thereby gain depictive knowledge of 
that quality. Rather, the intentionalist must say that it is in virtue of visually enter-
taining the relevant content that one gains the relevant depictive knowledge.21 The 
trouble now, it seems to me, is that the notion of visually entertaining is being given 
far too much work to do—more work, it seems to me, than it can handle. 
 One way to see this is to remind ourselves that, as we noted chapter , the inten-
tionalist’s relation of visually entertaining is not that of belief, but is nevertheless 
‘belief-like’. If, however, believing a content involving redness cannot supply us with 
depictive knowledge of that quality, then why should standing in the belief-like rela-
tion of visually entertaining to that content provide us with such knowledge? The 
intentionalist could say that it is simply a primitive matter that there is a diﬀerence 
                                                   
20 Moreover, this is the case regardless of how we conceive of the metaphysical nature of the  
relevant propositional content, i.e. of the nature of the proposition in question that somehow con-
tains or involves the property of being red. Thus, the notion of visually entertaining that content must 
brought in. (I am assuming here that all contents are propositional. Perhaps the intriguing view that 
contents are somehow concrete, developed in Crane b and discussed by Pautz forthcoming-b, 
could be in some sense made to do some work here, but we lack space to discuss this view here.) 
21 Another option here would be to claim that the contents we can believe are distinct in nature 
from the contents we can visually entertain, whereby the contents in the latter case are such that hav-
ing an experience with any content C containing visual quality Q it suﬃcient for gaining depictive 
knowledge of that quality. For this move to work, however, one would have to spell out the nature of 
the diﬀerence in content one has in mind—and I deny that any putative diﬀerence in content be-
tween believing and sensing could make a diﬀerence in the required way (cf. fn.  & fn. ).    
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between believing and visually entertaining that makes the diﬀerence here, so that we 
have two fundamentally diﬀerent ways of entertaining a content involving redness, 
whereby the relevant diﬀerence is brute, and such that because of this diﬀerence, 
believing a content involving redness does not provide depictive knowledge of that 
quality as opposed to visually entertaining it, which does. This explanation, howev-
er, given the brute diﬀerence in two allegedly rather similar relations, does not seem 
terribly convincing. What is still lacking is an account of the diﬀerence between be-
lieving and visually entertaining that makes the diﬀerence. Without such an ac-
count, the intentionalist explanation of how our experiences have properties like Φ 
looks like a poor one, and certainly a worse one than presentationalists can oﬀer.  
 There is a related point to note at this juncture. Again, we must remind our-
selves that for intentionalists, the notion of visually entertaining a content is a theo-
retical notion, not a familiar one on which we already have some prior grasp. 
 Thus Byrne (: ), for example, states that intentionalism is ‘intended as a 
theoretically fruitful description of the phenomenon of perception, not a piece of 
unarticulated folk psychology’. Johnston (), who is elaborating on Byrne’s 
() intentionalist views as expressed in that paper, then says the following: 
 
[The intentionalist] proposes that perception constitutively involves a non-factive 
propositional attitude rather like the non-factive attitude of believing: [Byrne] calls it 
EX-ing, meant to suggest experiencing. This non-factive propositional attitude is  
directed at a propositional content, which is true when the perception in question is 
veridical and false when it is non-veridical. The content of my EX-ing at any given 
time is a proposition which states how the scenarios before my senses would have to 
be if the EX-ing in question is to be veridical. (: )  
 
Of course, what Byrne calls ‘EX-ing’ I have been calling ‘visually entertaining’. 
However, what we call the relation (or ‘mode’, or ‘attitude’) that is involved here is 
not important. The crucial point is that this relation is to be understood as a theo-
retical posit of intentionalism. The whole notion of visually entertaining a content is 
introduced by the intentionalist as a means of setting out a theory of visual experi-
ence. It is, therefore, not a relation that we already have some pre-theoretical grip 
on, or that our pre-theoretical ontology of mind already recognises. Rather, the vis-
  
ually entertaining relation is a theoretical posit of intentionalism that is just stipulat-
ed to be such that when one stands in this relation to a content one thereby has an 
experience of a certain kind, with certain phenomenal character. In positing the vis-
ually entertaining relation, then, intentionalists end up positing a hitherto unheard 
of propositional attitude. In short, according to intentionalism, ‘visual experience is 
a sui generis propositional attitude’ so that experiencing amounts to ‘visually enter-
taining a content concerning the scene before the eyes’ (Johnston : —). 
 What we have, then, is an undefined primitive relation—visually entertaining—
said to be belief-like but distinct from belief, such that in visually entertaining a 
content involving some quality Q, one comes to gain depictive knowledge of it. 
What I submit is that due to the theoretical nature of the notion of visually enter-
taining, it cannot ‘bear the weight’ that must be placed upon it if the intentionalist 
explanation of Depictive Knowledge is to hold. We know that believing a content 
involving Q is not enough to gain depictive knowledge of it. The trouble is that we 
simply are not told enough about the theoretical notion of visually entertaining to see 
why visually entertaining a content involving Q, as opposed to say believing such a 
content should be able to provide depictive knowledge of the relevant quality.22 
 We might compare here Campbell’s (, ) argument that if the inten-
tionalist view is true, then perceptual experience cannot play the role (which it evi-
dently does play) of enabling us to think and talk about particulars for the first time. 
The idea is that thinking and believing propositions about these particulars is a mat-
ter of entertaining contents about them. What Campbell queries is whether there 
could be any propositional attitude that is more basic than those of belief and 
thought that could explain our capacity to come to think about the relevant particu-
                                                   
22 Rather than taking ‘visually entertaining’ to be a primitive notion within the intentionalist 
theory, there is room for the intentionalist to instead try to define this notion in terms of the Ram-
sey-Lewis method for defining theoretical terms, i.e. in terms of its functional or theoretical role 
within the intentionalist theory (cf. Pautz , , ). However, this move leaves the inten-
tionalist facing a dilemma. For either being such as to ground depictive knowledge of the qualities in 
visually entertained contents is one of the functional roles in terms of which ‘visually entertaining’ is 
defined or it is not. If it isn’t, then we still lack an adequate conception of how visually entertaining a 
content involving a quality could supply depictive knowledge of it. But if it is, then the explanation 
begins to look rather circular. Suppose for example we ask: why does visually entertaining a content 
containing blue as a constituent enable me to know for the first time what it is like for items to be 
blue? Saying that this is because by definition, the term ‘visually entertaining’ picks out a relation R  
(if it picks out anything at all) such that if one stands in R to a propositional content involving blue 
then, among other things, one thereby knows, for the first time, what it is like for items to be blue 
does not seem like a terribly convincing answer to our question. 
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lars, and in terms of which experience might be conceived. Obviously the intention-
alist thinks that there is, for otherwise there is no prospect of developing an inten-
tionalist view. Yet ultimately, intentionalists end up relying on the primitive notion 
of sensorily/visually entertaining a content. Therefore, it remains unclear if the re-
sultant propositional attitude that the intentionalist identifies experiencing with 
could provide anyone with the novel knowledge about the relevant particulars after 
all. Now I am arguably making a similar claim. Just as perceptual experience can 
provide novel knowledge of particulars—so that we can come to entertain proposi-
tions about them in belief and thought—just so, visual experience can provide novel 
depictive knowledge of certain basic visual qualities. We can then entertain contents 
via belief and thought about those qualities and concerning particulars instantiating 
them. What I am presently querying is whether we can find any more basic proposi-
tional attitude, any mode of entertaining contents that is more basic than belief and 
thought, that could explain the capacities we gain, once we have had the relevant 
experiences, for entertaining in belief and thought the relevant propositions, e.g. 
about what red items are like. Like Campbell, it is my view that a primitive, theoret-
ical notion of sensorily/visually entertaining a content just will not do. Rather, we 
should look to a non-propositional conception of experience in terms of acquaint-
ance with the particulars and the relevant qualities themselves. For this conception 
would enable us to explain how we are able to entertain contents in belief and in 
thought about e.g. red items, having had the relevant experiences as of red things. 
The upshot would seem to be that we should conceive of experience presentationally 
if we are to account, not only for the fact that perceptual experience can enable us to 
entertain thoughts about new particular objects, as Campbell has argued, but also in 
order to explain how experience enables us to entertain thoughts and beliefs about 
objects instantiating the qualities that we can sense things as having. 
 I conclude, therefore, that the intentionalist theory cannot oﬀer a compelling 
explanation—and certainly not one that is more compelling than the explanation 
involving the Phenomenal Principle—of how Depictive Knowledge could be true. 
This may well count against the intentionalist theory, but for now what matters is 
that in light of this, plus the above regarding the universals-view, we have good rea-
son to accept the Explanatory Claim, namely, that the best explanation as to why 
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Depictive Knowledge holds is to accept that the Phenomenal Principle is true, i.e., 
that every experience as of an item x having basic visual quality F really consists in 
the presentation of some particular item y manifesting F, and to hold that this is 
why, in having that experience, a subject previously lacking a conception of what F-
things are like would now know what it is like for an item to have that very quality.  
 
.. The Case for Presentationalism 
 
Thus far, we have considered two alternative explanations as to why Depictive 
Knowledge is true. One appeals to the idea that we are presented in experience only 
with universals; the trouble here is that this is an implausible theory of visual experi-
ence that must be abandoned. Another appeals to intentionalism, and the idea that 
we can gain novel depictive knowledge of a basic visual quality by means of visually 
entertaining a content involving that quality. The trouble here is that this explana-
tion forces the theoretical notion of visually entertaining a content to do more work 
than it can handle. Thus we can conclude that at this point there is good reason to 
accept the Explanatory Claim: namely, that in order to explain why Depictive 
Knowledge holds we should accept the Phenomenal Principle. Putting this together 
with Depictive Knowledge, of course, entails the Phenomenal Principle. What we 
will now do is use this result to argue for presentationalism proper. To repeat, to 
accept presentationalism is to accept the following two principles, namely, the: 
 
Phenomenal Principle 
 If it visually appears to S as if there is some item x with basic visual quality F,  
 then there is some actual item, y, such that (i) y is F and (ii) S is having an exper- 
 ience that consists in the presentation of this item as the F-object that it is. 
 
And the, 
 
Inheritance Principle 
 If S has a visual experience consisting in the presentation of some object, x, as  
 the F-item that it is, then that experience inherits its phenomenal character from  
 the qualitative nature of x, i.e. the nature that x has by virtue of being F. 
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Thus far, we have argued for the first of these principles. In this section, I will argue 
for the second. Then I will summarise my argument for presentationalism.  
 
...   The Character Question  
 
As Pautz (forthcoming-a) points out, one thing that any theory of experience must 
do is answer the Character Question: that is, they must oﬀer an explanation in psy-
chological terms, why our experiences have the phenomenological characters that 
they do (cf. Pautz : ). What is wanted, specifically, is a psychological-level, 
constitutive explanation as to why our experiences have the phenomenal characters 
that they do.23 To raise the Character Question, therefore, we have to make the nat-
ural assumption that the phenomenal character of an experience is a psychologically 
non-basic property of it. Given this assumption, it then follows that whenever there 
is an experience having some phenomenal character, we can explain why this experi-
ence has the character that it does in terms of some more basic psychological prop-
erty that the experience has. Answering the Character Question would then amount 
to specifying this psychologically more basic property, i.e. the property that the ex-
perience has in virtue of which it has the phenomenal character that it does. Pre-
sumably, this property would flow from the most fundamental psychological nature 
of the experience in question. The idea, in short, is that phenomenology is ultimate-
ly grounded in the fundamental psychological nature of the experience.24 
 The point I now wish to emphasise, along with Pautz (manuscript-a), is that 
while this is rarely noted explicitly, naïve realists have an extremely natural and per-
suasive answer to the Character Question, at least when confined to cases of veridi-
cal sensing. That is, they have a very compelling explanation as to why veridical per-
ceptual experiences have the phenomenal characters that they do. For what naïve 
realists can say is that these experiences have the phenomenal characters they do be-
                                                   
23 On constitutive (grounding) vs. causal explanations see Audi () and Dasgupta (). I 
assume we know what psychological-level explanations are: namely explanations given in psychologi-
cal terms. (For one philosopher who denies that a psychological-level explanation of phenomenal 
character given be given, and who thinks that we must look to the physical level, see Jackson .) 
24 I have stated the Character Question in terms of token-experiences and in terms of which psy-
chological properties explain why they have their distinctive characters. Alternatively, however, one 
could follow Pautz () and cast the Character Question in terms of personal level ‘experience 
properties’ and their instantiation. (In fact, I focus on this latter formulation later on, in chapter .)  
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cause of what the external objects and qualities that are presented are like. After all, 
according to naïve realism, the external item that is sensed in veridical perception is 
not merely extrinsically tied to the experience; rather the experience has the external 
object as a constituent, in such a way that the object and its qualities are able to 
constitutively determine the phenomenal character of the experience.25 To take an 
example from Kalderon (b), naïve realists say that in seeing a ripening tomato, 
the tomato is present in my awareness of it, so that: 
 
My perception of the tomato is not merely causally or counterfactually linked to the 
presence of the tomato, my perception is constitutively linked to the perceived toma-
to. And since my perception is constitutively linked to the tomato, the tomato, itself 
dappled in sunlight and shadow and partially obscuring the view of the chapel, shapes 
the contours of my sensory consciousness by being present in that consciousness. 
(b: ) 
 
Again, naïve realists have a very natural explanation as to why the tomato-experience 
has the phenomenal character that it does. For they can rely on the presentationalist 
explanation to the eﬀect that the experience simply inherits its qualitative character 
from the manifest nature of whatever is presented to the subject. This is something 
that Pautz (manuscript-a) stresses in detail; he says that we all share, pre-theoretical-
ly, a general naïve intuition to the eﬀect that the characters of our perceptual experi-
ences are grounded by the qualitative natures of the external items sensed, and that 
this fact alone could be used to mount a simple but persuasive argument for naïve 
realism. While I agree with Pautz in this, my aim at present is not to argue for naïve 
realism in this way. I just want to note how persuasive it is to think that an experi-
ence has the distinctive phenomenal character that it does because it inherits that 
character from the qualitative items it presents. 
                                                   
 25 Hawthorne & Kovakovich (: , fn. ) are right to point out that if objects are parts of 
singular propositions then a would be a part of Fa and hence if Fa were the content of experience e, 
then a would be a part of e, (given both transitivity and that the content of an experience is a part of 
it, as it seems to me it would be on intentionalist views), it does not follow that a would be a constit-
uent of the experience in the same way that it would be on naïve realism. Thus Logue (: , fn. 
) is right to say that singular content intentionalists ‘can’t get the same mileage out of the claim 
that yellowness is a constituent of a Russellian proposition the subject represents’ as naïve realists can 
when making seemingly analogous constituency claims about the objects of perceptual experience.  
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 Notably, this compelling style of explanation to a limited form of the Character 
Question, i.e. limited to the case of genuine perception, is an instance of a more 
general and equally compelling style of explanation, which we might call the presen-
tationalist explanation of phenomenal character. The idea is that in general, an experi-
ence has the phenomenal character that it does because it presents to its subject 
some item with a certain manifest nature, in such a way that the experience then 
inherit its character from this item and the nature it manifests. As Pautz explains, 
this presentationalist explanation of phenomenal character seems just as compelling 
as the naïve realist explanation of phenomenal character in just the perceptual cases 
(cf. Pautz manuscript-a on ‘Price’s Intuition’ and his forthcoming-b: , fn. ). 
 One might think that while a presentationalist answer to the Character Ques-
tion would be compelling if we presentationalism were true, the fact that we must 
reject presentationalist, since nothing is presented to us in hallucination, precludes 
us from answering the Character Question in this way. This worry, however, will 
not bother those who already see reason to endorse the Phenomenal Principle and 
the act-object conception of experience that goes with it—an act-object conception 
or, as we might say, a weak presentationalist conception, concerned with the struc-
ture of experience but not with the grounds of its phenomenal character. So suppose 
that we were to grant the Phenomenal Principle; as I have argued we have reason to 
do. We could then give an extremely compelling answer to the Character Question 
by saying the following: whenever a subject has an experience as of an object having 
basic visual quality F, that experience has the character it does because it has the 
property of presenting an F-thing as the F-item that it is. For it can then inherit its 
distinctive phenomenal character from that very item.  
 In short, the basic claim here is that once we have accepted the Phenomenal Prin-
ciple, the best way to answer the Character Question will be to adopt the Inher-
itance Principle. If that is right, however, then since the Character Question needs 
answering—and the better answer we can give, the better—we can argue from the 
Phenomenal Principle to the Inheritance Principle by abductive means. In short, the 
Character Question requires answering; but once we accept the Phenomenal Princi-
ple, we can explain why experiences as of items having basic visual qualities Q, 
Q…Qn have the phenomenal character that they do in terms of the presence of 
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objects actually having those qualities. Yet at this point, we have accepted not just 
the Phenomenal Principle but the Inheritance Principle as well. In short, the argu-
ment is that once we have argued for the Phenomenal Principle, we should accept 
the Inheritance Principle, for this then gives us a powerful answer to the Character 
Question (which is an important question that demands an answer).  
 Of course, we have already argued for the Phenomenal Principle. So at this 
point, we have reason to accept both that principle and the Inheritance Principle as 
well. In turn, this means we now have reason to adopt a presentationalist concep-
tion of experience as such, for that conception is captured by these two principles. 
Again, on this conception, any experience as of an item having some basic visual 
quality F or other, presents an actual object manifesting F in one’s experience of it; 
the phenomenal character of that experience is then determined, at least in part, by 
the manifestation of visual quality F (by the relevant presented object). 
 It might be said at this point that we cannot fully answer the Character Ques-
tion with the Inheritance Principle, concerned as it is only with basic visual quali-
ties. For what I have an experience as of some higher-order quality, say as of a 
church cleverly disguised as a barn, to take an example from Austin ()? This 
experience does not consist in the presentation of an actual barn. (Nor does the 
Phenomenal Principle imply this, given that it is restricted to basic visual qualities). 
So how do we explain its phenomenal character? There are in fact two possible re-
plies here. One reply is that while we see the item as a barn, and hence in some 
sense are acquainted with the quality of being a barn, this quality plays no role in 
grounding the phenomenal character of the experience; rather it is only the basic 
visual qualities given in experience that play this kind of role. On this kind of view 
only basic visual qualities play a role in grounding the phenomenal character of ex-
perience, even when non-basic visual qualities are seen. Another view, however, 
which I recommend to naïve realists in (..), is that instantiations both of higher- 
and of lower-order qualities play a role in grounding perceptual phenomenology. 
Strictly speaking, it would appear that naïve realists need not in fact choose between 
these options. For either way, we have achieved our goal of establishing that presen-
tationalism, conceived as the conjunction of the Phenomenal and the Inheritance 
Principle, is true. However, it is a nice question whether higher-order qualities, if 
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indeed they are presented to us in just the same sense as lower-order qualities are 
presented to us, play a role in grounding perceptual phenomenal character.26 
 Before moving on, note that I have not argued that accepting the Inheritance 
Principle is the only way of answering the Character Question. There are non-
presentationalist theories of experience like intentionalism and adverbialism that 
have answers to that question after all. What I am saying, rather, is that once we 
have accepted a weak presentationalist view that goes with accepting the Phenome-
nal Principle, we can then accept the Inheritance Principle, and in this way be able 
to provide what looks like the simplest and best answer to the Character Question. 
In short, having already accepted the Phenomenal Principle, there is good reason to 
draw on the Inheritance Principle in order to answer the Character Question, and 
hence there is good reason for accepting both of these principles. Once we have  
accepted these principles, however, we have accepted the kind of presentationalist 
view that this section has aimed to argue for. On that view, any experience as of any 
item having basic visual quality F really presents an actual item that has quality F, 
and the experience inherits its character from the nature of that presented thing. 
 Along with sense-datum theorists, therefore, it is my view that the presentation-
alist answer to the Character Question provides the simplest and best explanation as 
to why our experiences have the phenomenal characters they do. Intentionalists and 
adverbialists, as we will later see, have to appeal to properties such as that of visually 
entertaining a propositional content involving Fness or experiencing F-ly in order to 
explain why an experience as of an F-item has the character that it does; nor, as we 
shall see, are these explanations terribly compelling (cf. ..). However, just like 
the naïve realist in the perceptual case, presentationalists have it easy: they need only 
appeal to ‘presentationalist properties’ such as presenting an object that is F in order 
to explain why an experience as of an F-item has the character that it does. 
  
 
 
                                                   
 26 I will later argue that in hallucination we are only ever presented with items manifesting basic 
visual qualities. And I also claim that in such cases it is only the sensory items present to us, manifest-
ing these basic visual qualities, that constitutively determine phenomenal character. Yet I also explain 
at length how we can account for phenomenology that involves higher-order qualities. The explana-
tion involves drawing a distinction between sensory grounding and sensory modification (cf. . fn. ). 
  
...   Price and Presentationalism 
 
Thus far, we have argued for a presentationalist conception of experience. On this 
conception, every experience as of an item with basic visual quality Q, e.g. a thing 
having a certain colour, or a certain shape or size or visual depth, really involves the 
visual presentation of an actual item with that quality. The phenomenal character of 
the experience can then be simply but powerfully explained in terms of the real 
presence of that item manifesting the quality in question.   
 It is at this point, it seems to me, that we can see the true wisdom in the passage 
from Price that serves as the epigraph of this chapter. Price says: 
 
When I see a tomato there is much that I can doubt…One thing however I cannot 
doubt: that there exists a red patch of a round and somewhat bulgy shape, standing 
out from other colour-patches, a having a certain visual depth, and that this whole 
field of colour is directly present to my consciousness. (: ) 
 
If read epistemologically, there is much that is doubtful about this claim. After all, I 
can in fact doubt whether there is a red patch before me; perhaps, for instance,  
I have mistaken what is in fact a pink object for something that is red. However, 
when read, as I believe it was intended to be read, as a claim about the nature of  
experience, I think that Price is exactly right. For it is true that whenever we seem to 
see a thing, such as a tomato, we do at least have an experience involving the presen-
tation of some actual object, manifesting at least the basic visual qualities that the 
substance we seem to see appears to have. Thus, whether one is having a veridical 
perception, an illusory perception, or an hallucination, if one has an experience as of 
an item with some basic visual quality, there really exists an item with that quality. 
  Compare Johnston (manuscript-b: ), who notes that: ‘Strictly speaking, the 
proposition that there is a red patch of a round and somewhat bulgy shape, standing 
out from a background of other color-patches, and having a certain visual depth, 
and that this whole field of color is directly present to my consciousness is a proposi-
tion that can be doubted. For I can wonder whether my primitive recognitional  
capacities have gone awry, so that I am wrongly, say, seeing pink things as red. 
However, much of what Price is trying to convey is right…’ For my part, I find this 
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hard to disagree with. However, I also agree with Johnston that while it is famous 
among philosophers, this passage has nevertheless been neglected and has rarely 
been properly understood. Its main claim is simply not about epistemology, despite 
what Price seems to suggest, but rather about the metaphysics of experience; about its 
presentational nature, and the kinds of qualities that are always present when they 
seem to be. The central claim is that whenever a basic visual quality seems to be had 
by some real or apparent item, then something really instantiates that quality. 
 
.. Presentationalism and Naïve Realism 
 
In this section I address two questions. First, how do we integrate the presentational 
model of experience into a naïve realist view of perceptual experience? And, second, 
what constraints does the presentationalist conception of experience that we have 
argued for, especially with its commitment to the Phenomenal Principle, place on 
the kind of view of experience as such that naïve realists can go on to develop?  
 
...   Pure Presentationalism  
 
For reasons noted at the outset (see ..), this section has focused on the basic vis-
ual qualities. I also noted, however, that in veridical perception, at least, one can be 
aware of higher-order qualities, potentially for the first time; so that one can learn 
what it is like for an item to be a dog, say, just by having the relevant experience. 
Yet this is false of hallucinatory experience. That it is not false of perception, there-
fore, cries out for explanation. And there are two possible explanatory options. 
 One option would be to opt for a mixed view, of the sort that Anil Gomes 
() has recently defended (cf. Phillips  and Price ). The rough idea 
would be that in perception, while we perceive basic qualities by being presented 
with things that have them, we perceive higher-order qualities by representing 
things as having them. The result would be a dual-component view on which per-
ceptual experience has both a presentational and an intentional aspect. In genuine 
perception, we would be presented with things having basic qualities like colour and 
shape, yet we would also visually represent those things as having higher-order qual-
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ities like being a pig (the intentional element would be, if you like, an interpretation 
of the given, which would be comprised by the presentational element).  
 I would counsel against adopting any such view at this point. This is because 
naïve realists can stick with a pure presentationalist view and thus end up with a 
theory that is less complex both ontologically and ideologically. We would have no 
need for the notion of perceptual representation but only for the notion of presenta-
tion. On the view recommended, when we perceive a thing having a quality, this is 
always a matter of being presented with the thing instantiating the quality, regard-
less of the nature of the quality. Gaining novel depictive knowledge of the quality is 
always a matter of being confronted with an object that actually has that quality. 
 In short, once we have a presentationalist account of perceptual experience as 
regards the basic visual qualities like colour and shape, it would needlessly compli-
cate the theory if we were to bring in further resources in order to account for our 
awareness of higher-order qualities or non-basic qualities.27 Accordingly, absenting 
an argument to the eﬀect that we could only be aware of objects as having higher-
order qualities via representing things to have those qualities, we should maintain 
that whenever anyone has a veridical experience, as of any item having any quality 
whatever, one is presented with an actual item really instantiating that quality.  
 Of course, the higher-order qualities that we can be presented with in percep-
tion will (in some cases at least) depend on our antecedent conceptual capabilities. 
Thus, I side with Johnston (: ) in holding that in general, the greater one’s 
conceptual sophistication, the more one is able to ‘mine the scene…[for] exemplifi-
cations of the qualities that are in the perceptible scenario before one’. So I see no 
need for a ‘mixed view’—at least not in perception. Rather, we can have a through-
going presentationalist view of perception which is also thoroughly naïve realist.28 
 
                                                   
 27 Cf. the ‘Third Stage’ of Pautz’s argument against ‘Positive Disjunctivism’ as opposed to ‘Inten-
tionalism’ (: ), which rests on similar considerations of ideological and ontic simplicity.  
 28 Suppose also, as it is not implausible to think, that gaining novel depictive knowledge of some 
higher-order quality, which it is possible to do via having a perceptual if not an hallucinatory experi-
ence (cf. .), is something over and above gaining novel depictive knowledge of certain basic visual 
qualities (such that being aware of those qualities is what it is to be aware of some x as having the 
higher-order visual quality at issue). Then, if the actual presentation of an item having Q in experi-
ence e is the best explanation for why e has the property of being able to supply its subject with novel 
depictive knowledge of Q, this gives us yet further reason to think that we are presented with higher- 
as well as lower-order, or non-basic as well as basic, visual qualities in genuinely perceptual experience. 
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...   Experience and the Phenomenal Principle 
 
I want to conclude now with some remarks on how our acceptance of a presenta-
tionalist framework, conceived as the conjunction of the Phenomenal Principle and 
the Inheritance Principle, has implications for the kind of view of experience naïve 
realists can endorse. I have already said something about naïve realism, perceptual 
experience that is veridical, and presentationalism. Now I want to talk about naïve 
realism, presentationalism, and first illusory before hallucinatory experience.  
 As stated in chapter , I shall be assuming here that illusory experience is a kind 
of perceptual experience. Still, the Phenomenal Principle places constraints on what 
can be said about such experience that do not apply in the veridical case. This is, in 
fact, true in two respects, corresponding to the two core claims of naïve realism. 
Again, the first concerns the structure of experience as well as its objects. The idea is 
that every perceptual experience is a complex, relational event that in its nature con-
sists in the presentation of the very external items that one sees. The second con-
cerns the grounds of the phenomenal character of perceptual experience. This is the 
claim that the phenomenal character of such experience is constitutively determined 
by or inherited from the qualitative nature of what is given, that is, by the external 
items seen that the perceptual experience visually presents. Consider again the: 
 
Phenomenal Principle 
 If it visually appears to S as if there is some item x with basic visual quality F,  
 then there is some actual item, y, such that (i) y is F and (ii) S is having an exper- 
 ience that consists in the presentation of this item as the F-object that it is. 
 
And also once again the: 
 
Inheritance Principle 
 If S has a visual experience consisting in the presentation of some object, x, as  
 the F-item that it is, then that experience inherits its phenomenal character from  
 the qualitative nature of x, i.e. the nature that x has by virtue of being F. 
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Let us focus on the case of illusory experience. Here both of these principles seem-
ingly cause trouble. Consider first the Phenomenal Principle. Suppose I have an illu-
sory experience as of a blue bead in pink light which will in those circumstances ap-
pear black to me. The Phenomenal Principle implies that there is actually a black 
item of which I am aware. But what black item? Surely not the ball itself. In the 
classical argument from illusion, sense-data are appealed to at this point. But we 
then end up moving away from a naïve realist view and on to a sense-datum theory 
(cf. chapter ). Consider also the Inheritance Principle. The question is: what rele-
vant x is there in the presented scene from which the ‘blackish’ character of my ex-
perience can be inherited from? Again there seems to be no obvious answer. 
 I will address both of these questions in the following chapter. There will be no 
need to appeal to sense-data nor to depart from naïve realism as set out in chapter . 
However, we will be able to hold on to both principles and to the presentationalist 
conception of experience that when combined those two principles represent. 
 Take now hallucinatory experience. Imagine I have such an experience as of a 
red and round tomato. Is there really such an object? I am sympathetic to the intui-
tion that there would be at least something red and round, as the Phenomenal Prin-
ciple implies. However, many philosophers would want to deny this. For that road 
seems to lead to sense-data, or other ‘strange’ objects, which, since the latter half of 
the previous century at least, philosophers of perception have been trying to avoid. 
As for the second principle, if there is no red and round object, then there is no 
suitable x from which the character of the experience can be inherited. 
 This being said, in chapter , I will set out a view according to which both of 
these principles are respected, by bringing in sense-data (in line with Austinian Dis-
junctivism). Before this, in chapter , I will argue that as against contemporary wis-
dom on this matter, it is quite coherent for naïve realists to endorse this kind of view 
(more exactly, that they can do so the ‘screening oﬀ problem’ notwithstanding). 
 In sum, then, the presentationalist conception of experience places constraints 
on the kind of theory that naïve realists can adopt about experience; for it places 
constraints on what they must say about illusion and hallucination. However, I  
deny that this is a problem. Indeed, I claim that by respecting the two principles 
that constitute the presentationalist conception of experience, naïve realists end up 
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with a plausible presentationalist theory of experience as such; a ‘positive’, object-
level disjunctivist theory that is much more compelling than extant disjunctive 
views. 
 
. From Presentationalism to Naïve Realism 
 
Thus far, I have presented an argument for a presentationalist conception of experi-
ence, whereby accepting this conception is a matter of endorsing two principles: the 
Phenomenal Principle and the Inheritance Principle. In the rest of the chapter I will 
to do two things. In this section, I will establish that we can take presentationalism 
as a premise and use it to show that naïve realism is true. The final chapter then 
concludes with some remarks concerning the broader perception debate. 
 
.. Monistic Presentationalism and Qualitative Surrogates 
 
The presentationalist conception of experience that I am interested in consists in the 
conjunction of the Phenomenal Principle and the Inheritance Principle.  On the 
view we get by combing these two principles, every experience presents at least one 
item with at least some basic visual quality, and each experience derives its phenom-
enal character from the qualitative nature of the items that it presents. If an experi-
ence seems to present an object that is F, then by the Phenomenal Principle, that 
experience really consists in some item manifesting the quality of being F. By the 
Inheritance Principle, it then follows that the phenomenal character of the experi-
ence is constitutively determined by the presented item. We thus end up with: 
 
Presentationalism 
 Every visual experience consists in the presentation of some qualitative item or  
 other, i.e. an item manifesting at least certain basic visual qualities such as  
 colour, shape, and size, from which it then inherits its phenomenal character. 
 
Traditionally, those who have endorsed this kind of view have been monists regard-
ing the objects that experience presents. For such theorists have traditionally accept-
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ed the Common Kind Claim and have therefore maintained that no two experienc-
es can diﬀer either in terms of experiential structure or in terms of the basic kind of 
object they present. Let us say that anyone who holds this kind of view is a monistic 
presentationalist (cf. Kalderon ). 
 Naïve realists cannot be monistic presentationalists. Rather, if they are presenta-
tionalists at all, they must be pluralistic presentationalists, which is in eﬀect the same 
thing as being what we have earlier referred to as object-level disjunctivists. After all, 
naïve realists hold that perceptual experiences present ordinary external things from 
the immediate environment of the subject. However, it is definitely not true that a 
total hallucination could consist in the presentation of such an object. Rather, such 
an experience must consist either in the presentation of nothing at all, making us 
structural-level disjunctivists, or, given that we accept presentationalism, it must 
consist in some object other than an ordinary external thing, like a mind-dependent 
sense-datum. 
 We should note also that if we were to reject naïve realism and be monistic 
presentationalists, then we would end up having to endorse what I will call a ‘quali-
tative-surrogate view’ of perception. This is important because such views are prob-
lematic. Yet as we will see, the only way to be presentationalists without adopting a 
qualitative-surrogate view of perception is to endorse naïve realism. These claims, in 
fact, form the basis of my argument from presentationalism to naïve realism.  
 Suppose that you endorse monistic presentationalism. Then consider two expe-
riences, whereby one is a perceptual experience of a red tomato, the other is a quali-
tatively identical hallucinatory experience as of a red tomato. The object presented 
in the second case cannot be an ordinary tomato. It has to be what I shall call a 
mere qualitative-surrogate for such an object. That is, it must have the same basic 
visual qualities as such an object, though it will not in fact be a tomato. The idea is 
that one would mistake this item for a tomato were one not aware that one was hal-
lucinating. Given monistic presentationalism, whatever one is aware of in this case, 
be it a sense-datum or some other kind of non-normal object, one would be aware 
of an object of precisely the same kind in the matching perceptual experience. Call 
the hallucinatory object, so that we can remain neutral about its nature, a non-
normal object of awareness. This might be a sense-datum or a ‘Meinongian’ object 
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or some other kind of thing. The point is that in the perceptual case one would be 
aware of a non-normal tomato-like item as well. Moreover, that item, unless you 
knew the facts about the real nature of your perception, would fool you into think-
ing that it was a real tomato. Yet it would not be a tomato, it would be a mere qual-
itative-surrogate for a tomato. In general x is a qualitative-surrogate for an item of 
kind K just in is case it is a non-normal object of perception that is qualitatively just 
like a K, whereby a K is an item that intuitively one is able to perceive, like a toma-
to. Generalising from the example involving the tomato, the present point is that if 
we accept monistic presentationalism, then we must accept a qualitative-surrogate 
view, that is, a view on which we never perceive ordinary external objects in percep-
tion but only qualitative-surrogates for those objects. The sense-datum theory (in its 
Representative Realist form) is a classic (though not the only version) of this kind of 
view. As both Russell (: ) and Prichard (: ) incisively pointed out, the 
qualitative-surrogates we are aware of in perception would not be ordinary external 
things, but we would systematically mistake them for such items. Perceptual experi-
ences of tomatoes would consist in the presentation of qualitative-surrogates for to-
matoes, which we would systematically mistake for tomatoes. Yes, we would classify 
as seeing ordinary tomatoes, but only since the tomatoes that we would ‘see’ would 
be extrinsically connected to our experiences in the right way, and not by virtue of 
being what Broad would call objective-constituents of our experiences (the extrinsic 
connection is likely to be a causal one, but there are other options). 
 Let us say that in general, V is a qualitative-surrogate view of veridical percep-
tion iﬀ it implies that the experiences involved in such cases consist in the presenta-
tion of non-normal objects that are qualitative-surrogates for the external things we 
see. Note that on such a view, we can make perfect sense of the controversial di-
rect/indirect awareness distinction. For the qualitative-surrogates would be directly 
sensed; they would be the objective-constituents of the experiences partly compos-
ing them. Whereas the external things that we see would be indirectly sensed since 
we would sense them by virtue of (a) having an experience as of a suitable qualita-
tive-surrogate which (b) the external thing in question appropriately causes or is in 
some other way appropriate extrinsically connected to. (Austin  is wrong, 
therefore, to say that we can make no sense of this distinction. It is rather that this 
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distinction makes sense only within a given theory of perceptual experience; one 
that, I will argue, we would do well to avoid.) So for instance if I have an experience 
that consists in the presentation of a red, round and bulgy sense-datum, and if that 
experience is a perception of some actual tomato, because some actual tomato (say) 
causes the experience in the right way, then the qualitative-surrogate, i.e. the sense-
datum,  is the item that is directly sensed, and I indirectly sense the tomato itself. 
 The next sub-section argues that it is problematic to model our awareness of ex-
ternal particulars in veridical perception as indirect perception in this way. Instead, I 
argue, we should hold out for a view on which the external things themselves are 
directly seen. Given a presentationalist framework, however, we can end up with 
such a view only if we accept naïve realism about perceptual experience. Thus we 
arrive at this line of argument for naïve realism, which takes the more general 
presentationalist conception of visual experience as a premise: 
 
 () If presentationalism about experience is true, either a qualitative-surrogate  
  view of veridical perceptual experience is true, or else naïve realism is true. 
 ()  No qualitative-surrogate view of veridical perceptual experience is true. 
 () The presentational conception of visual experience is true. 
   Naïve realism is true. 
 
We have argued for () at length in the previous section. Nor is it hard to see, given 
what we have said so far, why () is true. For if presentationalism is true, then when 
I have an experience as of a tomato, I am aware of a tomato-like item that is red and 
that has a round and bulgy shape. It would be easily mistaken for a tomato. Thus, it 
is either the actual tomato that I take myself to be seeing, and so naïve realism is 
true, or it is a qualitative-surrogate for that tomato. Hence, if we can show that the 
qualitative-surrogate view of veridical perception should be rejected, we have reason 
to accept naïve realism. In short we should accept () as well as (). Consequently, it 
remains only to argue for (). That is the work of the following sub-section. 
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.. Against Qualitative Surrogate Views 
 
As Johnston (: ) explains, the main problem with adopting a qualitative-
surrogate view of veridical perception is that we end up with ‘paradoxical concep-
tion of [visual] experience’, whereby ‘the direct objects even of veridical sensory acts 
do not transcend what we can anyway hallucinate’. What we want is for the direct 
objects of veridical sensings to be external things themselves, not the non-normal 
objects that (given presentationalism) we sense in hallucination, which that can at 
best do duty for those objects by acting as qualitative-surrogates for them. That will 
be my main argument against qualitative-surrogate theories. As we will see, it is 
connected to the classic veil of appearances worry for qualitative-surrogate views. 
 I begin by discussing the so-called ‘veil of appearances’ worry for the traditional 
sense-datum theory.29 As we will see, all qualitative-surrogate views face this worry, 
and I believe that this is suﬃcient to motivate (). However, I also believe that 
much more could be said in favour of that premise. (The only thing preventing us 
from saying more is space.30) 
 It is often complained against the sense-datum theory, conceived as the view 
that our experiences consist solely in the presentation of mind-dependent sense-
data—so that genuinely perceptual experiences make us aware of external items only 
indirectly (because they stand in the right extrinsic connections to our experiences 
and perhaps also to the sense-data that are their objective-constituents)—that it 
erects a ‘veil of appearances’ or ‘veil of perception’ between ourselves and entities in 
the external world (cf. Bennett : ). The basic thought is that according to this 
kind of view, rather than just having unmediated access to external things, our ac-
cess to those things is mediated by awareness of distinct items, namely sense-data, 
and, therefore, by items of a kind that one could be aware of even in hallucination. 
Put diﬀerently, the idea is that on this theory, the sense-data ‘act as a kind of veil, 
draped between the subject and the external world’ (Wright : ).  
                                                   
 29 I am only focusing here, as I have been thus far, on Representative Realist forms of monistic 
presentationalism. So I set aside Phenomenalistic and Idealistic forms of the view in this thesis.  
 30 N.b., I do not think the standard arguments against sense-data would help us here. For one,  
I think that we can believe in sense-data, and that the arguments against them fail (cf. ..). Sec-
ondly, even if the traditional arguments against sense-data were to succeed, there would still be a 
wide array of qualitative-surrogate views to consider that may well be immune to those worries. 
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 There is much to say by way of developing this objection. For my part, however, 
the key thing to note is that we end up with a paradoxical notion of what it is to see 
an external object if we accept this kind of view. Moreover, I think that this objec-
tion holds, not just for sense-datum theories, but for the full range of qualitative-
surrogate views. The key complaint is nicely captured by Johnston as follows: 
 
We should reject the Conjunctive Analysis of veridical sensory awareness, especially its 
manoeuvring with the direct/indirect distinction. What is so odd about the analysis is 
that it entails that the objects of hallucination are present to us in a way that external 
particulars cannot be even when we are seeing external particulars. We should hold out 
for a view to the eﬀect that when we see external particulars, those particulars are no 
less ‘directly’ present to us than anything…in hallucination. (: ) 
Thus far, I have been using ‘conjunctivism’ to refer to any view that accepts the 
Common Kind Claim. Here, however, Johnston has in mind a narrower sense of 
the term, so that a conjunctive view is one whereby the immediate or direct object 
of awareness—i.e. the item that is what C. D. Broad would call an ‘objective-
constituent’ of the experience—is not an external item but a sense-datum or some 
other qualitative-surrogate for actual external items, i.e. the kind of thing one could 
be aware of even in total hallucination. Again, if any qualitative-surrogate view is 
true, then we can make good sense of the direct/indirect distinction. A direct object 
of some experience is an objective-constituent of that experience and so enters into 
its structure. Meanwhile, an indirect object is just the remote cause of, or else ex-
trinsically connected in some other way to, the experience in question, such that it 
counts as being the external item that the relevant subject sees. Hence it does not 
enter into the structure of the experience as a component as the direct object does. 
 The key complaint here is that it’s problematic to think that items of a sort that 
one could be aware of in hallucination are closer to the mind than the external things 
we see even in cases of genuine perception. For on the view in question, it is only the 
qualitative-surrogates that are actually made present to us in experience; the external 
things we’re said to see are mere remote causes of our experiences or else extrinsical-
ly connected to them in some other way. As Johnston () stresses, we should 
hold out for a view on which the direct objects of experience are not mere qualita-
tive-surrogates and on which the direct/indirect distinction gets no foothold. 
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 Some philosophers say that the ‘veil of appearances’ worry in fact brings out that 
we never really see external things at all: the surrogates ‘get in the way’ (see Alston 
: —).31 Others, in contrast, claim that the most we can make of the  
objection is that given qualitative-surrogate views, we are not aware of objects in the 
way we thought that we were. Here is Martin setting out this latter thought: 
 
It is common to complain against sense-datum theories that they deny that we have 
genuine awareness of objects in the world around us, to complain that they introduce 
a veil of perception. The best sense one can make of this complaint is really that sense-
datum theories are forced to say that the real nature of our sensory experience is not 
how it strikes us as being. (: —) 
 
Perhaps the fairest assessment here is that whilst Alston oversells the case—it is too 
early in the day to say that no form of conjunctive analysis can be made to work, i.e. 
that no qualitative-surrogate view can enable us to see, in some sense at least, exter-
nal things—I think that Martin undersells it. For the trouble here, as against Martin, 
isn’t just that seeing turns out not to be what we thought it was, i.e. the direct ap-
prehending of external things as the objective-constituents of our experiences. Ra-
ther, the trouble here is that if this is all that seeing is, then seeing is not what we 
thought it was at all. So the view does not just conflict with our ordinary concep-
tion of matters, but rather does serious violence to it. We might sum this up by  
saying on the model of seeing advocated by qualitative-surrogate views, we just do 
not have acquaintance with external things. Instead, we have a mere pale imitation 
of acquaintance. Accordingly, not only is our ordinary conception of seeing false 
given any qualitative-surrogate view, but in addition, we end up with an inferior 
substitute for what we took ordinary seeing to be; i.e. with degraded acquaintance. 
Indeed, my main objection to qualitative-surrogate views is essentially that the pale 
imitation of genuine seeing it puts in place of our actual conception of seeing things 
just will not do. The worry is nicely expressed by Barnes (—) as follows: 
 
                                                   
 31 I have considerable sympathy with this worry, although I do not rely on it here. Note, howev-
er, that it would be extremely natural to identify seeing with being visually presented with an external 
object. But given this, qualitative-surrogate views would entail, absurdly, that we do not see external 
objects: that the external world is invisible (for a related argument to this eﬀect see Johnston ).  
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The sensum theory can and does urge that in a Pickwickian sense of the term perceive 
we do perceive physical objects, i.e., we perceive sensa which are related in certain 
ways to physical objects. Nevertheless there is no doubt that, when presented with this 
type of explanation, we are apt to feel that we have been given a very inferior substi-
tute in exchange for the direct acquaintance with physical objects. (: )  
 
The ‘sensum theory’ is just another term for the sense-datum theory (it was C. D. 
Broad’s preferred term). So Barnes is not concerned here with qualitative-surrogate 
views as such in this passage. Yet, his point easily generalises. Intuitively, the things 
that we are visually presented with in experience are the ordinary external things 
themselves; as Brewer () writes, they are the ordinary, every-day empirical  
objects we know and love. Indeed, our intuitive conception of what it is to see those 
things is that we see them precisely by having them as the objective-constituents of 
our experiences: that is, by having them visually presented to us in experiences with 
presentational structure. This is the sense of seeing conveyed so very well by the fol-
lowing passages from Pautz (forthcoming-a), who notes that, intuitively: 
 
[W]e perceive ordinary physical things in this strong sense: the [phenomenal] character 
of our [perceptual experiences] is constituted by our simply perceiving the character of 
real things….in the external world. [Thus] the real, concrete states of things them-
selves shape the contours of our [perceptual] experiences. (forthcoming-a: —). 
  
The trouble, then, is that whilst the sense-datum theorist can perhaps say that we do 
see external objects—by virtue of those things being extrinsically connected to our 
experiences in certain relevant ways—she cannot say that we see external things in 
the most intuitive and natural sense; the one so well-articulated by Pautz in the pas-
sage above. Indeed, we seem to see external things only in a ‘Pickwickian’ sense. 
This is what Barnes brings out so well in the passage above. But if this is so, then 
given any qualitative-surrogate view, we may be said to see external things only in 
this ‘thin’ or ‘Pickwickian’ sense. Yet we cannot be said to have direct acquaintance 
with those things, of the sort that we would have were naïve realism true, so that 
our perceptual experiences would be partly constituted by the very external items 
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that we see. It follows that we never really see the external things around us in the 
intuitive way that we pre-theoretically accept.  
 In short, then, what’s deeply wrong with the sense-datum theory is that it leaves 
us with a poor substitute for the kind of acquaintance that we thought we had with 
external items. This complaint, however, can be generalised to any view on which 
we are presented with qualitative items that are not ordinary external things. Thus, 
it applies to all qualitative-surrogate views. This is the degraded acquaintance objec-
tion. According to these theories, instead of being aware of ordinary things in per-
ception, by having those things as objective-constituents of our experiences, we are 
aware of them in a merely Pickwickian sense. We may have some sort of awareness 
with external things, but of a deeply degraded kind. We should, therefore, reject this 
kind of view. Within a presentationalist framework, however, the only possible re-
placement is a naïve realist view, on which we are simply presented with the external 
things themselves, so that the experience consists, in its nature, in the presentation 
of the very external items seen, and not with mere surrogates thereof.   
 In eﬀect, then, the result is that presentationalists must be naïve realists and ob-
ject-level disjunctivists. Otherwise, they cannot avoid an implausible qualitative-
surrogate view of veridical sensing. Our argument for presentationalism, therefore, 
provides independent support for naïve realism and for the kind of disjunctivism 
that I prefer, whereby every experience presents some qualitative item to its subject.  
 
. Concluding Remarks 
 
I have argued, in this chapter, that we should endorse a presentationalist conception 
of experience, and that we can do so consistently with rejecting the sense-datum 
theory and instead endorsing naïve realism and object-level disjunctivism. In this 
way, we can accept one of the major insights of the sense-datum theory, yet without 
making the error of supposing that in perception, we are presented with anything 
but the external entities that we ordinarily take ourselves to see. 
 I have also argued that we can use this conclusion to build a novel case for naïve 
realism. If presentationalism is true, then either naïve realism is true or else some 
form of qualitative-surrogate view is true. Yet we have good reason to reject any 
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form of the latter view. So, given the presentationalist model of experience, we end 
up with strong reason to endorse the naïve realist picture of perceptual experience. 
 At this point, I want to conclude with a word about the broader debate regard-
ing perception and experience in the last hundred years or so. For a long time, espe-
cially in the first half of the twentieth century, but arguably also in the writings of 
early modern philosophers like Locke and Berkeley, the sense-datum theory proved 
extremely popular. (Of course, the early-modern philosophers referred to sense-data 
ideas or impressions, but this is just a terminological diﬀerence.) In eﬀect, a qualita-
tive-surrogate view is what you get when you combine a presentationalist concep-
tion of experience with conjunctivism (and hence the Common Kind Claim). Now 
I believe that adverbialists and intentionalists were right to see a tension here, and 
hence to see a problem with the sense-datum theory. The trouble is that presenta-
tionalism plus conjunctivism leads to some form of qualitative-surrogate view, of 
which the sense-datum theory is a paradigmatic example, and hence to an untenable 
model of perceptual cases. What I wish to conjecture, however, is that adverbialists 
and intentionalists went the wrong way in abandoning the presentationalist concep-
tion of experience and in holding on to conjunctivism with the Common Kind 
Claim at its heart. I realise that this move was made as a means of avoiding qualita-
tive-surrogate views such as the sense-datum theory. As we have seen, however, 
there is another way. Indeed, there is a better way. This is to reject conjunctivism 
and the Common Kind Claim, embrace disjunctivism instead, and retain a naïve 
realist view. One is then able to have one’s cake and eat it too: one can endorse na-
ïve realism, and yet also accept the most intuitive model of experience as such: 
namely, the presentationalist conception that I have argued for in this chapter. 
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Chapter  
Visual Illusion and Objective Looks  
 
 
To say that a wall which is white…but not bluish-white looks 
bluish-white…is merely another way of saying that I am directly 
aware of an expanse which really is…bluish-white. 
 
                     —  Moore, G. E. (: ) 
 
As we noted in chapter , naïve realism is in the first instance a view concerning  
veridical perception. We also noted that, prima facie at least, naïve realism does not 
easily generalise to illusory perception. However, I also said that naïve realism could 
be extended to cases of illusion. This chapter explains how this can be done.  
 In the first section, I draw out an ambiguity in the claim that the phenomenal 
character of an experience is constitutively determined by the nature of its presented 
objects (.). For there is a weaker and a stronger reading here, depending on 
whether we take the external, presented elements of an experience to fully or else 
merely partially determine its phenomenal character. I also note that naïve realists 
face a challenge when it comes to holding on to the stronger claim. The rest of the 
chapter is then structured around what we can call the traditional argument from 
illusion, which aims to show, rather ambitiously, that from the possibility of cases of 
illusion, we can conclude that we are only ever presented with sense-data in percep-
tion and never with external objects. In the second section, I set out a valid form of 
this argument, based on presentations by various contemporary philosophers (.). 
There I will note that in light of the previous chapter, we face an interesting con-
straint in rebutting the argument. For naïve realists usually reply by abandoning the 
Phenomenal Principle; yet it is impossible to make that move if naïve realists are to 
be presentationalists. Having set out the argument from illusion, the third section 
then introduces resources that will allow us to respond to that argument while re-
specting the Phenomenal Principle (.). Interestingly, this style of response re-
mains consonant with the broadly Austinian style of reply that naïve realists general-
ly prefer, which involves claiming that in cases of illusion, we are simply presented 
with the external item in question looking to be some way that it is not, whereby 
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the look it has is an objective look that it would have even were no one looking at it. 
In turn, this view of matters leads not only to a novel response to the classic argu-
ment from illusion, but to a novel analysis of objective looks, whereby these are to 
be conceived as a kind of item broadly analogous to sounds or tastes. The final sec-
tion then returns to our initial problem concerning how the presented elements of 
an illusory experience could constitutively determine its phenomenological charac-
ter. I argue that given the theory of illusory experience defended in this chapter, we 
can hold on to the idea that the phenomenal character of every perceptual experi-
ence is constitutively determined solely by the external objects it presents (.). 
 
. Objects and Character  
 
Naïve realism comprises two main claims: (i) that perceptual experiences consist in 
the presentation of external things, and (ii) that those external things constitutively 
determine the phenomenal characters of our perceptual experiences. In my view, 
both of these theses can ultimately be said to hold not only regarding fully veridical 
experiences, but also regarding illusory experiences. The aim of this present section, 
however, is simply to point out an ambiguity in the second core claim of naïve real-
ism, which leads to two possible readings of it. We will also see that naïve realists 
have trouble holding on to the stronger reading due to cases of perceptual illusion. 
 
.. Disambiguating  
 
The second thesis of naïve realism is that the phenomenal character of each percep-
tual experience is constitutively determined by the qualitative nature of its objective-
constituents or presented items—i.e., the external things that the experience pre-
sents. This claim, however, admits of at least two readings (French ). To bring 
this out, we can appeal to the intuitive distinction between full and partial constitu-
tive determination, or what is sometimes called full versus partial grounding (Fine 
; Rosen ; Schaﬀer ). When x has some conjunctive property  
C = FG, then x has C only partly in virtue of having F, for x’s possession of C has 
to be plurally grounded in its possession of F and its possession of G taken together. 
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Contrast this case with having the disjunctive property D = FG. With this prop-
erty, if x is F (but not G, let us say), the fact that x is F fully grounds the fact that x 
has D. After all, having F is suﬃcient for having the disjunctive property D of 
which F is a disjunct. These examples should provide a conception of what the full 
versus partial determination distinction looks like. We also gain a sense of what con-
stitutive over-determination would be—a notion I appeal to later on, in chapter .1 
 With this in mind, we can see how the second core naïve realist claim admits of 
two readings. On one reading, we have a claim of full constitutive determination. 
On the other, second reading however we have a claim of partial constitutive deter-
mination. We thus end up with two possible theses. Let us call these: 
 
Ambitious Naïve Realism 
 For each perceptual experience, p, with phenomenal character C, the fact that p  
 has C is constitutively determined solely and fully by what the external items  
 that it presents are like. 
 
And,  
 
Modest Naïve Realism 
 For each genuinely perceptual experience, p, with phenomenal character C, the 
 fact that p has C is constitutively determined, although only in part, by what the  
 external items that it presents are like. 
 
(Henceforth I refer to these principles as ‘Ambitious’ and ‘Modest’ respectively.) 
 
Given the plausible principle that if some x has some property F only partly in  
virtue of having G, then there must be some further property, H, distinct from G, 
in virtue of which x has F, Modest implies that it is not just the presented elements 
that constitutively determine or ground the phenomenal character of experience, 
                                                   
 1 For suppose that x has D fully in virtue of having F but also fully in virtue of having G. Here 
we have what Rosen (: ) calls a clear case of ‘harmless metaphysical overdetermination’. 
(N.b. not all cases of metaphysics or constitutive overdetermination are ‘harmless’. If a theory implies 
that we have systematic overdetermination, then that provides us with good grounds to reject it.) 
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since there is also a further factor at work—although the nature of this further  
element that grounds the character of the experience is left open. Hence, Modest 
entails the falsity of Ambitious, which says that the external objects are the full and 
the sole grounds of the phenomenal character of genuinely perceptual experiences.   
 
.. Modest or Ambitious? 
 
There may be various reasons for preferring Modest to Ambitious. However, I am 
interested here in the idea that one might have to ‘retreat’ to Modest due to the tra-
ditional cases of illusion, such as the case, for example, wherein a white wall bathed 
in yellow light looks yellow, despite not actually being so. There is, of course, a great 
deal of literature concerning such illusions, and I do not discuss all of this work 
here.2 Rather, my aim is to try to show that naïve realist need not retreat from Am-
bitious to Modest despite the existence of the traditional cases of illusion. 
 The reason that illusion might force us to retreat from Ambitious to Modest is 
clear. Suppose that I have an illusory experience wherein I perceive a green, oval  
tomato as red and round due to unusual lighting conditions. In this case, how can 
the actual character of the object that I see ground the character of my experience? 
After all, nothing I see has the qualities that would account for an experience with 
that character. In short, the trouble is that since there is nothing in the presented 
scene to fully ground the phenomenal character of the experience, we will have to 
retreat from Ambitious to Modest. For even if some elements of the presented scene 
perform some genuine grounding work vis-à-vis the character of the experience, we 
will have to appeal to further elements to fully ground the experience’s character.3  
 Is it really possible to develop a form of naïve realism that puts Modest in place 
of Ambitious? There are, in fact, various ways to do this. Perhaps the most popular 
way in the current literature is to invoke the notion of a ‘standpoint’ or ‘point of 
view’, as in Brewer () and Campbell (, ); cf. French (, ) and 
Phillips (). On this picture, the phenomenal character of an experience is de-
                                                   
 2 See e.g. Brewer (, ); Campbell (, ); Cassam (); French (, ); 
Johnston (, a); Martin (); Millar (); Phillips (), and Travis (). 
 3 One might, of course, be able to retain Ambitious for fully veridical cases. However, it would 
appear, prima facie, that for some illusory perceptual experiences, only Modest is going to hold. 
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termined not just by the objects that it presents, but also by the standpoint of the 
subject.4 A second option, not necessarily incompatible with the first, and which 
various authors have appealed to, involves the idea that we can be aware of objects 
in certain specific ways, whereby this idea goes beyond the uncontentious thought 
that we can be aware of objects via diﬀerent sensory modalities (Kalderon a; 
Martin ; Soteriou ). The central thought is that the way in which a subject 
sees something might partly determine the character of the experience that she has, 
in addition to the nature of the objects that she sees. Finally, there is the idea that 
objects can be presented to subjects of perception under certain modes of presenta-
tion, so that the presentation relation is really three- rather than two-place. In eﬀect, 
adopting this view amounts to adopting a form of the ‘theory of appearing’ (Alston 
; Langsam ; Johnston , , a, ). The thought is that the 
phenomenal character of an experience is constitutively determined not (or not just) 
by how the object is, but by how the object appears to the subject in the experience.5  
 I lack the space to discuss these views in detail. What I do want to stress, howev-
er, is that given the view of illusion I develop here, we can retain Ambitious, and, 
hence, do not have to complicate our theory of perception by appealing to stand-
point conditions, or to sui generis manners of perceiving, or to modes of presenta-
tion, etc. Nor need we think of the relation of presentation as three- rather than 
two-place, as on the theory of appearing, and indeed also on many views that appeal 
to standpoint conditions, like those of Brewer and Campbell. I mention this be-
                                                   
 4 One can distinguish two ways in which the ‘standpoint’ of the percipient might influence the 
phenomenal character of her experience. On one conception, the standpoint simply fixes the objects 
that one is aware of; those objects then fully determine the character of the experience. As French 
() puts it, this is to view standpoint conditions as playing only a ‘selective role’ in grounding 
phenomenal character. What is really needed, however, if we want a view on which it is not solely the 
objects of an experience that constitutively determine its phenomenal character, is a conception 
whereby standpoint conditions play what French calls an ‘additive role’. The idea is that somehow, 
the standpoint itself constitutively determines the phenomenal character of the experience, perhaps 
in addition to or alongside the external objects that the relevant experience presents. 
 5 Regarding this third option, one could in fact argue that what we end up with is a view that is 
in fact incompatible not just with Ambitious but with Modest as well. For take a case in which some 
a is actually F. Then take some other case wherein some b is not in fact F but yet looks F. The theory 
of appearing implies that my experience of a has the same nature as my experience of b—for both 
consist in the relevant item standing in the three-place relation x appears F to y. Therefore, since the 
character of the experience of b is obviously not at all determined by the Fness of b (since b is not F), 
then (assuming there is no overdetermination), it follows that the experience of a does not derive its 
character from the Fness of a, even though a really is F. Given the theory of appearing, then, we 
seem forced to reject the central naïve realist idea that the external things themselves, and the quali-
ties that they manifest in being seen, determine the characters of the experiences we have of them.  
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cause it seems to me to be an important virtue of the theory that I develop in this 
chapter. That view, it seems to me, leaves us with a simpler, and I think purer form 
of naïve realism than one would have were one to adopt one of the above-
mentioned views. After all, on the version of naïve realism that I develop, perceptual 
experience, even in cases of illusory experience, is nothing over and above the 
presentation of external items, whereby presentation is a two-place mental relation, 
and the phenomenal character of a perceptual experience is grounded solely and ful-
ly in its presented items, i.e. the qualitative nature of the external items it presents.  
 To show that the possibility of illusion does not prevent us from accepting this 
kind of view, I begin by considering what might called the traditional argument 
from illusion (against naïve realism), which is concerned with the first rather than 
the second core naïve realist claim, namely, that our perceptual experiences consist in 
the presentation of ordinary external items. The aim of this argument is to appeal to 
illusion in order to undermine this claim, replacing it with the idea that we are in-
stead presented in all cases of perception with mind-dependent sense-data. 
 Accordingly, the next section of this chapter sets out the traditional argument 
from illusion, plus some constraints on answering that argument drawn in part from 
the main conclusion of the previous chapter, namely, that all experiences are presen-
tational, so that the Phenomenal Principle must be true. I then develop a reply to 
the argument from illusion in the following section. Ultimately, what we end up 
with is a view of illusion that allows for ‘Ambitious Naïve Realism’ to hold. 
 
. The Argument From Illusion 
 
The traditional ‘argument from illusion’ aims to demonstrate that our perceptual 
experiences consist, not in the presentation of external objects as naïve realists main-
tain, but rather in the presentation of mind-dependent items (or ‘sense-data’ in the 
contemporary sense). Moreover, there is, amongst naïve realists, a standard way of 
replying to this argument, which traces back to Austin (). At the heart of this 
response are two central ideas. One is to reject the:  
 
 
  
Phenomenal Principle 
 If it visually appears to S as if there is some item x with basic visual quality F,  
 then there is some actual item, y, such that (i) y is F and (ii) S is having an expe- 
 rience that consists in the presentation of this item as the F-object that it is. 
 
The other idea is that in cases of illusion, the subject is presented simply with the 
external object seen, whereby this item objectively looks to be some way that it is 
not, i.e. the object has a certain look, say the look of a bent thing, yet without actu-
ally being the way it looks, e.g. without actually being bent. (The look is objective 
since the object has this look regardless of whether anyone is looking at it.) The key 
idea is that given these two claims, there is no need to appeal to sense-data, con-
ceived as mind-dependent objects of experience, to handle cases of illusion. All that 
we need are the external items looking to be certain ways that they are not in fact. 
 I agree with the second part of this reply. Following Austin, naïve realists should 
claim that in illusion, one is simply presented with the external item ostensibly seen, 
looking to be some way it isn’t. However, I disagree with the first part of the reply, 
i.e. with abandoning the Phenomenal Principle. For whilst it’s now commonplace 
to view this principle as being obviously false at best, in my view this principle is cor-
rect (cf. chapter ). Thus, in this chapter, I will explain how naïve realists can retain 
the ‘Austinian’ response to the argument from illusion (which appeals to the idea 
that objects can objectively look certain ways that they aren’t) whilst accepting the 
Phenomenal Principle. Crucial to the proposed view will be the idea that amongst 
the external items that are presented to us in perceptual experience are not only ex-
ternal objects, i.e. external ‘substances’ or ‘objects in the weighty sense’, but also the 
objective looks of things, which are to be conceived as ‘sensible quality-instances’.6   
 
.. The Argument  
 
Various versions of the traditional argument from illusion have been presented 
throughout the history of philosophy. Some are cursory and unsatisfactory (see e.g. 
Hume /: §. ; Russell : —), whilst others are somewhat more 
                                                   
 6 N.b. ‘sensible’ here is an adjective modifying the term ‘quality-instances’. A sensible quality-
instance is, therefore, simply a quality-instance that is sensible, i.e. capable of being sensed. 
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detailed (cf. Martin: : ). The most sophisticated versions of the argument 
are to be found in the current literature. In what follows, I shall set out what seems 
to me the strongest version of this argument, based on the contemporary versions 
discussed by Robinson (); Smith (); and Snowdon ().  
 As Snowdon () notes, the argument proceeds in two main stages. First, we 
have the Base Case Stage, which aims to show that in cases of illusion, one has an 
experience that consists (exhaustively) in the presentation of some mind-dependent 
sense datum. Second, there is the Spreading Step, which aims to move from the Base 
Case Stage to the more general claim that all perceptual experiences consist in the 
presentation of mind-dependent items in this way. In what follows, I will focus on a 
particular case of illusion, namely, that of a blue bead in pink light, which, due to 
being in unusual lighting conditions, looks just like a black bead looks in ordinary 
conditions (cf. Kalderon b: ). 
  Let us refer to the specific case of me having this illusion as ‘C’. The argument 
from illusion that we will focus on can then be stated thus: 
 
() In C, it appears to me as if there is a black item before me. 
() If, in C, it appears to me as if there is a black item before me, then there really  
 is a black item that I am presented with. 
 In C, there really is a black item I am presented with. 
() In C, the external bead that I ostensibly perceive is blue, not black.  

 In C, I am presented with a black item that is distinct from the blue bead that I  
 ostensibly see. 
() If, in C, I am presented with a black item that is distinct from the blue bead that  
 I ostensibly see, then this black item is a mind-dependent sense-datum. 
 In C, I am presented with a black mind-dependent sense-datum. 
() It is not the case that, in C, I am presented both with the external blue bead  
 that I ostensibly see and with a black sense-datum. 
 In C, I am visually presented with a black sense-datum, but not with the blue  
 bead that I ostensibly see.   
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This is the Base Case Stage of the argument. From here, it is natural to infer two 
things. First, that in the specific case that we are calling C, my experience consists, 
exhaustively, in the visual presentation of the black sense-datum involved, and not 
in the presentation of the blue bead that I ostensibly see.7 And, second, that the 
same basic line of reasoning as in the argument above would apply to any similar 
case of illusion. (After all, C was only an arbitrary case.) In this way, we end up with 
the result that all illusory experiences consist in the presentation of sense-data mani-
festing the basic qualities that the external things that we ostensibly see appear to us 
to have, rather than consisting, as we naïvely think, in the presentation of the rele-
vant external things themselves. The rest of the argument then continues like so: 
 
() If, in all cases of illusion, one’s experience really consists in the presentation of  
 some sense-datum D rather than the external thing ostensibly perceived, then  
 every perceptual experience consists in the presentation of sense-data rather than  
 the external objects that the subject ostensibly perceives. 
 Every perceptual experience, whether veridical or illusory, consists in the in the  
 presentation of mind-dependent sense-data, rather than in the presentation of  
 the ordinary external things that we ostensibly see.
 () If every perceptual experience consists exhaustively in the presentation of  
 sense-data rather than ordinary external things, then naïve realism is false.  
Naïve realism is false.8 
 
This is the Spreading Step of the argument. Here we move from the conclusion of 
the Base Case Stage, concerning perceptual illusion, to a claim about perceptual ex-
perience as such. This claim, moreover, is incompatible with naïve realism, and in 
particular, with the first core claim of naïve realism concerning not only the struc-
ture of perceptual experience but also its objects (viz. that they are external things). 
                                                   
 7 Presumably, this sense-datum would need to have at least certain of the qualities that the blue 
bead ostensibly perceived appears to have, such as its shape. After all, the phenomenology of the ex-
periential situation needs accounting for. We need a presented object manifesting just those qualities 
that are able to ground the phenomenological character of the visual experience in question. 
 8 This argument is valid only if we assume that external things are mind-independent. I will 
grant that here, but it is a nice question whether naïve realists should in fact build this into their theo-
ry out the outset. (That would rule out, for instance, the kind of Berkelian naïve realism Snowdon 
:  discusses, or the kind of Kantian naïve realism that Johnston : n.  leaves room for.) 
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 This argument, I think, captures the central thought that most proponents of 
the classical argument from illusion have had in mind. In essence, the argument is 
that cases of illusion show that naïve realism is false, by proving that perception  
only ever presents mind-dependent sense-data, instead of the ordinary mind-
independent objects we take ourselves to see. Moreover, the above argument is at 
least valid. The question, then, is whether it is sound. I want to say that it is not. 
But I have specific views on which premises we ought and ought not to reject.  
 
.. How To Reply (/How Not To) 
 
There are various ways to respond to this argument. However, by making certain 
plausible assumptions, we can narrow the space of options. One such assumption is 
that illusory experiences are genuinely perceptual. For this entails that naïve realists 
cannot accept even the Base Case Stage of the argument, which means rejecting the 
Spreading Step would be inadequate. For if illusory experiences are perceptual, then 
naïve realism entails that they consist in the presentation of external items. Howev-
er, this runs counter to the conclusion of the Base Case Stage, which says that illuso-
ry experiences consist in the presentation of mind-dependent sense-data rather than 
the external objects ostensibly perceived. The upshot is that we have to find some 
way of rejecting at least one of premises ()-(), regardless of what we think of the 
claims grounding the Spreading Step.9 In short, we must reject one of these claims: 
 
() In C, it appears to me as if there is a black item before me. 
 
() If, in C, it  appears to me as if there is a black item before me, then there really  
  is a black item I am presented with. 

                                                   
 9 For what it’s worth, in my view naïve realists would end up with a rather implausible position 
if their response to the argument from illusion involved blocking the Spreading Step whilst accepting 
the Base Case Stage. For they would then end up with a view whereby in cases of veridical percep-
tion, we are presented with mind-independent things, whereas in cases of illusion, we are presented 
with mind-dependent items. However, it seems to me that C. D. Broad (: ) is clearly right in 
claiming that ‘in view of the continuity between [cases of veridical perception and of illusion], such a 
doctrine’ would be utterly implausible and could be defended ‘only by the most special pleading’  
(cf. the discussions in Fish : ﬀ; Foster : ﬀ; Robinson: : ﬀ; Smith : ﬀ). 
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() In C, external bead that I ostensibly perceive is blue, not black.  
 
() If, in C, I am presented with a black item that is distinct from the blue bead that  
 I ostensibly see, then this black item is a mind-dependent sense-datum. 
 
() It is not the case that, in C, I am presented both with the external blue bead  
 that I ostensibly see and with a black sense-datum. 
 
We might refer to () as the Illusion Premise. This follows immediately once we 
grant the possibility of the relevant case of illusion. I am willing to grant this prem-
ise, as I believe that cases of illusion are possible—and I would grant all of the rele-
vant analogue premises one could deploy. As for (), this is an instance of the Phe-
nomenal Principle.10 Many philosophers think that this ought to be given up and 
hence that () should be rejected; we will return to that idea shortly. As for premise 
(), we might call this the Constancy Premise, since it follows from the notion of col-
our constancy—which entails that even in pink light, say, when looking black, the 
blue bead remains blue. I would suggest that we should accept this premise also.11 
Thus, we are left with premises () and (). We might refer to () as the Sense-
Datum Premise.12 This is perhaps the weakest link in the argument. As Warnock 
(: ) notes, that something isn’t an ordinary external object needn’t make it 
mind-dependent. Premise () might be referred to as the Uniqueness Premise. This 
too is not at all obvious. Moreover, according to both French & Walters (forthcom-
ing) and Snowdon (), it may not be easy to motivate. However, it seems to me 
that there’s at least a case to be made for it, concerning the grounding of phenome-
nal character. After all, once we know that we are presented with a black sense-
                                                   
 10 After all, colours are basic visual qualities. And I assume that black is a genuine colour, contra 
what some might want say. (One can, e.g., choose to dress in this colour; or to paint with it, etc.) 
 11 Armstrong (: ) and Fish (: ) suggest (individually) that we should reject this 
premise, at least regarding colour-illusions. On their view, a blue bead in pink light that looks black 
would actually be a black bead; the lighting it is in would not only make it look black, but would in 
fact make the bead black simpliciter. I am sympathetic with the intuitions that motivate this kind of 
view—there is a real temptation, perhaps especially with the colours, to countenance a genuine black 
item when we see an item that looks black. Note, however, that the view I develop in this chapter 
respects this intuition without doing violence to our intuitions about colour constancy. This seems to 
be a virtue that my own view possesses as against the ‘Armstrong-Fish’ proposal. 
 12 This is to be distinguished from what I have called the Sense-Datum Claim, which is a premise 
concerning hallucinatory experience in the Simple Argument from Hallucination (see . above). 
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datum in case C, we can fully account for the phenomenal character of my experi-
ence (assuming that if the sense-datum has some colour, it will have some size and 
shape as well—indeed, it will presumably have the size and shape of the ostensibly 
seen blue bead). The question is, given these facts about the presented sense-datum, 
what need have we to suppose that I am presented with the blue bead as well? After 
all, the phenomenal facts are already accounted for by the presentation of the sense-
datum. In fact, were I presented with the bead and the sense-datum, then we would 
seem to end up with the phenomenal character of my experience being overdeter-
mined. Given the ubiquity of the relevant kind of illusion, the result would then be 
widespread and systematic overdetermination of phenomenal character.13 In short, it 
appears that once we accept premise (), giving up () is not a plausible option.  
 In any case, if we can find a way to reject (), then there is no need for us to give 
up (). And as it happens, I believe that it is () we should reject. The rest of this 
chapter will set out a specific view of illusion that entails the falsity of this premise. 
 I also suggest that the other premises in the Base Case Stage of the argument 
should be granted. This makes my position, as a naïve realist view, somewhat non-
standard. At the same time, however, I also think that my view ultimately counts as 
a variation on the standard Austinian naïve realist reply to the argument that I have 
briefly sketched above. This will become clearer as we proceed. 
 
.. Austin’s Reply and a Variation 
 
On the standard Austinian line of response to the argument from illusion, which 
many contemporary naïve realists employ, one major move involves rejecting the 
Phenomenal Principle, and, hence, the premises that one can derive from it, such as 
() in our argument. The idea is that we should claim, as against (), that whilst the 
bead looks black, there is no black item that I am presented with. Rather, I am 
simply presented with the blue bead which in the relevant circumstances of percep-
tion has a black look. The bead objectively looks black, and it’s the-blue-bead-looking-
black that I see, and that is presented to me in my perceptual experience. To switch 
examples for a moment, consider the case of the ‘bent’ stick in water. Austin writes: 
                                                   
 13 That result, however, would appear to be problematic (cf. .. below). 
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What is wrong, what is even faintly surprising, in the idea of a stick’s being straight 
but looking bent sometimes? Does anyone suppose that if something is straight, then 
it jolly well has to look straight at all times and in all circumstances? Obviously no one 
seriously supposes this. So what mess are we supposed to get into here, what is the 
diﬃculty? (: ) 
 
The idea is that whilst the stick looks bent whilst submerged in water, it doesn’t fol-
low that there is really anything bent that’s present to my mind. Accordingly, fol-
lowing Austin’s lead, we might reply to our version of the argument from illusion 
by asking: what is wrong, even faintly surprising, in the idea that the blue bead 
looks black despite not actually being so, and that it is the blue bead, with its black 
look, that is presented to me, as having that black look, in my illusory experience of 
it? So far as I can tell, this is what many contemporary naïve realists would say. 
 Note, however, that given this view, an interesting question arises, namely, how 
exactly are objective looks to be analysed? For example, what does it take, or what is it, 
for an item to look to have some quality, say blue, that it actually lacks; a look, 
moreover, that it would have even were no one looking at it? 
 Several naïve realists have oﬀered putative analyses of objective looks (e.g. Brew-
er , ; Campbell , ; Kalderon b; Martin ). Whereas 
Austin appears content to leave the notion of a thing objectively looking to be some 
way that it is not unanalysed (cf. Travis ). In this chapter, however, I shall oﬀer 
a novel analysis of objective looks, i.e. of what it is for x to look to have basic visual 
quality Q without necessarily instantiating Q itself. Importantly, part of what is 
novel about this account is that it respects the Phenomenal Principle which the 
standard Austinian response denies. We thus end up with a variation on the stand-
ard Austinian reply, which takes up Austin’s key idea involving the objective looks 
of things, yet makes this idea compatible with the Phenomenal Principle.  
 In my view, it is a virtue of the proposed account that it accepts the (unfairly 
maligned) Phenomenal Principle, for as against contemporary wisdom, there is in 
fact good reason to endorse this thesis. I have already argued for the Phenomenal 
Principle in chapter  when defending the presentationalist conception of experi-
ence (.). However, I will also present some further considerations below (..). 
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.. The Phenomenal Principle Revisited 
 
As I have said, few contemporary philosophers accept the Phenomenal Principle. 
Indeed many explicitly reject it. However, I believe there are at least three good rea-
sons to accept it. One we have already seen in chapter . There, I was concerned 
with arguing for the idea that experience is presentational. A consequence of that 
argument, however, is that the Phenomenal Principle is true, i.e., that whenever one 
has an experience as of some item x manifesting basic visual quality Q, there really is 
some item or other, y, that exemplifies Q and of which one is aware (as having Q). 
In short, I think one main reason to accept the principle is that without it, we can-
not properly account for the fact that we can gain novel depictive knowledge of 
basic visual qualities in experience. Again, this is the main reason that I provided for 
accepting the presentational model of experience in chapter  above. 
 Here are two further reasons for accepting the Phenomenal Principle. One is its 
sheer intuitive force. Again, as we saw in chapter , it just seems deeply plausible to 
think that at least when it comes to the basic visual qualities, such as the manifest 
colour and shapes that things appear in experience to have, when we seem to see 
instances of these qualities, there really are things that exemplify those qualities, and 
with which we are presented. Hence the plausibility of remarks like the following: 
 
When I say ‘This table appears brown to me’ it is quite plain that I am acquainted 
with an actual instance of brownness…This cannot indeed be proved, but it is abso-
lutely evident and indubitable. (Price :  ) 
 
Many philosophers reject, often oﬀhandedly, the general intuition about the nature 
of experience that this remark expresses. Nevertheless, Price’s remarks have consid-
erable and indeed striking intuitive force.14 Thus, I would argue, with Snowdon 
(), that the deep psychological pull of the presentational model of experience 
and the associated Phenomenal Principle is what marks oﬀ a certain style of reply to 
                                                   
 14 These remarks appear to raise a puzzle: why do so many philosophers reject a principle express-
ing a general conception of experience that many of us find so deeply intuitive? Suggestion: I suspect 
that philosophers are attracted to the principle, but also see it as having consequences that they can-
not live with. (I, of course, believe that we can live with the consequences of that principle after all.)  
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the traditional arguments from illusion and hallucination, involving oﬀ-hand rejec-
tions of the Phenomenal Principle, as clearly inadequate. As Snowdon explains:  
 
A standard criticism of the argument [from illusion] is that its proponents simply as-
sume the truth of some such principle as – ‘if x appears F, then something is F’ – but 
that we have no reason to accept it. It seems to me that to say this is to fail to capture 
the psychological source of the appeal of the argument. For most people, the general 
principle, if accepted, is itself an implication of, or a generalisation from, a more fun-
damental conviction that, for a particular value of an apparent F (say, apparent colour, 
or shape) it is just obvious to inspection that there is something which is F. The more 
fundamental conviction is that to which a critic must speak. (: —) 
 
What Snowdon brings out so nicely here, it seems to me, is this: the trouble with 
these oﬀ-hand rejections, such as one finds in Austin (), say, or in Pitcher 
(: ch. ), is that there is something very intuitive about thinking about experi-
ence presentationally (cf. Ayer ). Indeed, were this not so, it would be hard to 
see why so many philosophers, throughout the early modern period, and then again 
throughout the first half of the twentieth century, thought about experience in pre-
cisely these terms, often assuming that this conception of experience required no 
argument. (Price :  also notes that this is how philosophers have tended to 
think about experience. Indeed it seems to me that this was the dominant view until 
the rise of reductive materialism in the latter half of the last century.15) 
 There is one final point I want to make in favour of the Phenomenal Principle. 
This has to do with the explanitoriness of that principle vis-à-vis the phenomenal 
character of experience.16 Essentially, accepting the Phenomenal Principle, and the 
presentationalist view of experience that motivates it, allows us to oﬀer a very pow-
erful explanation as to why our experiences have the phenomenal characters that 
                                                   
 15 What is the connection here? The point is that with the rise of reductive materialism philoso-
phers wanted to avoid commitment to sense-data or other abnormal objects of experience; yet a 
presentationalist view of experience entails that such items exist. Indeed, given the Common Kind 
Claim, it entails that they are ubiquitous in experience; that we are always presented with such items. 
However, I think we should reject the Common Kind Claim. As for the objects of hallucination, I 
think we can take these to be sense-data, yet also ‘fit’ these items into a respectable materialist view. 
 16 Strictly speaking, what follows also concerns the Inheritance Principle, which states that every 
experience inherits its phenomenal character from its presented objects. However, I continue to focus 
on the Phenomenal Principle for simplicity. (For the connection between these principles and the 
more general presentationalist conception of experience  cf. chapter  above.) 
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they do. To show this I will begin with some remarks from C. D. Broad, made in 
the context of defending the Phenomenal Principle when presenting a form of the 
argument from illusion in favour of his version of the sense-datum theory. 
 According to Broad, one of the main reasons to accept the Phenomenal Princi-
ple is that we need this principle in order to explain what might be called the rele-
vant ‘appearance facts’. The idea can be fleshed out in the following way. Whenever 
someone has an experience as of … (e.g. as of some red round object), then there is 
a certain ‘appearance fact’, namely, that the subject is having that very experience.17 
Broad’s central thought is that in order to explain the full range of appearance 
facts—not just those involved in veridical perception, but those involved in illusion 
and even hallucination too—we must appeal to the real presence of objects mani-
festing the relevant qualities. In connection with illusion in particular, Broad writes:  
 
When I look at a penny from the side I am….aware of something; and it is plausible 
to hold that this something is elliptical in the same plain sense in which a suitably 
bent piece of wire, looked at from straight above, is elliptical. If, in fact, nothing ellipti-
cal is before my mind, it is very hard to understand why the penny should seem elliptical. 
(: ) 
 
He also says: 
 
We say [the stick] looks bent [and] certainly do not mean by this that we mistakenly 
judge it to be bent…We are aware of an object which is very much like what we 
should be aware of if we were looking at a stick with a physical kink in it, immersed 
wholly in air. The most obvious analysis of the facts is that, when we judge that the straight 
stick looks bent, we are aware of an object which really is bent. (: ) 
 
What comes out clearly in these passages, especially in the sentences I’ve emphasised 
in italics, is that Broad is aware of a certain type of explanandum—what I have been 
calling appearance facts—and that he seems to think that the best way of explaining 
the appearance facts in a given case is by appealing to the presentation of an item 
                                                   
 17 According to Pautz (: ), whenever I have an experience as of (for example) a black 
bead—say by seeing an ordinary black bead in normal conditions, or a blue bead in pink light, or 
when hallucinating—there is a property that I have in all these cases. This is what Pautz calls an ‘ex-
perience property’, roughly, that of having an experience as of a black bead. It would be plausible to 
think of what I am calling the ‘appearance facts’ as instantiations of Pautz’s experience properties. 
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that actually has the relevant quality or qualities. Of course, in the above passages 
Broad is concerned with shape properties. The key idea is that if we are to explain, 
say, why a penny looks elliptical, despite the fact that it is not, then we have to sup-
pose that we are acquainted with something that really is elliptical. Now in my view, 
this reasoning seems compelling. Likewise with the case of the ‘bent’ stick in water: 
the stick is not bent, but it does seem to me, experientially speaking, as if it is; and it 
is hard to explain why things should seem to me that way if I were not presented 
with an actual instance of bentness. In short, to explain the appearance facts here, 
we need to appeal to an instance of the relevant quality—to something with the 
quality—being manifest in my experience. That, at least, seems to be the key idea. 
 Consider now our own example case. If I am aware of a blue bead in pink light, 
to stick with that example, then there is a certain appearance fact—it seems to me, 
experientially speaking, as if there is a black bead before me. Arguably, the best way 
to explain this, if not the only adequate way, is to appeal to an actual black item, 
and to suppose that my experience involves the presentation of that thing. In any 
case, we can agree that this would be a compelling explanation of the facts. There 
would be no mystery as to why it seems to me as if there is a black item before me if 
indeed I were having an experience consisting in the awareness of a genuinely black 
item, for the experience could then inherit its character from the presented thing. 
 It is worth noting, too, that this point can be generalised. One way to see this is 
to consider some remarks from Pautz (manuscript-a) regarding what he calls the 
‘general naïve intuition’. Pautz’s idea is that one could argue for naïve realism based 
on this ‘general naïve intuition’, i.e. the claim that intuitively, it is the very external 
objects that we see that ground the phenomenal characters of our perceptual experi-
ences. This seems exactly right to me; but I also think we find it equally natural to 
say much the same about non-perceptual experiences. If that is so, however, then 
there is good reason to think that we should accept the Phenomenal Principle in 
order to oﬀer the best possible explanation as to why our experiences have the phe-
nomenal characters they do.18 
                                                   
 18 I am, essentially, sliding here between talk of what grounds the character of a token experience 
and what explains why a subject instantiates a given experience-property, i.e. why a given appear-
ance-fact obtains. This fits with my claim in chapter  (fn. ) that in fact, we can raise the Character 
Question either in terms of token experience or in terms of person-level properties and facts. 
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 Naturally, there are other explanations that might be given as to why our per-
ceptual experiences have the phenomenal characters that they do. I would argue, 
however, that the presentationalist explanation is the best—and far better than any 
that could be oﬀered by non-presentationalist views like adverbialism or intentional-
ism. After all, these views force us to replace the natural idea of an experience inher-
iting its phenomenal character from the qualitative nature of the sensory objects 
that it presents with something much less clear—with the idea that the subject is 
standing in a theoretically introduced relation dubbed ‘visually entertaining’ to a 
proposition, for instance, as on intentionalism, or with the idea that one is simply 
sensing in a certain way, say sensing-redly, as on adverbialism.19,20 It is, I think, fair 
to point out that the presentationalist explanation is the more natural explanation. 
It does not invoke the theoretical notion of entertaining a content or of sensing-Fly. It 
simply appeals to the notion of an item present to the mind, or conversely, of a sub-
ject being aware of that item. Given that the subject is aware of the item, that it is 
present to her, the character of the experience can then be inherited from it. 
                                                   
 19 Intentionalists make it clear that visually entertaining is a theoretical notion (cf. ..). It seems 
to me that adverbialists must say the same of their monadic sensing-Fly properties. For otherwise, as 
Alston (: , fn. ) brings out, one might well worry that saying that talk of e.g. ‘sensing-treely’ 
is no more than a ‘curious reformulation of [talk of] being sensorily aware of a (putative) tree’. Thus 
we would not have ‘any genuinely alternative concept of a tree-like way of sensing’, and we might 
then worry, with Clarke (: ) that ‘we do not have in a literal sense an adverbial theory of 
[experience]’, since ‘we do not, in fact, actually know what it means to ‘take [experience] adverbially’. 
 20 Pautz would deny that intentionalists should constitutively explain phenomenal character in 
terms of subjects visually entertaining propositions. Rather, he thinks they should make an identity 
claim: that having an experience with character C just is visually entertaining some proposition p (see 
e.g. Pautz : ). This view, however, only forces us to change our complaint. What we must 
say is not that the intentionalist oﬀers an inferior explanation of visual phenomenology, but rather 
that she oﬀers no explanation at all, when intuitively an explanation is indeed required. Pautz would 
counter that identities do not need explaining, but I believe this is besides the point. Whether or not 
identities need explaining, which is debatable in any case, the point is that there is the strong intui-
tion (that many of us share) to the eﬀect that something must explain, in a constitutive rather than 
causal sense, and at the psychological level, why our perceptual experiences have the distinctive char-
acters that they do. Indeed, by Pautz’s own lights, the intuitive view is that what constitutively de-
termines the phenomenal character of an experience, at least in the case of perception, are the very 
external objects and qualities presented. There is also a puzzle as to how having an experience with 
phenomenal character C could be the selfsame thing as visually entertaining some proposition p. Perhaps 
nothing grounds this identity claim, if in general identities are not in need of grounding. But that 
does not mean we can’t be puzzled as to why this or that identity claim should hold. Pautz (: 
) in eﬀect admits this, for he writes that even if identities are ungrounded, nevertheless ‘…one 
might say that, intuitively, having an experience with a certain presentational phenomenology simply 
cannot consist in standing in a relation to a non-extended entity such as a proposition... One might 
think that it can only consist in standing in a relation to an extended object. But I think that this is 
an intuition we must reject because…I believe that Intentionalism is the best overall theory of phe-
nomenal character’. The trouble here is this final remark is question-begging in the present context. 
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 In sum, then, I think that there are good reasons—if also reasons that are over-
looked in the current literature—that count in favour of accepting the Phenomenal 
Principle. If that is so, however, then we should preserve the Phenomenal Principle 
if possible. I therefore see it as a virtue of my response to the argument from illusion 
that it preserves naïve realism while preserving the Phenomenal Principle as well. 
 
. Objective Looks and Illusory Experience 
 
According to the broadly Austinian response to the argument from illusion, in cases 
of illusion we are not presented with mind-dependent sense-data, but rather with 
external items that objectively look to be some way they aren’t. What, however, is it 
for an item to objectively look some way? What is it for an item to have such-and-
such an objective look? In my view, we both can and should treat the objective 
looks of things as a type of thing. In particular, we should think of them as the visual 
analogues of sounds and smells and tastes. They have their own qualitative natures, 
and can be parts of ordinary objects. By analysing objective looks in this way, we 
can accept the Phenomenal Principle while refuting the argument from illusion. 
 
.. Objectifying Looks  
 
We can begin by considering the following suggestive passage from Johnston: 
 
Are there things seen which are…the visual analogs of sounds or smells? I believe that 
there are. You see an item by visually discriminating one of its objective looks, and 
such objective looks are often direct items of vision. (a: , (cf. Scruton ), 
 
The crucial thing about objective looks—that which makes them objective rather 
than merely subjective—is that they are so to speak there anyway: external things 
have the objective looks they do even when no one is looking at them. It follows 
that objective looks are not mental or mind-dependent. As Johnston explains: 
 
[L]ooks are not mental items; “the” doggy look is not a mental item. The look or range 
of looks you have to be able to discriminate in order to have a visually workable con-
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cept of a dog just involves general standing features of dogs, namely the range of ways 
they look. (a: ) 
 
Suppose we grant that there are objective looks, which are in no way mental. How 
are we to conceive of such looks? In my view, we should think of the objective looks 
of things as sensible quality-instances. In turn, these are to be thought of as a kind of 
sensory item with their own qualitative nature. It is the purpose of the next sub-
section to say some more about such quality-instances, and how we can conceive of 
the objective looks of things as sensible quality-instances (or complexes thereof). 
  
.. Sensible Quality-Instances 
 
We can distinguish between visual qualities and the instances thereof. What H. H. 
Price felt certain of, when looking at a brown table, was his acquaintance with an 
actual instance of brownness, not with the quality that we call ‘brown’. A visual 
quality is a certain kind of universal, and thus an item that many diﬀerent things 
can share. A given instance of a quality, however, is not a universal. Rather, an in-
stance of a quality is a particular, and is as such non-shareable. Indeed, as I conceive 
of these items, they are particulars which each have their own qualitative natures. 
Or at least, this is the case regarding sensible quality-instances: items we can see and 
sense. It is my view that these items a certain kind of sensible trope. 
 I also think that among the objects we can perceive there are both substances, or 
‘objects in the weighty sense’, and the sensible quality-instances that these substanc-
es have as qualitative parts. Both kinds of item are objects of perception. We are 
aware, in perception, of objects and their quality-instances. My hypothesis will be 
that the objective looks of things just are instances of sensible qualities. 
 
...   Module Tropes 
 
Important here is a distinction (drawn from Garcia a, b , cf. Maurin 
) between two conceptions of a quality-instance or trope. (N.b. I see these as 
two words for the same thing.) On one conception, tropes are ‘modifier tropes’. 
That is, they are items that lack a distinctive qualitative nature of their own, but 
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which also, by being related in some way to the objects that they are the tropes of, 
confer on those objects the relevant qualitative nature, the one associated with the 
predicate involved. Thus, a redness modifier trope would lack a qualitative nature of 
its own, and would have not satisfy the associated predicate ‘is red’. Yet, it would 
confer upon the substance that it is a trope of the nature that goes with satisfying 
that predicate. Having a non-red trope as a part would make the relevant object red. 
 On the second conception, by contrast, tropes are ‘module tropes’. The key 
diﬀerence is that these items do have qualitative natures, and do satisfy the associated 
predicates. So, for example, a redness module trope has a qualitative nature of its 
own, and satisfies the predicate ‘is red’. Given the notion of a module trope, one 
might then take the view that the objects that these tropes are the qualitative parts 
of satisfy the relevant predicates precisely in virtue of having them as parts. The 
trope would satisfy the predicate in the most basic sense and the substance would 
satisfy the predicate in virtue of having the trope as a constituent. (This is, more or 
less, my view, albeit we need to complicate the account a bit. See .. below.) 
 In what follows, when I speak about sensible quality-instances, I am thinking of 
these as module tropes.  Again, module tropes are to be viewed as entities with their 
own qualitative nature, which satisfy the associated predicates. They are, therefore, 
perfectly apposite to classify as objects of vision, as among the things we can see.21 
 Various philosophers appear to have recognised the possibility of countenancing 
so-called ‘module tropes’. For instance, Garcia’s module tropes are rather similar to 
the ‘tropers’ of Loux (), which are distinct from the items that Loux refers to as 
tropes proper. Here is how Loux introduces the notion of a ‘troper’: 
 
[O]ne might propose [an] ontology that has as its metaphysical atoms what we might 
call ‘tropers.’ Whereas tropes are particular properties—things like this redness, this 
triangularity, this pallor, tropers are thin individuals—things like this individual red 
thing, this individual triangular thing, and this individual pale thing. The claim would 
be that familiar objects are bundles of compresent tropers. (: )  
                                                   
 21 For certain qualities, one might wonder whether the notion of a module trope makes any 
sense. For example, we might want to countenance the particular hungriness of Socrates, conceived 
as a certain trope. But is this trope itself hungry? Surely not. In reply, however, I remind the reader 
that I am primarily concerned here with the sensible qualities and their instances. Accordingly, a 
certain kind of trope theorist may (in their fundamental ontology) have to recognise both modifier 
and module tropes, in order to properly account for the full range of features the world contains. 
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The ‘tropers’ that Loux mentions here would appear to be what I am calling module 
tropes. That is, they are items with a distinctive qualitative nature that can serve as a 
the qualitative parts of a substance (or else as parts of a bundle of compresent tropes 
that comprise a substance, as on the view some trope theorists prefer). For instance, 
Armstrong (: ), following Ayer’s famous characterisation of sense-data,  
refers to tropes as ‘junior substances’, i.e. as things with their own qualitative nature, 
which they then confer on the substances that they are the qualitative parts of. 
Likewise, Forrest (: ) says that on his view, tropes are not so much properties 
as ‘mini-substances that would ordinarily be thought of as having a location and [at 
least] one other property’. Finally, van Cleve writes that: 
 
[W]hen I read accounts of what [tropes] are supposed to be, I cannot help thinking 
that they belong to the category of particulars rather than…properties. A ‘particular 
redness’ seems really to be a special kind of particular. (Perhaps it is a particular that 
exemplifies just one property, redness, and that one essentially). (: —) 
 
The conception of a module trope is arguably precisely the notion of a trope held by 
the founder of contemporary trope theory: D. C. Williams. On his view, tropes are 
particulars with their own qualitative natures. A redness trope, for example, has its 
own qualitative nature, and in virtue of having this nature, is apt to satisfy the pred-
icate ‘is red’. The substance that it is a qualitative part of then satisfies this predicate 
as well (albeit perhaps in a diﬀerent sense), precisely in virtue of having that trope.22 
This comes out explicitly in the following passage: 
 
[S]uppose we confront two lollipops, one, Heraplem, with a red round head, and the 
other, Rindesta, with a red square head, and let us name their respective color tropes 
‘Harlac’ and ‘Rastoc’. The tropes are both red—they are exactly similar reds; and let's 
say, more specifically, that they are both ‘mandan red’—all tropes just like these are 
mandan red, or are mandan reds. Looking not merely at the concretum Heraplem but 
at the abstractum Harlac we may say ‘This is Harlac’, where the ‘is’ expresses identity, 
                                                   
 22 Of course, for Williams, a substance is itself a bundle of tropes, and so for a substance to have 
a trope is for that trope to be a part of the bundle that is the substance. On my view, however, which  
I simply assume here, substances are not bundles of tropes. Rather, we have both substances and 
tropes, and at least some perceptible substances have sensible module tropes as qualitative parts.  
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and similarly with ‘This is Rastoc’ (in Rindesta); but again we may say of Harlac, 
‘This…is mandan red’, where ‘mandan red’ is an adjective predicable of all tropes like 
Harlac…We can say…of Rastoc too that…it is mandan red…[again] where ‘mandan 
red’ is…an adjective…(Williams : —)  
 
I would also argue that the notion of a module trope traces back even further than 
Williams. Consider, for instance, the notion of an idea in the work of Berkeley. 
When Berkeley (: §) says that an apple (for instance) is nothing but a conge-
ries of ideas—‘a certain colour, taste, smell, shape and consistency having been ob-
served to go together…’—the relevant ideas are surely module tropes. The same 
might be said of the sensible ideas of Locke, or Hume’s impressions of sense. (Cf. 
Price : , who argues that all philosophers have ‘started with sense-data’, alt-
hough they have called them diﬀerent names, tracing all the way to the scholastics. 
This is relevant for, as I read Price, sense-data are just sensible-quality instances. See 
esp. Price : V, where he discusses in detail the nature of sense-data.) 
 Now, even if the notion of a module trope has ancient pedigree, there remains a 
question as to why we should recognise the existence of such items. Here is a simple 
argument that works so long as we focus on sensible qualities and the instances 
thereof. In short, this is an argument for thinking that we should recognise the ex-
istence of module tropes, and in particular, that we should recognise the existence of 
at least sensible such tropes. The argument essentially is that tropes can be seen; but 
that this could only be so if what we see are module tropes (cf. Garcia: c: ). 
 We might note here that it is common for trope theorists to maintain that the 
objects of perception include tropes. Thus Schaﬀer introduces the notion thus: 
 
The trope theorist…[believes in entities such as] the [particular] redness of the rose. 
What is the redness of the rose? Look. (: ) 
 
For Schaﬀer, the redness of the rose is able to be seen; it is a perceptible item. This 
seems, moreover, exactly right: when I look at the rose, its redness is one of the 
items that I can be said to see. It’s hard to understand, however, how I could be see-
ing the redness of the rose, if the redness of the rose were not a module trope that 
satisfies the associated predicate ‘is red’. For if the trope were a mere modifier trope, 
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lacking a qualitative nature of its own, it would be hard to see how it could count as 
an object of vision. The idea, therefore, is that the redness of the rose has to be, in 
Ayer’s words, a junior substance, a kind of item with its own qualitative nature; one 
that, moreover, enables it to classify as an object of vision alongside the rose itself.  
 In short, the argument is that we can see the individual characteristics of things, 
but that for this to be the case, we have to think of their characteristics as module 
tropes. For otherwise, these items would lack the kind of qualitative nature requisite 
for being seen. (I believe our arguments against the idea that we can see ‘pure uni-
versals’ in ... apply just as well to the idea that we can see modifier tropes.) 
 Like Schaﬀer, D. C. Williams believes that tropes can be seen; that when it 
comes to tropes, ‘experience and nature evince them over and over’ (: ). The 
sunlight that we see, for example, is for Williams a trope. Indeed, Williams thinks 
tropes are the primary objects of vision, and perhaps the only things we truly see: 
 
What we primarily see of the moon, for example, is its shape and color and not at all 
its whole concrete bulk. Generations lived and died without suspecting it had a con-
crete bulk; and if now we impute to it a solidity and an aridity, we do it item by item 
quite as we impute wheels to a clock or a stomach to a worm. (: ) 
 
There is clearly something intuitive about this thought. We see objects, it seems, by 
seeing the tropes that are their qualitative parts. For this conception to make any 
sense, however, we have to think of tropes as module tropes. They have to be ‘junior 
substances’; items with their own qualitative natures. Otherwise, it’s hard to make 
sense of how they could be sensible items. (An item with no qualitative nature 
seems unable to be visually presented. That is why, intuitively, we cannot see num-
bers or sets or items of that kind. I also think this is why it’s mistaken to say that we 
can see or be visually presented with pure universals, as I argued in ... below.) 
 Note, however, that it would be mistaken to view tropes as items that we see 
 instead of or in place of substances. When I look at the moon I see the moon. I 
might be said to see the moon by way of seeing things like its colour or its shape. 
However, this in no way means that the colour or shape of the moon somehow oc-
clude the moon itself. On my view, seeing the tropes belonging to objects facilitates 
our awareness of them and does not prevent it. Indeed, recognising this fact is cru-
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cial to understanding where the early sense-datum theorists, who in speaking of vis-
ual sense-data, went wrong, but also to seeing in what respects they got things right.  
 
...   Visual Sense-Data as Tropes 
 
The sense-datum theorists of the early twentieth century took the primary objects of 
vision to be visual sense-data. These visual sense-data, moreover, were generally con-
ceived as a certain kind of visual expanse. Think, for example, of the ‘coloured  
expanses’ of H. H. Price () and C. D. Broad (), the ‘colour patches’ of  
G. E. Moore (), and the ‘extended colours’ of H. A. Prichard (: ch. ). 
Think also of the visual sense-data described by Russell (: ), which he refers to 
as ‘particular colours and shapes’. The visual sense-data being described here are, it 
would appear, visual expanses—that is to say, patches or expanses of colour.23 
 In my view, we should agree that there exist visual sense-data, conceived as visu-
al expanses. I disagree, however, that these should be thought of as mental items, as 
on Prichard’s view of matters, or as being somehow neither mental nor physical, as 
C. D. Broad maintained, or as items causally generated by the brain of the subject, 
as on H. H. Price’s considered view. Rather, we should think of the expanses we can 
be aware of in perception as ordinary external things. Compare R. J. Hirst below: 
 
The standard examples of sense data seem to be as public as tables and chairs. [For  
example], they include patches or expanses of colour…(: ) 
 
Nor need we think of the visual expanses recognised by the sense-datum theorists as 
occluding ordinary external substances. Instead, we should view these expanses—or 
at least, those visual expanses that are connected to ordinary external things in the 
usual way, such as the brown expanse that one can see when looking at a table—as 
external items that are among the objects of vision, just like the external objects of 
which these expanses are the qualitative parts. I also think we should view these ex-
panses as complex module tropes composed at least of a colour trope and a shape 
                                                   
 23 One contemporary philosopher who recognises the existence of visual expanses, conceived as 
perceptible yet mind-independent things that are distinct from ordinary substances, is Johnston 
(manuscript-b, manuscript-c). In his view, a range of cases demonstrates the existence of such things, 
yet there is no reason to take the visual expanses to be mental—any more so than tables or chairs.  
 
trope. Both the brown visual expanse that H. H. Price senses when he looks at a 
brown table, or the bluish-white expanse that Moore sees when looking at a white 
wall in blue light, would on this view be complex tropes of precisely this kind. But 
they would also be qualitative parts of the relevant external objects. There is no bar-
rier to saying that both the tropes and the associated substances are seen, despite the 
fact that we both can and should distinguish between them, as distinct items and as 
distinct kinds of thing, belonging to diﬀerent ontological categories. 
 Accordingly, the sense-datum theorists were in a way quite right to view their 
visual expanses as distinct from the surfaces of external objects and hence from the 
external things themselves. However, they were mistaken to think of these expanses 
as completely distinct and disconnected from the relevant external things. Instead, the 
visual expanses that we can see in perception ought to be viewed as complex quality-
instances possessed by the relevant objects, and that are generally seen as pervading 
their surfaces (as if spread out over those objects, cf. Stout: : ). Once we 
recognise this, however, we can recognise the existence of visual expanses—i.e. 
complex colour and shape module tropes—as items that belong to external objects 
as their qualitative parts. There is then no temptation whatever to view the expanses 
as occluders of external objects, rather than just some of the many items in the  
external environment that it is possible to see (cf. Johnston manuscript-b: ). 
 One moral here, I think—which is a moral that other elements of this thesis 
brings out—is that when rejecting the sense-datum theory, we should be careful 
that we don’t also reject the genuine insights that the sense-datum theorists bring 
out. For instance, it is I think a genuine insight that when you see, or even seem to 
see, a brown item, then there is a brown expanse you also see or sense, whereby this 
item is distinct from the (real or apparent) table itself. In a case of veridical percep-
tion, this brown expanse will be a relatively stable qualitative part of the perceived 
object. In particular, it will be an external, mind-independent trope or quality-
instance, such that the table is brown in virtue of having it as a qualitative part. In 
illusion, however, the relevant item would be a temporary qualitative part of the 
table, which it would have due to the specific circumstances of perception it is in. 
This, at least, is the view of perceptual experience I develop here. (As for my views 
about hallucination, which also involve sensible quality-instances, see chapter ). 
 
 
.. Looks and Illusion 
 
We began this third section with the idea that we could think of the objective looks 
of things as a kind of item. We are now in a position to make proper sense of this 
idea. What’s key is to think of the objective looks of things as sensible quality-
instances and hence as module tropes. On this view, when I see an item that looks 
blue, for example, or black, the blue or black look of the object is just an instance of 
the relevant quality. That quality-instance is then itself a blue or black item—for 
module tropes are self-exemplifying. As we will see, endorsing this kind of view ena-
bles us to make sense of cases of illusion without rejecting either naïve realism or the 
Phenomenal Principle. We can even maintain, with Austin, that all we see in cases of 
perceptual illusion are external items looking to be certain ways they aren’t.  
 Let us return to the example of the blue bead in pink light. This item has a black 
look. But it is not black. The present view is that this look is itself a kind of item; 
the kind of item that the sense-datum theorists would have referred to as a visual 
expanse. Most fundamentally, it is a sensible quality-instance, with its own qualita-
tive nature. It is an instance of blackness, and hence it is black in the most primitive 
and basic sense. A black substance will then be black precisely by virtue of having an 
instance of blackness, or a blackness trope, as a qualitative part.  
 That, at least, is the rough picture. Some details, however, need filling in. After 
all, the blue bead in pink light is not actually black. Yet I do want to say that it has a 
black quality-instance, conceived as a genuine black item, as a qualitative part. So 
we cannot say, when it comes to substances, that having an instance of blackness as a 
qualitative part is suﬃcient for being black. It is at this point that we need to com-
plicate the account somewhat. We can begin by saying what it is for an item to look 
to have some basic visual quality. Then we can say what it is for an item to actually 
have that quality. This will provide us both with an account of the objective looks of 
things, and with an answer to the argument from illusion; one that respects the 
Phenomenal Principle but that is also an instance of the broadly Austinian response.  
 When the blue bead is in pink light, it has a black look. This black look, I con-
tend, is a sensible quality-instance. It is an instance of blackness, and an item which 
itself is black. The bead, moreover, has this item as a qualitative part. However, the 
 
bead is not itself black. For it only has a black quality-instance as a qualitative part 
due to the abnormal conditions it is in. The bead is in abnormal lighting, and this is 
what makes it the case that it has a black look. Or perhaps better: the blueness of 
the bead and the pink light combine to make it so that the bead has the black look 
that it does. In short, the conditions that the bead happens to be in, alongside cer-
tain of its standing properties, make it the case that there exists—just for the dura-
tion of time that the bead is in those conditions and has those properties—an in-
stance of blackness which the relevant bead has as a qualitative part. Remove the 
bead from those conditions and that instance of blackness ceases to exist. But whilst 
the bead is in those conditions, the instance of blackness exists, and is an item capa-
ble of being seen. The instance is, moreover, the black look of the bead. It is a mod-
ule trope, a perceptible item, which is a temporary qualitative part of the blue bead.  
 In the illusory case involving the blue bead, therefore, on the present analysis 
anyway, there is indeed a genuine black item of which I am aware. This thing, how-
ever, is not a mind-dependent sense-datum, but rather simply the black look of the 
blue bead, conceived as a sensible trope. The bead has this black look (as a qualita-
tive part) only temporarily, and so it fails to count as something that is black. 
Hence, colour constancy is respected. The premise that’s false in the argument from 
illusion then turns out to be, not () as many naïve realists maintain, but rather: 
 
() If, in C, I am presented with a black item that is distinct from the blue bead that  
 I ostensibly see, then this black item is a mind-dependent sense-datum. 
 
This is because the antecedent of () holds while the consequent fails. On my pro-
posed view of illusion, premise () is true, just as the Phenomenal Principle entails:  
I seem to see a black item, and so there is a black item that I really see. However, 
this black item isn’t a mental sense-datum. Rather, it is the black look of the bead, 
qua sensible quality-instance that the bead has as a temporary qualitative part.24 
                                                   
 24 There may be some illusions wherein it is best to view the relevant quality-instance not as a 
temporary qualitative part of the item, but rather as merely temporarily co-located with the item. 
This may be the right approach with a white wall that looks yellowish when bathed in yellow light. 
But the blue bead in pink light seems to look black in such a way that the blackness-trope is in fact a 
temporary qualitative part, not merely a quality-instance co-located with the bead. 
 
 Accordingly, as advertised above, whilst I follow the majority of contemporary 
naïve realists in accepting the Austinian view that in illusion, one is presented with 
the external item seen looking a certain way, namely a way that it in fact is not,  
I do not follow these naïve realists (or Austin either) in rejecting the Phenomenal 
Principle. Rather, I accept that principle, along with premise (), and then reject 
premise () of the argument instead. In short, I accept the Phenomenal Principle, 
and hence accept that when it looks to me as if some item has visual quality Q, I am 
aware of some item that is Q. However, I deny that this item is a mind-independent 
sense-datum. For in my view, in cases of visual illusion at least, the item that is Q is 
a sensible quality-instance, which is perfectly external and mind-independent.25 
 Now suppose that one were to see an actual black bead. In this case, I want to 
say, one would be aware of the black bead and an instance of blackness, and this 
instance of blackness would be the black look of the bead. So far, then, the veridical 
case, wherein one sees an actual black bead, is just like the illusory one, for in both 
cases one is aware of a bead and its black look. There is, however, a crucial diﬀer-
ence: in the veridical case, the bead is black; but this not so in the illusory case. It is 
legitimate to ask, therefore, what makes the diﬀerence here. My answer is that in the 
veridical case, the black look of the bead—the instance of blackness that is its black 
look—is not merely a temporary qualitative part of the bead. It is, rather, a qualita-
tive part of the bead that it has as a relatively stable component, and which, moreo-
ver, it is disposed to have in normal conditions. This then makes it the case that the 
bead actually is black. To merely look black is to have an instance of blackness as a 
mere temporary qualitative part. But to be black requires more than this: an item 
has to be disposed to have the relevant qualitative part in standard conditions.  
                                                   
 25 Illusory cases of the sort I am focusing on should be sharply distinguished from partial hallu-
cinations, which involve both perceiving and hallucinating at once. If, for instance, I see a white wall 
as being yellowish because I am having a partial hallucination—as on the traditional but false con-
ception of a subject with jaundice who is looking at a white wall—then there is a yellowish item I am 
aware of, i.e. a quality-instance. But this item is no part of the wall. Rather, it is a mind-dependent 
thing. Thus, this kind of case is very diﬀerent to the cases of visual illusion we have been discussing. 
(For a useful discussion of this kind of case from a naïve realist perspective, see Brewer : ﬀ. 
In this thesis, I will not discuss partial hallucinations directly. However my basic view is that in such 
cases we are having a compound experience, which has a perceptual experience as a proper part and 
an hallucinatory experience as a proper part. Given my analysis of the latter two experiences-types, 
the reader will be able to make an educated guess as to what my view of these ‘mixed cases’ will be.) 
 
 My proposal, then, is that we accept the following three claims, which clearly 
distinguish the cases wherein an object (i) looks to be some way, (ii) is in fact that 
way, and (iii) merely looks to be that way (i.e. looks some way w without being that 
way). The idea is that the latter two cases can be analysed in terms of the first. (Keep 
in mind in what follows that we are focusing, as we have been throughout, on the 
basic visual qualities, with which the Phenomenal Principle is concerned.) 
 We can begin with: 
 
LOOKING-F 
 An object looks F iﬀ it has an instance of Fness as a qualitative part. 
 
If we accept this claim, then an account as to what it is for an object to be F can be 
given using the notion of what it is for something to look F—plus the idea of some-
thing being disposed to look a certain way in normal or standard conditions: 
 
BEING-F 
 An object is F iﬀ it is disposed to have some instance of Fness as qualitative part  
 when it is in normal conditions. 
 
Given this view, we can now answer an important question relating to the philoso-
phy of colour constancy: why is the bead still blue despite looking black when it is 
bathed in pink light? The proposed answer is: because the bead retains the disposi-
tion to look blue in normal conditions, and so still meets the conditions for being 
blue. In this way, we  end up with a rare philosophical analysis of the phenomenon 
of colour constancy. (This can then be generalised to shape constancy, etc.)  
 I have said what it is for a thing to look F. And I have said what it is for a thing 
to be F. Thus, it is now time to say what it is for something to look F without actual-
ly being F. That is, we need to specify what it is for something to merely look a cer-
tain way without being that way. What I propose is that we accept this claim: 
 
MERELY LOOKING-F 
 An object merely looks F iﬀ it has an instance of Fness as a qualitative part but is 
 
 not disposed to have an instance of Fness as a qualitative part when in normal 
 conditions.  
 
Thus, I maintain that in the classical cases of illusion, we have an external object 
that merely looks F as per the above, and which therefore is not actually F. Howev-
er, given my view concerning the objective looks of things, it does not follow that 
there is no F-object one is visually presented with in illusory cases. For, in looking 
F, the relevant external object has an instance of Fness as a temporary qualitative 
part, and this item itself is both F and also just as visually present to the subject as 
the external thing it is a temporary qualitative part of. In this way, the Phenomenal 
Principle still holds, even though the argument from illusion fails. For on the view 
we end up with, it is only mind-independent objects that are presented in illusion.26  
 Let me now make a remark regarding the objects of perception, i.e. the range of 
items we can visually perceive. It is often said, and rightly so, that we can see both 
objects and their features. (For instance, I can see the rose and I can see its redness 
too.) I would deny, however, that we can see universals such as the general property 
of being red. Thus, when we see the features of things, we are not seeing particulars 
and universals. Rather, we are seeing particular external things and their particular 
quality-instances. The objects of vision are thus entirely particular. In my view, 
nothing universal is given or presented to the subject in visual awareness. 
 One final comment before moving on. I have focused on a case of colour illu-
sion. So one might worry that my view cannot be extended to the other relevant  
qualities like shape. As it happens, I think that this is false, and I hope to go into 
greater length about this issue elsewhere. Here, unfortunately, I lack the space. I 
acknowledge, therefore, that work must be done to show that we can generalise the 
view I have developed here to all cases of illusion, involving qualities besides colour. 
 
 
                                                   
 26 This view is obviously not entirely diﬀerent from the ‘Armstrong-Fish’ view mentioned earlier 
(fn. ). After all, both views recognise that in colour illusion, when a thing looks (e.g.) red but isn’t, 
there is an instance of redness the subject sees. The key diﬀerence is that I do not say that the object is 
red in the illusory circumstances. Thus, my view has the advance of respecting colour constancy. 
 
. Objects and Character Again  
 
I will wrap up by returning to the issue concerning the grounds of phenomenology 
in perceptual cases according to naïve realists, and how this connects with cases of 
illusion. Again, naïve realists say that the phenomenal character of a perceptual ex-
perience is grounded by the qualitative nature of the external items seen. However, 
as we saw in the first section (.), there are two ways to understand this idea, i.e. a 
weaker and stronger reading, as represented by the theses we have called Modest and 
Ambitious. Again, the distinction tracks whether the external items seen fully or else 
merely partially ground the phenomenal character of our perceptual experiences. 
 It would be natural for naïve realists to think that due to cases of visual illusion, 
one has to retreat from Ambitious to Modest in order to have a coherent view. Giv-
en my proposed view of illusion, however, it turns out that this is not necessary. For 
we can claim that in illusion, it is the presented elements and the presented elements 
only that ground the phenomenal character of the experience. For instance, in the 
case involving the blue bead that looks black, it is, on my view, just the bead and 
some of its features (e.g. its shape and size), plus its black look (which is an instance 
of blackness), that ground the character of my illusory experience. On this view, 
then, we need only appeal to the presented elements of the experience in order to 
account for its phenomenal character. That is, we only need the external objects seen 
and their objective looks. So Austin is right that nothing else is required. However, 
on my account of illusion and objective looks, we can say this quite consistently 
with accepting the Phenomenal Principle, contra what many naïve realists think. 
 Ultimately, therefore, there is no need to retreat to Modest, or at least, there is 
no need to do this in response to the challenge posed by the standard philosophical 
cases of illusion. Rather, we can be ‘ambitious’ naïve realists, and indeed, we can be 
ambitious naïve realists who are also thoroughgoing presentationalists who accept 
the Phenomenal Principle. All that we require is the right view of illusion, which 
brings in the notion of items having objective looks—that is, looks viewed sensible 
quality-instances that have their own qualitative natures, that are in a certain sense 
self-exemplifying, and that the external object question has as a qualitative part. 
 
Chapter  
The Screening Oﬀ Problem Revisited 
 
[A]fter the relevant changes have occurred in the relevant struc-
tures, one visually perceives a flash of light or has the illusion of 
doing so, depending on the character of the initial stimulus.  
 
                               —  Hinton, J. M. (: ) 
 
Thus far, I have argued that naïve realists both can and should endorse the view that 
both in veridical and in illusory perception, the subject has the same basic kind of 
experience, namely, the kind of experience we call ‘perceptual experience’. I have 
also explained, however, that naïve realists must be disjunctivists who hold a diﬀer-
ent view about the nature of hallucinatory experience. Again, this is because no hal-
lucinatory experience consists in the presentation of external items. 
 Since naïve realists must be disjunctivists, there is a question as to what view of 
hallucination they ought to endorse. However, as explained in chapter , it is my 
view that naïve realists both can and should endorse a sense-datum theory of such 
cases. The combination of naïve realism about perceptual experience with a sense-
datum view of hallucination then leaves us with Austinian Disjunctivism.   
 In this chapter, I am concerned with one major worry that can be raised against 
the idea that naïve realists can endorse a sense-datum theory of hallucination. This is 
the concern that were naïve realists to endorse a sense-datum theory of hallucina-
tion, then they would be unable to satisfactorily resolve the so-called ‘screening oﬀ 
problem’ (Martin , ). What I shall argue here is that, as against prevailing 
philosophical orthodoxy, it is not in fact the screening oﬀ problem that prevents 
naïve realists from adopting a view of hallucination such as the sense-datum theory, 
but rather the assumption (which is widespread in the current literature) that naïve 
realists must respond to the screening oﬀ problem in a particular way. I also argue 
that naïve realists do not have respond to the screening oﬀ problem in the tradition-
al manner. This then leaves naïve realists quite free to endorse any theory of halluci-
natory experience they want.  
 
 I begin by setting out the screening oﬀ problem that naïve realists face (.).  
I then sketch out the traditional naïve realist line of response to this problem, and 
show that this not only leads to seemingly unattractive views of sense-experience, 
but also that this orthodox response is not open to naïve realists if they wish to be 
Austinian Disjunctivists (.). After setting out an alternative reply to the problem 
that Austinian Disjunctivists can live with (.), the final section of the chapter then 
concludes (.).1  
 
. Screening Oﬀ 
 
Recall that naïve realism consists of two main claims. The first of these concerns the 
structure of perceptual experience and the nature of its objects. The idea is that each 
perceptual experience consists in the presentation of external items manifesting cer-
tain visual qualities. The second claim then concerns perceptual phenomenology. 
The idea is that the phenomenal character of a genuinely perceptual experience is 
constitutively determined by the qualitative nature of the items it presents. 
 The screening oﬀ problem targets the second core claim of naïve realism. Clear-
ly, however, if this claim is false, then so too is naïve realism.2 Therefore, we can rep-
resent the screening oﬀ problem as an argument against naïve realism as such: 
 
 () In cases of perception, one has an experience of the hallucinatory kind. 
 ()  If, in cases of perception, one has an experience of the hallucinatory kind,  
  then naïve realism is false. 
   Naïve realism is false.3 
 
                                                   
 1 This chapter is based on my paper Moran (b).  
 2 Byrne & Logue (: ) suggest, in eﬀect, that naïve realists could respond to the screening 
oﬀ problem by giving up their second claim and retaining only the first. The resulting view, however, 
would not really be in the spirit of naïve realism. After all, at the core of our naïve conception of ex-
perience, as we saw in chapter , is the idea veridical perceptual experience derives its phenomenolog-
ical character from the qualitative natures of the external things presented (cf. Martin : ). 
 3 An experience is of the hallucinatory kind iﬀ it is the kind of experience involved in a case of 
hallucination, and of the perceptual kind iﬀ it is involved in a genuine case of perception. These are 
ostensive definitions, so in principle, one could have the kind of experience that we have in halluci-
nation even in a case of perception. (Indeed, many naïve realists believe that this is actually the case.) 
 
The argument is valid. Accordingly, naïve realists must reject one of the premises. 
But which premise should they reject? The move that many  contemporary naïve 
realists favour involves accepting the first premise whilst denying the second, usually 
by means of appealing to a particular theory of hallucinatory experience—the idea 
being that given that theory, the worries raised by the screening oﬀ problem can then 
be dissolved. In this chapter, however, I advocate taking the opposite approach, 
which involves rejecting premise () whilst accepting premise (). Before getting to 
that, however, let us begin by considering what motivates these two main premises.  
 
.. Premise () 
 
The argument for () turns on two claims. The first is that to have an experience of 
the kind involved in hallucination, it is suﬃcient to be in the right kind of anteced-
ent brain state.4 The central motivating idea is that hallucinatory experiences are 
‘inner events’, so that to cause an experience of this kind, it is suﬃcient to induce in 
the subject the right kind of local condition. As Martin (: ) puts it, we con-
ceive of hallucinatory experiences as ‘inner events’, and, therefore, ‘have the concep-
tion that the occurrence of such events imposes no additional condition on the 
world beyond the subject’s putative state of awareness’ (cf. Snowdon b: ). 
 Compare the naïve realist’s view of perceptual cases. On that view, perceptual 
experiences consist exhaustively in the presentation of external items, and thus con-
stitutively involve external things. This then has the obvious consequence that no 
antecedent brain state could be suﬃcient to produce such an event. The present 
point, however, is that even if experiences of the perceptual kind constitutively de-
pend on external objects (just as naïve realists maintain), so that the occurrence of a 
mere brain state is never suﬃcient to produce an experience of that kind, it seems 
clear that hallucinatory experiences do not depend on external objects in this way. 
This then suggests that unlike with the case of perception, the occurrence of (the 
                                                   
 4 I assume that certain brain states cause our experiences (both perceptual and hallucinatory). 
Note, however, that this assumption does not exclude the view that certain brain states partly consti-
tute or ground our experiences. (One brain state might cause an experience, and also generate anoth-
er brain state which then constitutes that experience, either fully or in part.) Note also that, as Mar-
tin (: —) explains in some detail, adopting the view that brain states do not cause, but 
rather constitute, our perceptual experiences does not help with solving the screening oﬀ problem.  
 
right kind of) antecedent brain state can be suﬃcient for an experience of the hallu-
cinatory kind to occur. The following principle captures the key idea we need: 
  
Local Supervenience:   
 If x is in brain state B, and y is in brain state B, and if B and B are brain 
 states of the same kind, then if B is the proximate cause of an hallucinatory  
 experience in x, B is the proximate cause of an hallucinatory experience in y.5 
 
This is the first of two crucial ideas needed to motivate premise (). The second idea 
is that if a certain brain state causes a perceptual experience in one case, then it is 
possible for a brain state of that same type to cause an hallucinatory experience in 
some other case. Put diﬀerently, the claim is that for each actual perceiver, x, there is 
a (nomically) possible hallucinator, y, such that the antecedent brain state that’s the 
proximate cause of x’s perceptual experience is the same kind of brain state as the 
antecedent brain state that’s the proximate cause of y’s hallucinatory experience.  
 Suppose, for example, that you’re now perceiving a red apple. In this case, the 
brain state you are in will have been produced in the normal manner. However, it is 
very plausible to think that if an instance of the kind of brain state that caused your 
experience were to be artificially produced elsewhere, it would produce in the sub-
ject an hallucinatory experience that is subjectively just like your own. As Foster 
(: ) writes, it seems that ‘given any…visual perception…we can envisage a 
situation in which…by electrically stimulating the optic nerves…the subject would 
have an hallucination which was, as an experience, exactly like it’.6 
 Now if, for each perceiving subject, x, there is a possible hallucinating subject, y, 
such that the brain state causing x’s experience is (type-)identical with the brain 
state causing y’s experience, then given Local Supervenience, premise () holds. For 
what follows is that whenever someone has a perceptual experience, the brain state 
that is its proximate cause also causes, for that same person, an hallucinatory experi-
                                                   
 5 Since we are concerned here with the causation of a certain experience-type by certain types of 
brain state, the above should be read as a nomological supervenience thesis. 
 6 The claim here is only that if some brain state causes an experience that is of the perceptual 
kind, it could also cause an experience of the hallucinatory kind. Thus in making this claim, we beg 
no questions against the disjunctivist. After all, the above is clearly consistent with the disjunctivist 
thesis that perceptual experiences and hallucinatory ones have diﬀerent natures (Moran b: ). 
 
ence. This then entails that in general, whenever someone has a perceptual experi-
ence, they also have an hallucinatory experience. Yet this is equivalent to (). So at 
this point, we have established the first premise of the screening oﬀ argument. 
 
.. Premise () 
 
Within a disjunctivist framework, and given premise (), there two ways to interpret 
what happens in cases of perception () (Johnston ; Martin ; Snowdon 
b). The first is to maintain that whenever one is perceiving, one is having two 
experiences at once, whereby these two experiences diﬀer in nature, one being of the 
perceptual kind, the other of the hallucinatory kind. The second option, in contrast, 
is to hold that whenever one is perceiving, there is just one experience involved, 
whereby this experience simultaneously falls under two kinds, namely, the perceptu-
al kind of experience, Kp, and the hallucinatory kind of experience, Kh.7  
 In his original presentation of the screening oﬀ problem, Martin argues in fa-
vour of the second interpretation. Moreover, this is the interpretation that is gener-
ally favoured (or else just taken for granted) by naïve realists and by commentators 
on the screening oﬀ worry. Nor is it hard to see why that is so, especially when we 
keep in mind that the two experiences would be phenomenally the same (so that if 
one is an experience as of a red apple, for example, then so too is the other). As 
Snowdon (b: ) puts it, ‘it is hard to understand the possibility of, say, sim-
ultaneously undergoing one experience that is a hallucination as of a pink ele-
phant…and also another perceptual experience of a pink elephant…As total experi-
ences, they [would] seem to compete’ (cf. Johnston : ; Martin : ﬀ). 
 Suppose, then, that in each case of perception, there is just one experience had 
by the subject; an experience with a certain phenomenological character, and which 
is an instance both of the perceptual kind Kp but also of the hallucinatory kind Kh. 
This makes trouble for naïve realism, and in particular for its second core claim. For, 
given this conception of a perceptual experience, it seems to follow that we can ex-
                                                   
 7 On this latter conception, experiences involved in perception have all of the properties that 
naïve realists ascribe to perceptual experiences. However, the nature of a perceptual experience is not 
exhausted by tat, for a perceptual experience also instantiates the distinct experiential kind Kh, which 
is a matter of having those properties that would make an experience have the nature of the sort in-
volved in having an experience of the kind involved in hallucination (whatever nature that might be). 
 
plain why any given perceptual experience has its phenomenal character solely in 
terms of the experiential properties it has in virtue of falling under the hallucinatory 
kind, thus leaving us with no reason to bring in the experiential properties that it 
has in virtue of instantiating the perceptual kind (French ; Martin , ; 
Nudds ; Snowdon ; Soteriou: ). In short, and as Martin puts it, the 
result appears to be that the presentational elements of experience become ‘redun-
dant to the explanation of [its] phenomenal aspects’ (: ). That is, there would 
appears to be no need to appeal to the external items that our experiences present in 
order to explain why they have the phenomenal characters that they do, for we can 
explain this just by appealing to the properties they have in virtue of being experi-
ences of the hallucinatory type. Occamite considerations thus tell against doing so, 
Therefore, it would appear that if () is true, the second core claim of naïve realism 
is false, as is naïve realism itself. But this is just to say that premise () is true.  
 One might reply here that both the properties that the experience has because it 
instantiates the hallucinatory kind and those it has because it instantiates the percep-
tual kind explain its phenomenal character. However, this would then lead to a wor-
ry regarding overdetermination (cf. Fish : ; Martin : —). For if the 
properties that the experience has due to being an instance of the hallucinatory kind 
are suﬃcient to explain why it has the phenomenal character that it does, then 
bringing in further properties would generate nothing but constitutive overdetermi-
nation. This kind of overdetermination would then be present in every case of genu-
inely perceptual experience. So we end up with overdetermination that is systematic 
and widespread. This result, however, also appears to be deeply problematic.8 
 An alternative reply would be to say that as opposed to the traditional interpre-
tation, whereby if () is true, this means that in perception one has a single experi-
ence that falls under both the perceptual and the hallucinatory kind, what is rather 
the case is that in perception, one has two diﬀerent experiences—one falling under 
the perceptual kind Kp, the other falling under the hallucinatory kind Kh. For given 
this interpretation, the properties of the experience of the hallucinatory kind that 
explain why it has the phenomenal character it does would not be shared by the ex-
                                                   
 8 Pautz (manuscript-a) seems to think otherwise, arguing that accepting systematic and wide-
spread overdetermination is a viable option. I disagree. After all, we know widespread causal overde-
termination is problematic. But why should this point not extend to the constitutive case as well? 
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perience of the perceptual kind, and so room would be left for the external items 
that are presented in the perceptual case to play a role in explaining why that experi-
ence has the character that it does. The trouble, however, is that we are still going to 
end up with screening oﬀ worries or with concerns regarding overdetermination. To 
see this, suppose I see a red apple. I therefore have what Pautz () calls a visual 
experience property, roughly, the property of having an experience as of a red apple. 
Now, we need to account for why I have this property. It is not merely a brute psy-
chological fact that I am having an experience with this phenomenological charac-
ter; there is something that explains why this is so; for example that I am aware of 
certain sense-data, as n the sense-datum theory, or that I am visually representing 
the world to be a certain way, as on intentionalism. Moreover, what naïve realists 
need to say here is that I have this visual experience property in virtue of being ac-
quainted with an actual red apple. However, if I (while perceiving) I am also having 
an experience of the hallucinatory kind, which doesn’t consist in acquaintance with a 
red apple, then it appears that the appearance fact that consists solely in my having 
the hallucinatory kind of experience can do all of the necessary explanatory work. 
But then we have no reason to posit the perceptual kind of experience, which,  
unlike the hallucinatory kind of experience, is not common both to cases of percep-
tion and of hallucination. Moreover, were we to posit this extra experience, we 
would then face overdetermination worries once again (Fish : ﬀ; Pautz : 
—). The only diﬀerence is that these worries would now concern, not the 
character of certain token experiences, but rather the instantiation of particular ex-
perience properties. And so interpreting the case as involving two token experiences, 
rather than just one experience that falls under two distinct experiential kinds, mere-
ly shifts the bulge in the carpet, rather than dissolving the screening oﬀ problem. 
(Rather than eliminating the screening oﬀ problem, this move simply forces us to 
reformulate our complaint.) 
 
.. Conclusions 
 
At this point, we have presented what appear to be two strong arguments for prem-
ises () and (). Yet, these claims jointly entail that naïve realism is false. Thus, we 
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need some way of pushing back. As we will see in the next section, there is a stand-
ard strategy that many naïve realists adopt. What I shall argue is that this orthodox 
strategy is problematic (..), and that moreover, it is a style of reply that as Aus-
tinian Disjunctivists, we are not at liberty to adopt (..).  
 
. The Orthodox Response  
 
The standard way for naïve realists to respond to the screening oﬀ problem is to ac-
cept premise () while denying premise (). This amounts to saying that even if we 
have an experience of the hallucinatory kind as well as one of the perceptual kind in 
cases of perception, nevertheless, every perceptual experience still has its phenome-
nal character in virtue of the qualitative nature of the external items it presents, just 
as naïve realists maintain.  
 There are two points I want to bring out in this section. The first is the orthodox 
reply is problematic in itself, since it seems inevitably to lead to implausible theories 
of hallucinatory experience. The second is that the orthodox reply is not available to 
us as would-be Austinian Disjunctivists, meaning that if we are to be Austinian Dis-
junctivists, then we must reject premise () rather than premise () of the screening 
oﬀ argument, thereby denying that in cases of perception the subject also undergoes 
an experience of the kind that is involved in hallucination.  
 
.. Against Orthodoxy 
 
I will keep this section brief, having made the main point in greater detail in my 
(b). (The point is also somewhat orthogonal to our main task, viz., that of solv-
ing the screening oﬀ problem in a way that allows us to adopt Austinian Disjunc-
tivism.) The point that I want to bring out is that the orthodox reply, when imple-
mented, leads to implausible theories of hallucination. At least, this is how things 
have turned out in the literature so far. It would appear, moreover, that it is intrinsic 
to this style of response; in other words, it would appear that this response is intrin-
sically such that in adopting it, one ends up with an implausible view of hallucina-
tion. After all, in adopting this response, one needs, somehow, to both accept the 
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claim that even in perception, one has an experience of the hallucinatory kind, and 
yet avoid running into the troubles regarding screening oﬀ and overdetermination 
of the kind that we discussed above, What I do not see is how one can do this with-
out adopting an implausible theory of hallucinatory experience. 
 We may take the case of Martin’s view of hallucination as an illustrative exam-
ple. (After all, this is arguably the most widely endorsed theory of hallucination 
among naïve realists.) Essentially, what Martin thinks is that in order to endorse 
premise (), and yet avoid accepting () and having to reject naïve realism, we 
should accept what is widely referred to as the negative epistemic account of halluci-
nation. At the heart of this theory is the idea that having an hallucinatory experience 
of some specific kind is just a matter of being in a certain sort of negative epistemic 
state. In particular, having an hallucinatory experience of a specific kind is a matter 
of being in a condition such that it cannot be known of that condition, in some 
suitably impersonal sense, and just by means of introspective reflection alone, that it 
is not (or does not involve having) an experience of the corresponding perceptual 
kind. Thus on this view, if I have an hallucination as of a white picket fence, say, 
then the experience I have just is, in its nature, a state with the following negative 
epistemic property, namely, that of being such that one cannot tell of it that it is not 
an experience of the specific naïve realist kind that actually does consist in the 
presentation of some particular white picket fence. Let us say that any experience 
with this property is ‘reflectively indiscriminable’ from the corresponding perceptual 
experience. And let us say that if any experience e is such that it cannot be known of 
e, just by means of introspective reflection, that e not an experience of kind K, then  
e is reflectively indiscriminable from an experience of kind K. 
 On Martin’s view, having an hallucinatory experience—having an experience of 
that specific kind—is just a matter of being in a negative epistemic condition: a per-
son is having an experience of this kind just in case she is in a state such that it can’t 
be known of that state that it is not a perceptual experience consisting in the presen-
tation of certain external items. It should, therefore, be clear why Martin describes 
his view as having what he admits to be the surprising and, he claims, initially hard 
to accept consequence that ‘when it comes to the mental characterisation…of hallu-
cinatory experience, nothing more can be said than the relational and epistemologi-
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cal claim that it is indiscriminable from [some corresponding] perception’ (Martin 
: ). There is, as it were, nothing more to having an experience of the halluci-
natory kind; it is merely a matter of being in a certain kind of negative epistemic 
state. (Contrast this with more demanding accounts of hallucination, in terms of 
the awareness of sense-data, say, or the visually entertaining of contents.) 
 With this view of hallucination in the background, focus now on a specific case 
of perception. Suppose, for example, that you are having a perceptual experience of 
some particular white picket fence w. For the naïve realist, this experience consists 
in the presentation of an actual white picket fence. Accordingly, we can say that to 
be an experience of that particular kind—call this kind of experience KP—is to be 
an experience that presents that particular white picket fence, say w, to its subject. 
But now we also know that according to the negative epistemic view, to be an expe-
rience of the corresponding hallucinatory kind, i.e. an experience of the sort that 
would be involved in the corresponding hallucination, KH is simply a matter of  
being an event that is reflectively indiscriminable from an experience of kind KP. (In 
turn, a mental event has this property iﬀ its subject is in a condition that cannot be 
told apart by introspection from one of actually being presented with a white picket 
fence.) But this obviously entails that the particular experience you are having, even 
while perceiving, falls under both experience kind KP and experiential kind KH. For 
any event that actually does present a white picket fence is obviously also reflectively 
indiscriminable from an event that presents a white picket fence. (This is a simple 
consequence of the factivity of knowledge.) The upshot is that given Martin’s view 
of hallucinatory experience, we can make good sense of () being true, i.e. of it be-
ing so that whenever one is perceiving, and therefore having an experience of the 
perceptual kind, one is also having an experience of the hallucinatory kind. For 
whenever one is having a perceptual experience of a certain kind K, that perceptual 
experience also has the property of being reflectively indiscriminable from an experi-
ence of kind K. Yet that is all it takes for this event to fall under the corresponding 
hallucinatory kind given Martin’s negative epistemic account of hallucination.   
 Martin () refers to the combination of naïve realism about perception with 
the negative epistemic account of hallucination as Evidential Disjunctivism. Other 
proponents of this view include Nudds () and Soteriou (). What these au-
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thors all claim is if one endorses Evidential Disjunctivism, then one can not only 
make sense of () being true, but can also avoid any worries regarding screening oﬀ.9  
Even if that is so, however, the trouble is that by endorsing this kind of view, naïve 
realists also end up with an implausible theory of hallucinatory experience. This is 
widely agreed upon in the literature. However, I think it is also fairly evident when 
one considers what Martin’s view actually says. What the view boils down to is the 
claim that there’s nothing more to hallucinating than being in a condition of which it 
cannot be known, impersonally speaking, that being in this condition is not a mat-
ter of having a perceptual experience consisting in the presentation certain external 
items (e.g. a white picket fence if the hallucination is as of a white picket fence). The 
trouble is that, intuitively, this cannot be a full metaphysical account of what it is to 
have an hallucinatory experience as of a certain object. In short, having a sensory 
experience, whether hallucinatory or otherwise, cannot simply be a matter of being 
in a certain kind of negative epistemic state, in the way that advocates of Martin’s 
view assert. Many in the literature share this intuition. Moreover, it would appear 
that this feeling lies at the heart of the intuitive resistance that many feel towards 
Martin’s theory of hallucination. 
 So far, I have only discussed Martin’s view here, and I have not discussed the 
manifold criticisms of this theory that have been put forward in the literature. (See 
for example Byrne & Logue ; Conduct ; Farkas ; Fish ; Haw-
thorne & Kovakovich ; Knight ; Pautz ; Siegel , ; Smith 
; Sturgeon .) And it is true that there are also other naïve realist views of 
hallucinatory experience that have been endorsed as a means of accepting () and 
yet rejecting () that I have not discussed. It seems to me, however, that these are all 
problematic as well. In general, whenever one pursues the orthodox strategy, and 
tries to accept () without accepting (), one is forced to endorse a view of halluci-
nation that is unintuitive and implausible. We should, therefore, hold out for a re-
ply to the screening oﬀ problem that allows us to endorse a plausible and inde-
                                                   
 9 For discussion of how Martin’s view is actually meant to solve the screening oﬀ problem, see 
Byrne & Logue (); Hellie (); Nudds (); Sollberger (); Soteriou (). See also 
Moran (manuscript-a), which argues that Martin’s view does not solve the screening oﬀ problem. 
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pendently well-motivated theory of what it is to have an experience of the hallucina-
tory kind.10   
 There is one further point to make, namely, that the whole style of response here 
leaves one vulnerable to an objection that Johnston (: ) raises against dis-
junctivists (although he clearly has only certain disjunctivists in mind). The objec-
tion, essentially, is that disjunctivists employ a ‘backwards methodology’ when theo-
rising about hallucinatory experience. Intuitively, when developing a theory about 
hallucinatory experience, one should look at the distinctive features of such episodes 
and build a theory that respects and, when necessary, that explains them. If naïve 
realists adopt the orthodox reply to the screening oﬀ problem, however, then they 
end up developing theories of hallucination not, as Johnston writes, as a result of ‘an 
investigation of the distinctive features of hallucination itself’, but rather ‘as an at-
tempt to answer [an] argument’. It might be said that both things could be done at 
once; that one could answer the argument and also respect the distinctive features of 
hallucination and explain them where necessary all with a single theory. Martin’s 
theory, however, clearly does not do that. It does not tell us, for example, how de-
pictive knowledge of certain visual qualities is possible on the basis of undergoing 
hallucinatory experience (cf. Hawthorne & Kovakovich : ; Pautz ). 
Nor does it provide a good explanation as to why our perceptual experiences have 
the phenomenal characters that they do. After all, according to Martin (: ), 
the explanation as to why an experience has the character that it does derives from 
the kind of experience it is. But for Martin, to be an experience of the hallucinatory 
                                                   
 10 Views I have not discussed include those of Fish () and Hellie (). According to Fish, 
hallucinatory experiences lack phenomenal character entirely, so that the screening oﬀ problem, as I 
have characterised it, does not arise. (This radical claim is also endorsed or advocated or recommend-
ed to naïve realists by Logue b and Sturgeon , .) The idea is that hallucinatory experi-
ences are in their nature mental events without phenomenal character but with the causal upshots 
that the corresponding perceptual experiences would have. What Hellie () holds, in contrast, is 
a view he calls ‘multidisjunctivism’. The idea is that our hallucinatory experiences have no unified 
nature. My hallucinatory experience might consist in the presentation of sense-data, whilst yours 
might consist in visually entertaining a content. Every metaphysically possible coherent view of hal-
lucination leads to a kind of hallucinatory experience that one might have when hallucinating, and it 
is not clear what determines, on Hellie’s view, why in this case one should have that kind of halluci-
natory experience as opposed to another. Now these views strike me as hard to accept as well. As I 
put it elsewhere: ‘[J]ust as it’s hard to see how an hallucinatory experience could be a mere negative 
epistemic state, so too it’s hard to believe that such experiences are events lacking in phenomenal 
character determined only by their characteristic causal upshots, or that they fail to share a common 
psychological nature.’ (Moran b: —). (For some further criticisms of Fish’s view see Logue 
; Knight ; Ludwig & Thalabard ; and Siegel ; see also Johnston .) 
 
kind is to be an experience that is reflectively indiscriminable from some corre-
sponding perceptual experience. Thus, by Martin’s own lights, we end up having to 
explain why an hallucinatory experience (as of some X) has the character that it does 
in terms of the fact that it is reflectively indiscriminable from a genuinely perceptual 
experience (of an X). Intuitively, however, this is a poor explanation. Indeed, the 
order of explanation is intuitively the other way around. The reason that the subject 
of this hallucination cannot tell it apart from the corresponding perception is be-
cause it and the perception have the same phenomenal character. 
 We can conclude, therefore, that the orthodox style of reply is problematic.  
I will now argue that this is especially so if we wish to be Austinian Disjunctivists. 
  
.. Orthodoxy and Austinian Disjunctivism 
 
In this section we can again be brief. The point is just to demonstrate that whilst the 
truth of () seems independently problematic for naïve realists (cf. ..), this is  
especially so for naïve realists wishing to be Austinian Disjunctivists. This then im-
plies that even if there is some way of accepting () and then denying (), this 
would have to involve giving up Austinian Disjunctivism. Therefore, since we want 
to be Austinian Disjunctivists, we have to reject orthodoxy and reject (), not (). 
 We can bring this point out as follows. Suppose first that () is true. Suppose, 
also, that Austinian Disjunctivism is true, so that perceptual experiences present ex-
ternal things whilst hallucinatory experiences present sense-data. Here it seems plau-
sible that given (), in cases of perception the subject must be having two experienc-
es, since it seems plausible that when it comes to experiences with presentational 
structure, these are to be individuated in terms of the kind of item that they present 
(cf. Johnston ). But now it follows that whenever a subject has a visual experi-
ence property V in some case of perception, such as having an experience as of a 
white picket fence, the fact that the subject has this property, this ‘appearance fact’, 
will be constitutively overdetermined. For, both the fact that the subject is having 
an experience consisting in the presentation of external objects, and the fact that the 
subject is having an experience consisting in the presentation of mind-dependent 
sense-data, are independently suﬃcient for explaining why the subject has the expe-
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rience property in question. We thus end up with massive and systematic constitu-
tive overdetermination of (the instantiation of) visual experience properties in cases 
of perception. Of course, we can avoid overdetermination by denying that the ex-
ternal objects perform any constitutive work in grounding visual experience proper-
ties in  such cases. However, such a view is not at all in the spirit of naïve realism, 
and would seem to entail the falsity of the second core naïve realist claim (cf. fn.  
above). For when the external objects ground the phenomenal character of the per-
ceptual experiences that they are presented in, this thereby (mediately) grounds the 
fact that the subject is having the relevant experience property. Therefore, we face a 
choice between constitutive overdetermination and screening oﬀ. For, either the 
external objects perform no work in grounding perceptual phenomenology or they 
do. If they do, we get constitutive overdetermination. But if they do not, then we 
then end up with screening oﬀ, since the external objects will not play the ground-
ing role regarding perceptual phenomenology that naïve realism assigns to them. 
Instead, the phenomenal aspects of experience are grounded by the sense-data alone. 
Both results are equally problematic for the Austinian Disjunctivist.  
 One might think to reply here by denying the individuation claim and insisting 
that the subject has just one experience, which consists partly in the presentation of 
external objects and partly in the presentation of sense-data. However, aside from 
the diﬃculties of making sense of this, especially in light of the fact that the external 
items and the sense-data would manifest the same basic visual qualities, we would 
still face trouble regarding screening oﬀ and overdetermination. The only diﬀerence 
is that the trouble would now arise at the level of token experiences and their phe-
nomenal characters. For if both the external objects and the sense-data ground the 
character of the experience we have problematic overdetermination, and if we avoid 
overdetermination by claiming that only the presence of sense-data grounds the 
phenomenal character of the experience, then we have screening oﬀ once more, 
since the external objects of perception no longer play the role in grounding percep-
tual phenomenology that naïve realism ascribes to them. Accordingly, the conclu-
sion is that if we wish to be Austinian Disjunctivists, then rather than accepting 
premise (), along with orthodoxy, and then trying to find some way to live with 
(), we should, instead, reject (). That will be my strategy in the following section. 
 
. Causal Conditions and Local Supervenience 
  
This section sets out my proposed response to the screening oﬀ argument. As we 
have seen, the orthodox reply to the problem from naïve realists involves accepting 
the first premise and rejecting the second. That is, we are to accept: 
 
 () In cases of perception, one has an experience of the hallucinatory kind. 
 
And yet reject: 
 
 () If, in cases of perception, one has an experience of the hallucinatory kind,  
  then naïve realism is false. 
 
As against this, I suggest that naïve realists can, and should, reject premise () 
(which leaves us able to grant ()). On the proposed view, one never has, in a case of 
genuine perception, the kind of experience involved in hallucination. Moreover, we 
need not accept any particular view about the nature of hallucinatory experience in 
order to reply to the screening oﬀ worry. Instead, we can reply to that problem 
whilst remaining silent about the mental nature of hallucinatory experience.  
 Recall that premise () depends on Local Supervenience: the claim that experi-
ences of the hallucinatory type are bound to occur whenever the right kind of brain 
state is produced (..). Again, the motivation for this claim is the thought that 
hallucinatory experiences are ‘inner events’, which occur whenever the subject is in 
the right intrinsic state. In my view, however, naïve realists can reject this assump-
tion, by claiming that hallucinatory experiences are essentially caused in a certain 
way (namely, in the standard, non-deviant manner), so that no hallucinatory experi-
ence could ever occur in the absence of the right causal conditions, whereby these 
causal conditions can never be met in perception. This then entails that in percep-
tion, it is impossible for an hallucinatory experience to occur. It then follows that 
both Local Supervenience and () are false, so that the screening oﬀ argument fails.11 
                                                   
 11 To be maximally clear, the claim being advanced here is that one cannot simultaneously have 
an experience of some perceptual kind Kp and an experience of the hallucinatory kind Kh, whereby 
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 To develop this view, I propose to incorporate elements of the ‘causal theory of 
perception’ within a naïve realist framework. As we will see, the causal theory is 
standardly developed within a conjunctivist framework that presupposes the falsity 
of naïve realism. However, I believe that as naïve realists we can draw from elements 
of that framework in order to develop a compelling response to the screening oﬀ 
problem. I will attempt to bring this out in more detail in what follows (see ..). 
 
.. The Causal Theory and Disjunctivism 
  
According to conjunctivism, there is just one basic type of experience, which is 
common to cases of perception and hallucination. It follows that proponents of this 
view must explain why certain instances of this experience-type are perceptual rather 
than hallucinatory. The answer often given is that instances of this experience-type 
are perceptual iﬀ they are caused in a standard, non-deviant manner. Conjunctivists 
who answer in this way endorse the classic causal theory of perception.12 
 One way to bring the plausibility of this view into focus is to consider cases of 
‘veridical hallucination’: that is, cases wherein someone has an hallucinatory experi-
ence as of an F while in the presence of a genuine F. For instance, I might be stand-
ing before a clock while having an hallucinatory experience as of a clock (cf. Grice 
). In this case, whilst my sense-experience will be fully ‘accurate’—for how 
things seem to be matches up with how they are—nevertheless, my experience is hal-
lucinatory rather than perceptual. That there could be such cases shows that having 
an experience as of a clock, even in the presence of a genuine clock, is not suﬃcient 
for perceiving a clock, or even having a perceptual experience at all. Plausibly, how-
ever, this is a fact that demands an explanation. Why is it that having an experience 
(as of a clock) whilst before a clock, is not suﬃcient for perceiving it? Surely this is a 
necessary condition; so what other conditions are needed to have suﬃcient condi-
tions for perception? A plausible answer here is that in order to perceive some par-
ticular clock, rather than just having an hallucination as of a clock, the clock must 
                                                                                                                                        
instances of these experience-types are phenomenally the same. (After all, one could simultaneously 
have a perceptual experience and an hallucinatory experience that are phenomenally distinct.) 
 12 The causal theory is initially plausible. However, recall the worries raised in (..) about the 
idea that any kind of causal relation between an external object O and an experience that does not 
contain O as an objective-constituent could be suﬃcient for that experience to be a perception of it. 
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itself be causally responsible for the experience in the right kind of way. The idea 
would be that when the clock is causally responsible in this way, one perceives it, 
but that otherwise, one merely has an hallucination. As for having ‘the right kind of 
causation’, this amounts to having causation of the standard, non-deviant kind.  
 Of course, it is notoriously diﬃcult to define the terms ‘standard’ and ‘deviant’ 
causation, or at least to find non-circular definitions. However, it does not follow 
that these notions are irremediably obscure. Rather, we seem easily able to judge 
whether a case involves standard or deviant causation. Indeed, our understanding of 
these notions is arguably a crucial part of our intuitive grasp on the distinction be-
tween perceptual and hallucinatory experience itself. As William Child explains:  
 
The point of bringing out the causal diﬀerence between vision and hallucination is not 
to allow us to distinguish states of aﬀairs that were indistinguishable before. Rather, it 
is to yield a philosophical understanding of the distinction. (: ) 
  
What I want to suggest, at this point, is that while the idea that perceptual experi-
ences only occur as a result of standard causation is typically put forward by con-
junctivists, naïve realists can adopt a broadly analogous view. After all, it seems ex-
tremely plausible to think that perception is at least partially causal in character. 
Perceiving seems to be a matter of being in contact with the world in a distinctive 
kind of way, and it seems very plausible to think that (part of) what it takes to be in 
contact with the world in that kind of way is for the relevant parts of the world to 
have a distinctive sort of causal impact upon one (cf. Child , , ). 
 Notice, however, that in accepting that there are causal constraints on having a  
perceptual experience, naïve realists end up with a rather diﬀerent view to conjunc-
tivists. For, given their theory of experience, conjunctivists don’t have to say that the 
type of causation involved makes any diﬀerence to the basic kind of experience pro-
duced. Rather, on their view, we have just one basic experience-type, whose mental 
nature remains invariant across perceptual and hallucinatory cases. Instances of this 
experience-type then classify either as perceptual or as hallucinatory depending on 
their aetiology. By contrast, in accepting that there are causal conditions on perceiv-
ing, naïve realists thereby adopt a view on which the kind of causation in play 
makes a crucial diﬀerence to the fundamental kind of experience that is produced—
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and so not just to whether a certain experience-type has a certain property (i.e. being 
a perception/being an hallucination) as on the standard causal theory. Specifically, 
naïve realists end up holding that perceptual experiences (i.e. experiences of that dis-
tinctive type) can occur only if there is causation of the appropriate sort, involving 
the perceived external thing in the appropriate manner. 
 This, however, is no objection to the position combining naïve realism with the 
idea that perceptual experiences essentially require causation of the standard sort. 
Rather, we can read the above as clarifying exactly how the naïve realist version of 
the causal theory diﬀers from the more standard form, which, again, presupposes 
conjunctivism. Thus, while the causal theory of perception is standardly adopted by 
conjunctivists, there is, I claim, room for naïve realists to accept a version of this 
view. This states that an experience of the perceptual kind can occur only if standard 
causation connects the subject, in the right way, to the external object sensed.13 
 Why would naïve realists wish to endorse the modified causal theory just de-
scribed? One reason is that doing so provides a compelling way for naïve realists to 
resist an important argument against their view, namely the causal argument (for 
discussions of this argument see Burge ; Crane ; Foster ; Robinson 
; Smith ; and Snowdon b). Driving this argument is the idea that the 
same kind of proximate cause always produces the same type of immediate eﬀect. 
Consider, for instance, a case of perception and a corresponding case of hallucina-
tion. And suppose that the perceptual experience has the same proximate cause as 
the hallucinatory one. It then follows, by the same cause, same eﬀect principle, that 
even in the hallucinatory case, the relevant brain state causes an experience of the per-
ceptual kind. But this is clearly unacceptable for naïve realists, who hold that per-
ceptual experiences constitutively involve external items. For that entails that no 
experience of the perceptual kind can occur in a case of hallucination.  
 It is sometimes said that naïve realists can respond here by rejecting the same 
cause, same eﬀect principle, on the grounds that perceptual experiences (according to 
                                                   
 13 N.b., this view is compatible with the ‘anti-causalist’ position that Snowdon has been develop-
ing over the years  (Snowdon , , ). For what Snowdon argues is that the causal theory 
is mistaken as a piece of conceptual analysis. However, that claim is compatible with it being part of 
the essence of our perceptual experiences that they be caused in a certain manner. (To deny this, one 
would have to claim that our conception of the nature of a thing coincides with its real essence. But 
surely this is not the case. Remember Locke’s crucial distinction between nominal and real essence!) 
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naïve realism) have external objects as constituents (see Martin : ; Nudds 
: —). The thought is that since the occurrence of a mere brain state is 
insuﬃcient for an appropriate external object of perception to exist, it follows that, 
as against the ‘same cause, same eﬀect’ principle, no brain state is suﬃcient for the a 
perceptual experience to occur. However, this response faces a problem regarding 
cases of veridical hallucination. For, in cases of veridical hallucination, an appropri-
ate external object of perception does exist, so that, for all that has been said, there is 
no reason why the relevant brain state shouldn’t produce an experience of the per-
ceptual kind. Yet we still do not want to say that the subject has a perceptual experi-
ence in this case. For no hallucinatory experience, even a ‘veridical’ hallucinatory 
experience, constitutively involves the presentation of external things.14 
 If, however, naïve realists maintain that there are causal conditions on having a 
perceptual experience (as I have suggested), they can explain why the relevant brain 
state doesn’t cause a perceptual experience even in the case of veridical hallucina-
tion. This is because they can maintain the following, namely, that since it lies in the 
nature of perceptual experiences to occur only as the result of standard causation, 
experiences of this distinctive kind cannot occur in cases of hallucination, veridical 
or otherwise—for in cases of hallucination, we have non-standard causation, and so 
the relevant brain state doesn’t cause a perceptual experience (cf. Foster : —
). Hence, by adopting elements of the causal theory of perception, naïve realists 
can provide a compelling response to an important problem for their view. (For fur-
ther details of my response to the causal argument see Moran manuscript-b.) 
 At this point, I want to claim that naïve realists could use this same basic strate-
gy to handle the screening oﬀ argument. For what they can claim is that just as 
                                                   
 14 Similar reflections undermine a recent suggestion from Allen (: —) as to how 
naïve realists might reject premise (). Allen’s idea is that—given his theory about hallucination in 
the background, according to which hallucinatory experiences are essentially a type of imaginative 
episode—naïve realists can maintain that experiences of the hallucinatory kind cannot occur in cases 
of perception, since an essential condition on an having an hallucinatory experience (conceived as an 
imaginative episode) is that a suitable object of perception be absent from the scene before the eyes of 
the relevant subject (cf. Martin : ). The thought is then that since this condition is clearly 
never met in perceptual cases, it follows that in such cases, hallucinatory experiences never occur. 
(Obviously if I perceive a clock, then the condition that a clock be absent from the scene before the 
eyes is not met.) Now this reasoning does indeed imply that premise () is false. The trouble here, 
however, is that the absence of an appropriate external object is not in fact necessary for the occur-
rence of an hallucinatory experience. For one could well have an hallucinatory experience as of a 
clock (say) even when there is a clock before one—as cases of veridical hallucination demonstrate. 
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there are causal constraints on perceptual experiences occurring, so too, there are 
causal constraints on hallucinatory experiences occurring, since it lies in the nature 
of such episodes to be caused in a non-standard way. Call this ‘the argument from 
analogy’. The central thought is that just as naïve realists can say that there are caus-
al conditions on having a perceptual experience (thus replying to the causal argu-
ment), so too, they can say that there are causal conditions on having an hallucina-
tory experience (thus rebutting the screening oﬀ argument).  
 
.. The Argument from Analogy 
 
The main idea here—namely, that there are causal conditions on having an experi-
ence of the sort involved in hallucinating—was in fact suggested by C. D. Broad 
() when discussing the diﬀerence between perception and hallucination and the 
nature of hallucination as opposed to perception. According to Broad: 
 
We may define the term ‘hallucination’…as follows. We shall say that a person was 
having such an experience on a given occasion, if and only if the following two condi-
tions were fulfilled. (i) He was ostensibly seeing, hearing, touching, or otherwise sensi-
bly perceiving a certain thing or person or event or state of aﬀairs, as external to his 
body. Whilst (ii) at that time his eyes, ears, fingers, or other receptor sense-organs 
were not being aﬀected in the normal physical manner…by any such thing, person, 
event, or state of aﬀairs as he was ostensibly perceiving. (: —, my italics) 
 
The idea here, or at least part of it, is that it’s no contingent matter that hallucina-
tions occur as a result of non-standard causation. Rather, it is an essential, and so 
necessary, condition on something being an hallucination, or rather the kind of ex-
perience involved therein, that it be caused in a non-standard or deviant way. 
 I submit that this view is rather intuitive. It seems natural to think that if an ex-
perience is hallucinatory, then it must have been non-standardly produced. Indeed, 
one might well think that this is just part of what it is for an experience to be hallu-
cinatory. For are hallucinatory experiences not precisely the experiences you get 
‘when things go wrong’, in a distinctive kind of way? Indeed, as Thau (: ) 
points out, it’s very plausible to think that hallucinatory cases involve at least in part 
a ‘failure to see’ (cf. Johnston : ; Tye : ). It also seems extremely 
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natural to cash out this idea of failure in causal terms; that is, in terms of the intui-
tive distinction between standard and deviant causation. If, however, it is indeed 
part of the essence of hallucinatory experiences to be caused in a certain manner, 
then experiences of that kind are caused in that manner whenever they occur.15 
 The thought that deviant causation is an essential condition for the occurrence 
of an hallucinatory experience is also part of the standard causal theory of percep-
tion. Again, conjunctivists maintain that there is just one basic kind of experience 
common to cases of perception and hallucination. Therefore, whilst needing to  
explain why some instances of this experience-type are perceptual, they must also 
explain why some instances of this experience-type are not perceptual but rather hal-
lucinatory. And again, the standard reply involves causation: a given token of the 
common kind of experience is hallucinatory iﬀ it is caused in a deviant manner. 
 In my view, naïve realists can also make this kind of claim. That is, they can also 
say that there are causal constraints on the occurrence of both perceptual and hallu-
cinatory experience. Of course, naïve realists will deny that there is just one basic 
experience-type, whose instances are perceptual when caused in one way and hallu-
cinatory when caused in another. However, they can accept the following view. 
There are two basic kinds of experience, perceptual and hallucinatory, which diﬀer 
in nature, since the former kind of experience, but not the latter, involves the 
presentation of external things. Moreover, it lies in the nature of the first experience-
type (distinctive of perceptual cases) to be generated by a process involving appro-
priate causation by the perceived external items. Yet when it comes to the second 
experience-type (distinctive of the hallucinatory cases), it lies in their nature to be 
generated by non-standard or deviant causation. And so it can never happen that 
someone has both a perceptual experience and an hallucinatory experience at once.16 
 As against this, it might be said that whilst it’s plausible to think that there are 
causal conditions on hallucinating, it is considerably less plausible to think the same 
of having the kind of experience involved in hallucinating (on this crucial distinction 
                                                   
 15 There is an interesting objection here turning on the idea that uncaused hallucinations are 
metaphysically possible. For, given this, it would appear that it cannot be true that all hallucinatory 
experiences are essentially caused in a deviant manner (for some are not caused at all). In reply here, I 
suggest that we can treat cases where causation is entirely absent as the limit case of deviant causation.  
We can then allow for uncaused hallucinatory experiences even within the proposed framework.  
 16 For some other proposals made in similar contexts, on which perceptual and hallucinatory 
experiences never co-occur, see Hinton (: ); Foster (: ); Snowdon (b: ).  
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cf. Johnston : ). However, once we allow naïve realists to claim that there 
are causal constraints on having a perceptual experience (as surely we must), it is 
unclear how we could then bar them from claiming that there are causal conditions 
on having an experience of the hallucinatory kind. In any case, why think that the 
same causal conditions on hallucinating proper don’t apply to hallucinatory experi-
ence as well? It thus appears that naïve realists can respond to the present objection. 
  
.. Summary  
 
The central idea, then, is that naïve realists both can and should claim that there are 
causal conditions on both perceptual experience and on hallucinatory experience. In 
saying this, I claim, they can oﬀer a compelling response to the screening oﬀ prob-
lem, which is analogous to the reply that they can give to the causal argument. 
 How exactly does the view developed allow us to undermine the screening oﬀ 
argument? Well, once more, given the view we’ve been developing, Local Superveni-
ence is false. This principle was meant to follow from the idea that hallucinatory ex-
periences are ‘inner events’, which, as it were, ‘demand nothing of the external 
world’ to occur. However, if there are causal conditions on the occurrence of an hal-
lucinatory experience (as I have claimed), then it is just not true that having an hal-
lucinatory experience is an entirely local matter in this way. On the contrary, there 
will be conditions that go beyond the intrinsic state of the subject that must be met 
if an hallucinatory experience is to occur. So both Local Supervenience and premise 
() turn out to fail, as does the screening oﬀ argument against naïve realism.17 
 In sum, if there are causal conditions on the occurrence of both perceptual and 
hallucinatory experience, as I have claimed, then it is impossible for experiences of 
the hallucinatory kind to occur in cases of perception, regardless of the kind of brain 
state the subject is in. For if the subject is having a perceptual experience, there must 
have been causation of the standard sort. However, this kind of causation excludes 
causation of the deviant or non-standard kind being present. Yet without deviant 
                                                   
 17 There may, of course, still be a sense in which hallucinatory experiences are ‘inner events’, 
since they are still plausibly viewed as being events that occur ‘within’ the subject, and which do not, 
say, involve external objects as constituents. (Perhaps some naïve realists have just been wrongly as-
suming that no ‘inner experience’ could have extrinsic requirements on its occurrence.) 
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causation, it is impossible for an hallucinatory experience to occur. Accordingly, the 
upshot of accepting a modified version of the causal theory in the way that I have 
suggested is that as naïve realists, we can reply to the screening oﬀ argument by 
claiming that Local Supervenience, and therefore premise (), are false.18 
 On the view I have defended, then, the kind of causation in play is critical to 
determining what kind of experience we end up with in a given case. For instance, if 
we have a causal chain that involves an external object in the appropriate kind of 
way, then we end up with a perceptual experience, i.e. an experience which consists 
in the presentation of an external object, and which contains that object as a con-
stituent. Whereas if we have a causal chain of the non-standard kind, which does 
not involve an external object in the right way, then what is generated is an halluci-
natory experience, which doesn’t consist in the presentation of any external object. 
 Thus, on the proposed view, the causal chain that generates an experience plays 
two diﬀerent roles. On the one hand, it plays a straightforwardly causal role in 
bringing the experience about. On the other hand, however, it also plays a non-
causal role in determining what kind of experience the proximate brain state (which 
occurs at the end of the long causal chain) is able to produce. If the proximate brain 
state is embedded within a standard causal chain, then it will be able to causally 
produce a perceptual experience, yet unable to causally produce an hallucinatory 
experience. But if the proximate brain state is embedded within a deviant causal 
chain, then it will be able to causally produce an hallucinatory experience yet unable 
to cause a perceptual experience. Therefore, the character of the long causal chain in 
which the proximate brain state is embedded determines, in a non-causal, constitu-
tive manner, what kind of experience the proximate brain state can cause.19,20 
                                                   
 18 There is an important objection to flag here turning on the fact that the notions of standard 
causation and deviant causation seem to be vague. The trouble is that given this, we can apparently 
generate cases wherein it is vague what kind of experience one is having. Yet that looks like a prob-
lematic consequence. This worry raises deep issues that I cannot deal adequately with here, but that I 
hope to deal with elsewhere. (Ultimately,  I suspect that naïve realists may have to allow that there 
can be genuine cases of vagueness in reality,  rather than mere semantic or epistemic vagueness.) 
 19 A result of the proposed view, therefore, is that the causal context in which a brain state occurs 
makes an important diﬀerence to the kind of experience it produces. (The nature of the experience 
produced will vary depending on how the proximate cause of that experience itself is caused.). 
Against this, one might say that it’s implausible to think the aetiology of a brain state could make a 
diﬀerence to the kind of eﬀect it will produce (see Robinson : ; Foster : ; Johnston 
: ; and Snowdon b: ). However, whilst this is another important objection, I lack 
the space to deal with it properly here. (That being said, I take it up elsewhere; see my manuscript-b.) 
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. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has developed a novel response to the screening oﬀ problem, which 
challenges premise () of the screening oﬀ argument rather than premise (). Thus, 
rather than allowing that even in perceptual cases, subjects have experiences of the 
hallucinatory kind, we can instead deny this claim. In this way, we can hold on to 
Austinian Disjunctivism, the screening oﬀ worry notwithstanding. I want to close 
by noting that the alternative response to the screening oﬀ problem that this chapter 
has developed is not only a better option for those wanting to endorse Austinian 
Disjunctivism, but is arguably a better line of response simpliciter, than the standard 
naïve realist response. The main reason for this is that the new response allows naïve 
realists to remain neutral about the nature of hallucinatory experience. In contrast, 
as we saw earlier in this chapter, the more standard line of response requires naïve 
realists to endorse one or another specific theory of such cases. These views, moreo-
ver, seem rather implausible as theories of hallucinatory experience. It would appear, 
therefore, that there is much to be said in favour of a reply to the screening oﬀ prob-
lem that remains non-committal as to the nature of hallucinatory experience. 
 This last point bears on the more general debate about perceptual experience, 
which in the current literature is primarily between intentionalists and naïve realists 
(cf. Crane ). For, one of the main criticisms that opponents of naïve realism 
have pressed is that naïve realists can oﬀer no satisfactory account of hallucination—
the assumption being that naïve realists will have to make an unintuitive claim 
about such episodes in order to handle the screening oﬀ problem (cf. ..). My 
point is that if this assumption is false, as I have argued here, then this criticism 
                                                                                                                                        
 20 A more pressing objection, perhaps, is the objection from complex laws (Pautz forthcoming-
a). The worry here is that given the view I have developed, at least when combined with Austinian 
Disjunctivism (although perhaps the objection would go through even without this further assump-
tion), we end up committed to bizarre and implausibly complex psycho-physical laws. For a con-
junctivist, the ‘covering law’ could be represented by a conditional ‘(x) x is in brain state type B → 
x has experience-kind K’. However, for disjunctivists who accept my reply to the screening oﬀ prob-
lem, the laws will be much more complex. Since we must grant that we will end up with the more 
complex laws, the only real way to reply here is to insist that the explanatory power of the theory 
makes it worth accepting this additional complexity (see .. on the explanatory power of the view). 
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fails. The argument of this chapter, therefore, has wider implications for the debate 
about perception as a whole, and not just for would-be Austinian Disjunctivists. 
 
Chapter  
A Sense-Datum Theory of Hallucination 
 
Nature is not only that which is visible to the eye…It also  
includes the inner pictures of the soul… 
 
                                   — Munch, E. (: )  
 
In this final chapter, I defend a sense-datum theory of hallucinatory experience. I 
then explain that when combined with naïve realism, this view leads to Austinian 
Disjunctivism, before showcasing the explanatory power of this theory, and, accord-
ingly, my reasons for thinking that this neglected theory is just as worthy of consid-
eration as any other theory currently being discussed in the perception literature.  
 It should be noted that I do not argue for the sense-datum theory from the 
ground up. Rather, I remind the reader of my reasons for accepting that something 
is presented to the mind in hallucinatory experience, before making the assumption, 
backed by brief argument against other positions, that we should think of the object 
of hallucination—i.e. the object given to the mind in hallucinatory experience—as a 
mind-dependent sense-datum. In what follows, then, I take the traditional thought, 
present throughout the history of philosophy, that we are presented with mental 
objects in hallucination, and then develop this thought into a systematic view. 
 I begin by setting out my reasons for thinking we should be sense-datum theo-
rists about the bad cases (.). I then turn to explicating the nature of sense-data as I 
conceive them; along the way, certain objections to sense-data will be addressed 
(.). I then explain why, in my view, if we are to properly account for hallucinatory 
experience in terms of sense-data, we must bring in an intentional or representa-
tional element that is derivative on prior acts of sensing (.). Finally, I conclude 
the chapter by showcasing the explanatory power of Austinian Disjunctivism and by 
dealing with some classic objections to the existence of sense-data (.). 
 
.  Sense-Data and Hallucination 
 
This thesis has already provided reasons for accepting what might be called the: 
 
 Existential Thesis 
  In cases of hallucinatory experience, we are presented with some qualitative  
  item or other. 
 
In chapter , we gave initial reasons for thinking that something must be presented 
to the mind in hallucination (..). In chapter , we set out the Argument from 
Depictive Knowledge, which has the conclusion that every experience, and hence 
every hallucinatory experience, presents some qualitative item or other; and indeed, 
that it derives its phenomenal character therefrom (..). And in chapter , when 
arguing further for the Phenomenal Principle, we noted that in accepting that an 
experience as of an F really presents an F-item, we can oﬀer the best possible expla-
nation of the appearance facts, or of the Character Question as I earlier called it: 
that is, we can best explain why our experiences have the phenomenal characters 
that they do, and hence why things visually appear to the subject as they do (..). 
 Thus, the thesis so far has presented various reasons for accepting the Existential 
Thesis. So suppose that we grant this thesis, i.e. the claim that something is present-
ed to the mind in cases of hallucinatory experience. The question then is what the 
nature of this item is. In this chapter, I defend the traditional view, once widely held 
among philosophers, that we should take the objects presented in hallucinatory  
experience to be sui generis mental items. Of course, there is in fact no logical  
entailment between these theses (Warnock : ). After all, just because I am 
aware of something in hallucination, it does not follow that this object is mind-
dependent. In fact, there are many options regarding what the ‘obscure object of 
hallucination’ might be. One way to see this is to consider Adam Pautz’s: 
 
Item Awareness 
  ‘Whenever one has a visual experience, there is something of which one is  
  aware.’ (: ) 
 
Think of this thesis as restricted to hallucination. Then, what we have is basically the 
Existential Thesis. The important point is that when considering hallucination, 
Pautz is clear that in his view, the doctrine of Item Awareness is quite neutral re-
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garding the nature of the ‘something’ that every visual experience presents. Moreo-
ver, Pautz also seems to think that when it comes to specifically hallucinatory expe-
rience, we have five main options for the kind of object that could be presented to 
us, namely: 
 
• Pure universals. 
• Meinongian objects. 
• Non-actual possibilia. 
• Actual mind-independent particulars. 
• Actual mind-dependent particulars (sense-data). 
 
For our purposes, we can rule out universals-awareness right away. For we have al-
ready argued that this doctrine is to be rejected in chapter .1 Accordingly, by 
Pautz’s taxonomy, we are left with three options besides my preferred sense-datum 
view. The trouble, however, is that all of these other options look problematic.  
 The first idea is that we are presented with non-existent ‘Meinongian items’.2 As 
Knight (: ) puts it: ‘The Meinongian strategy is to identify the object of hal-
lucination with a non-existent object with just the properties that the hallucinating 
subject is inclined to predicate on the strength of his hallucination’.3  Now one issue 
is that it is unclear if we can make sense of ‘Meinongian’ items, that is, items that 
fail to exist but that nevertheless have properties and relations. As the famous objec-
tion from Russell () has it, one seemingly lacks the kind of ‘robust feeling for 
reality’ needed for studying metaphysics if one can accept this kind of view. Howev-
er, this general point aside, it also is seems to me unclear if Meinongian items are 
                                                   
1 That argument, or the core of it, is essentially this. Any object of visual awareness must mani-
fest at least certain basic visual qualities: it must classify as a sensory object. Yet properties (universals 
taken all by themselves) lack entirely the right kind of nature here. The property of being red is not 
red, for example, as Johnston (: ) explains (although of course, Johnston is a fan of the ‘pure 
properties’ view of hallucination, i.e. the view that such experiences present properties that are not 
instantiated in the scene before the eyes.) More generally, it would appear that a property just lacks 
the kind of sensible nature that is required for being a sensory object. Accordingly, pure properties 
cannot be seen, and cannot be visually presented to a subject in a case of hallucination either. 
2 Arguably, the term ‘Meinongian’ does not provide the best label for this kind of view, as it 
seems that Meinong did not in fact hold that there are non-existent items in the relevant sense (cf. 
Crane a; van Cleve ). However, I will use this label here just for expository convenience. 
3 Knight () is one proponent of this view. So are Butchvarov (, , ) and, argu-
ably, Lycan (). Johnston () oﬀers a thorough discussion and powerful critique of this view. 
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the kind of thing that could partly constitute an experience in the first place. On the 
one hand, the Meinongian endorses a presentational conception of hallucination, 
and on this conception, hallucinatory experiences are complex wholes. In particular, 
they are relational complexes built out of the presentation relation holding between 
a suitable object and the relevant subject. These wholes, moreover, are fully real. The 
hallucinatory experience that I am now having is just as real, for example, as the lap-
top I am now typing on or the chair that I am now sitting on. On the other hand, 
however, Meinongian objects are unreal; they do not exist. The trouble is that it is 
hard to see how anything real could have even one unreal part. For how could put-
ting together some real things with even one unreal thing yield something real as its 
output? After all, if you only have unreal things, then no operation could possibly 
take those things as input and produce a fully real whole that has those things as 
parts. No real object can be wholly constituted only by items that are unreal. But if 
that is so, how could a wholly real thing be even partly constituted by something 
unreal?  
 In short, it seems that there is no mereological function that could take as parts a 
real subject, the real relation of presentation, and some unreal Meinongian item, and 
yet return as output a complex whole, viz. an hallucinatory experience, that is fully 
real. This means, however, that we cannot combine a presentational view of halluci-
nation with the idea that hallucination presents unreal items. (I thus fully agree with 
Price :  that ‘we cannot be acquainted with that which is unreal’.4) 
 Let us turn now to the other two options. Consider first the view that we are 
presented with non-actual, ‘merely’ possible objects in hallucination (for discussion 
of this view see Johnston ; cf. Lewis  and Lycan ). While there are a 
variety of views on which non-actual or ‘merely’ possible objects exist, the only view 
on which these objects will have the necessary sensible qualities is Lewisian modal 
realism. Accordingly, we would need to endorse the view that hallucinatory experi-
ences present Lewisian possibilia. Yet many philosophers refuse to follow Lewis 
() in believing in a plurality of possible worlds that are just as real and concrete 
                                                   
4 There is a harmless sense in which the objects of hallucination sometimes fail to exist: I can, for 
example, hallucinate a dragon under the influence of certain drugs, yet, of course, there will be no 
actual dragon in the vicinity. However, we can understand this in terms of the presentation of some 
fully real item, which I then take to be a certain way, i.e. which I take to be a dragon (cf. . ).  
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as our own. And for that there seems to be good reason: the incredulous stare this 
view provokes is well-deserved (even if it is not an argument). There are also further, 
specific worries pertaining to the idea that Lewisian possibilia could be the objects of 
hallucinatory experience. One problem concerns how the visual presentation rela-
tion could hold between physical items across diﬀerent possible worlds—given that 
those worlds, and so the items within them, are spatio-temporally and causally iso-
lated from each other. However, we do not have space to go into these here.5 
 As for the final view, namely, that hallucinatory experiences present us not with 
sense-data, but with external things that depend on the mind or the brain—
following Martin (manuscript), we might call such items ‘sensibilia’, a term co-
opted from Russell ()—this seems problematic as well. To be clear, in my sense 
of the term, ‘sensibilia’ are items just like traditional sense-data: they are distinct 
from ordinary external objects but they are sensible objects with qualitative natures. 
Unlike sense-data, however, they are mind-independent and in no way mental.6 
 Those early twentieth-century philosophers of perception who took the objects 
of sense to be ‘sensibilia’ rather than sense-data (taking these terms in my sense), 
including Broad () and Price (), believed that all experiences present enti-
ties of this kind; that is, items with certain basic visual qualities which we typically 
mistake for ordinary external things. A naïve realist, however, might want to adapt 
this kind of view, thus ending up with a disjunctivist position whereby perceptual 
experiences present ordinary external items whilst hallucinatory experiences present 
sensibilia (in the sense that I have defined). This is the position that I am presently 
concerned with.7 Again, I think this kind of view is once again problematic and 
should be rejected. Here I will focus on one main argument against it. This argu-
ment has two main steps. First, it is argued that proponents of this view must say 
                                                   
 5 That said, let us just one specific problem: a problem of metaphysical under-determination. 
Suppose I have an hallucination as of a blue swan. Within the Lewisian pluriverse there is a plethora 
of intrinsically identical blue swans in exactly the same surroundings as the one I seem to see, even 
given overlap. So which of the many possibilia, i.e. of the many blue swans, am I acquainted with? 
Surely I sense just one. Yet there is nothing in reality to determine which blue swan it is going to be.  
6 Note that this isn’t Russell’s usage of the term. Rather, Russell (: ) uses sensibilia to re-
fer to ‘those objects which have the same metaphysical and physical status as sense-data without nec-
essarily being data to any mind…’. Thus, Russellian sensibilia are just like sense-data yet necessarily 
unsensed. Whereas my sensibilia are like sense-data, yet can be sensed and are mind-independent. 
7 A recent advocate of this kind of view is Johnston (manuscript-c). In his view, we are aware of 
external things in good cases, yet in cases of hallucination, we are aware of a ‘mosaic of colour ex-
panses’, whereby these items are rather like visual sense-data, albeit taken to be mind-independent. 
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that the sensibilia presented in hallucination are externally located. Then it is argued 
that this concession leads to a fatal dilemma for advocates of the sensibilia view. 
 The first stage of my argument is to point out that intuitively, if I am aware in 
some experience of some sensibilium, s, then s has to be externally located; that is, it 
must be located somewhere in external reality. To see the force of this claim, note, 
first, that a sensibilium will manifest the requisite visual qualities needed to do phe-
nomenological justice to the situation. For instance, the sensibilium I see when I 
hallucinate a red and round tomato will at the least be red and round; thus, it will 
have a certain shape, presumably it will also have a certain visual depth. Intuitively, 
however, anything with a shape (size, depth) has some location or other. Yet if the 
relevant object is mind-independent, rather than being a mental item, we cannot 
suppose that it is located in some mental space. The only option, therefore, is, ap-
parently, to treat the object as being located in external space, and, accordingly, as 
being spatially located alongside other ordinary denizens of the material world. 
 This first stage of the argument seems hard to refute. Once this step is granted, 
however, advocates of the sensibilia view face a dilemma. For if sensibilia are indeed 
located in the external world, then either the subject has the power to create exter-
nally located things, perhaps by means of the powers of the mind or brain, a view 
that seems implausible on its face, or else there has to be a plethora of sensibilia that 
are as it were, just there anyway, waiting to be sensed by hallucinating subjects but 
that generally remain unsensed. Evidently, it seems that neither option is plausible.8  
 The sensibilia view, therefore, faces a problem. On the one hand, the advocate of 
this view seems forced to say that sensibilia are externally located. At same time, 
however, there is no good way to make sense of such items being in external space 
alongside ordinary empirical objects; nor is there any other space in which to ‘put 
them’. There are good grounds, therefore, to reject this alternative to the sense-
                                                   
 8 Taking this latter option, as Martin (manuscript: ch. , ) explains, entails that ‘we live in a 
universe which is entirely replete with suitable placed sensibilia, such that whoever is caused to have a 
sensing of a given character, there is bound to be an appropriately placed [sensibilium] for them to 
be aware of. Whether I take you to the top of Mount Everest and cause you there to have an halluci-
nation of dancing pink elephants, or to the Sea of Tranquillity on the Moon and cause you there to 
have an hallucination of a choir of angels, there are bound to be corresponding [sensibilia] which 
match the way things then strike you as being’. This view, however, is rather hard to accept. (Fans of 
the sensibilia view, such as Broad  and Price , tended to accept this sort of view. But I agree 
with Martin’s assessment that in so doing, i.e. in viewing the objects of awareness as mind-
independent in this way, they made their view much more problematic than it needed to be.) 
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datum view. The upshot, it seems to me, is that the object of hallucination should 
be treated, not as mind-independent, but rather as mental or mind-dependent. Giv-
en this, however, there is some justification for the classical view of matters—that 
we are presented, in hallucinatory experience, with impressions, or ideas, or sense-
data, i.e. with mental objects that depend for their being on the mind of the subject. 
 With more space, a fuller argument could be given here against the alternatives. 
However, I will assume henceforth that we are presented with sense-data in halluci-
natory experience. Relatedly, I assume that we have reason to think that our hallu-
cinatory experiences consist exhaustively in the presentation of mental sense-data.   
 The remaining question, then, is what the precise nature of mental sense-data 
actually is. That is the question I sketch a schematic answer to in the next section.  
  
. The Nature of Sense-Data 
 
This section defends a certain conception of sense-data. It also deals with some of 
the objections that have been raised against mental objects of awareness over the 
years. These worries are considered, however, only insofar as they arise while I am 
clarifying my preferred conception of sense-data qua mental objects of awareness.  
 
.. Experience-Dependence 
 
When it is claimed that sense-data are mind-dependent, what is often meant is that 
sense-data are experience-dependent, i.e., that they depend for their being on the par-
ticular experiences that they are the objective-constituents of. Thus, if I am having 
an hallucinatory experience that presents a certain sense-datum, that sense-datum 
depends for its being on the particular experience I am having. It derives its being 
from that experience, and it could not possibly exist apart from that experience.9 
 According to Martin (manuscript), certain of the traditional problems relating 
to the individuation of sense-data—as expressed, for example, by Paul (); 
                                                   
9 Notice that the modal claim here is entailed by, but not exhaustive of, the dependence claim. 
When x depends on y, this means that x derives its being from y. It then follows that the existence of 
y necessitates the existence of x. However, the necessitation of x’s existence by y’s existence is not 
suﬃcient for it to be so that x derives its being from y, and hence is not suﬃcient for x to ontological-
ly depend on y. Thus, ontological dependence and necessitation are distinct (cf. Fine ). 
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Barnes (—); and Chisholm () (among many others)—can be dealt with 
if we conceive of sense-data as experience-dependent in this way. As Martin writes: 
 
[The] problems relating to the individuation of sense-data can be treated as simply  
derivative of questions about the individuation of episodes of sensing. For if sense-data 
are properly dependent existences on events of awareness of them, then there will be a 
mapping from objects of sense to acts of sensing, and the individuation conditions for 
the former will be as settled, or as unsettled, as those for the latter. (manuscript: ch. , 
—) 
 
People rarely argue that experiences do not exist on the basis that there are certain 
puzzles concerning their identity and individuation. However, if sense-data are 
‘properly dependent existences’ on the experiences that they are the objects of, then 
their individuation can be no more problematic than the individuation of the expe-
riences on which they properly depend. Thus, viewing sense-data as experience-
dependent would seem, as Martin suggests, to provide a promising strategy for deal-
ing with the traditional problems relating to the individuation of sense-data. 
 However, it seems to me misguided to think of sense-data as being experience-
dependent. Indeed, I believe that the notion of an experience-dependent sense-
datum is incoherent. I first explain why I believe this is the case. I then set out an 
alternative conception of mind-dependence, before returning to the traditional 
problems of individuation that have been raised against the sense-datum theorist. 
 Note, first, that experiences, at least on the presentationalist conception that 
sense-datum theorists accept, are a kind of complex whole (cf. Johnston : ). 
Then, note that in general, it seems evident that complex wholes depend for their 
being on their proper parts. For each complex whole W, with parts the XXs, there is 
a one-many relation of dependence such that W (fully) depends on the XXs.10 It 
then follows that for each member x of the XXs, there is a one-one relation of partial 
dependence between W and x such that W depends in part for its being on x. In 
                                                   
10 The whole here depends both fully and collectively on the parts in question. The relation here is 
therefore one-many. In general, one thing can depend on various other things; it is in these cases that 
we have collective dependence and hence a one-many relation of dependence from the thing that is 
posterior to those things that are prior. The case of wholes depending on their parts is paradigmatic. 
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short, if W fully depends on the XXs, then W partly depends on any x among the 
XXs, i.e. for any x among the XXs, W depends for its being at least partly on x. 
 Now take a given hallucinatory experience consisting in the presentation relation 
holding between some subject, S, and some sense-datum, D. The experience itself 
we can refer to as E. By the above principles, it follows that E depends at least partly 
for its being on D; for E is a complex whole, and D is one of its parts. If sense-data 
are experience-dependent, however, then D depends fully for its being on E. Ac-
cordingly, we end up with a violation of the evident asymmetry of ontological de-
pendence. On the one hand, the sense-datum is said to depend (fully) on E. Yet on 
the other, E is said to depend (in part) on the sense-datum. My contention is that 
this situation is impossible. If A fully depends on B, then B cannot depend, even in 
part, on A. Two things cannot prop each other up, ontologically speaking. If A de-
rives its being from B, then B cannot derive its being, even in part, from A. Nor can 
B fully derive its being from any plurality of items containing A as a component.11  
 The trouble, in short, is that given a presentational conception of experience, 
any given sense-datum will partly constitute the hallucinatory experience that it is 
the object of. That experience will therefore be a complex whole that partly depends 
on that sense-datum for its being. The asymmetry of ontological dependence then 
precludes the sense-datum from depending, in turn, for its being on the act-object 
experience it partly constitutes. The upshot is that sense-data cannot be experience-
dependent. (We could reject asymmetry, but then either irreflexivity or transitivity 
must go as well. Yet surely ontological dependence is all three of these things!) 
 Crucially, it does not follow from this argument that sense-data are not in any 
sense mind-dependent. Rather, the moral is that we should distinguish experience-
dependence from mind-dependence proper. To be experience-dependent is to be 
dependent for your being on a certain experience. Whereas to be mind-dependent is 
to depend for your being on a particular mind. Since there is a clear diﬀerence be-
tween the mind of a subject on the one hand and a token-experience on the other, 
we can clearly distinguish between two relations here, and, hence, two kinds of 
mind-dependence, two ways an item can be mental (cf. Moran manuscript-c). 
                                                   
11 That ontological dependence is asymmetric is widely accepted in the metaphysics literature.  
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 Do we have to think of minds substantively—i.e. as a kind of object—in order 
to make sense of what I am calling mind-dependence proper? No: we can obviously 
speak of our minds and of their powers without having to view our minds as a kind 
of item. Moreover, one of the powers of our minds, I would insist, is the power to 
create and sustain (in certain cases anyway) its own objects of awareness. A sense-
datum, moreover, in the sense I have in mind, is precisely such an object. It is an 
item created and sustained by the powers of the mind of the hallucinating subject.  
Accordingly, to believe in sense-data, we have to take seriously the old idea that our 
minds have the capacity to create and sustain their own objects. A sense-datum is 
thus mind-dependent in the precise sense that it depends for its being on the mind 
of the subject. Each sense-datum owes its being to the particular mind that (in vir-
tue of exercising the relevant power) created it and that sustains its existence. 
 Return now to the problem about the individuation of sense-data. If sense-data 
are not dependent on experiences, then we cannot say that their identity-conditions 
are parasitic on those of the experiences that they depend on. However, what we can 
say is that a sense-datum exists because it has been created by a particular mind, and 
will persist just so long as that mind continues to exercise the powers that sustain 
the relevant sense-datum’s existence. There is no general problem, then, as to the 
origination and continued existence of sense-data. Their individuation can be ex-
plained by taking seriously the powers of the mind, especially the idea that the mind 
has the power to create and sustain the existence of its own objects of awareness.12  
 It might be thought that one cannot just leave things there. For the so-called 
problems of individuation that arise in connection with sense-data are many and 
diﬀuse, and it is unclear whether a general appeal to the mind’s powers is suﬃcient 
to dispense with them all. I am in fact prepared to grant this, but I would also note 
that for many of the ‘problems of individuation’ that have been raised in connection 
with sense-data, one can raise parallel problems in the case of material objects, or 
other familiar things such as events and states that everyone believes in. The point is 
that in the case of these other items, the problems are generally taken to be puzzles 
                                                   
12 I grant that on disjunctive views such as my own, there is a substantive question as to why the 
mind only creates its own objects of awareness in cases of hallucination. Given the view that I set out 
in  chapter , I would suggest that whether the mind will exercise the relevant powers depends at 
least in part on the causal context that the subject is in. However, I acknowledge that this cannot be 
the whole story. Accordingly, further work needs to be done if we are to properly answer this worry. 
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that need resolving, rather than reasons for claiming that the relevant items do not 
exist. With Jackson (: ﬀ), then, I would insist that if there are residual puz-
zles regarding the individuation of sense-data, which cannot be handled simply by 
viewing sense-data as entities that are created and sustained by the relevant subject’s 
mind, then these should be dealt with just as we deal with the analogous puzzles 
arising in connection with other types of object. (We should keep in mind, also, 
that just as we do not deny that these other objects exist despite such puzzles, we 
need not deny that sense-data exist due to the existence of these puzzles either.) 
 
.. Particulars not Substances 
 
When problems concerning the identity and individuation for sense-data are raised, 
it is also common to raise questions regarding their ontological status. On the one 
hand, sense-data are to be viewed as particular existents. On the other hand, howev-
er, sense-data are plausibly not substances.13 After all, whatever else one is aware of 
when after-imaging and hallucinating, it would appear not to be a substance with its 
own principle of unity and persistence determining its existence both at a time and 
over time. (Contrast organisms, which are paradigmatic substances in this sense.) 
The advocate of sense-data thus seems to end up with a question as to the status of 
sense-data, ontologically speaking. The issue is nicely articulated by Price like so: 
 
[What] sort of particular existents are [sense-data]? [W]e say that they are particulars, 
[but] this does not of course imply that they are substances…All substances are  
indeed particulars, but not all particulars are substances…Most particulars, however, if 
they are not substances, seem to be ‘of’ or ‘in’ substances in the sense of being phases 
(or states) of substances. Indeed, it is commonly thought that every particular is either 
a substance or a phase of some substance. (: —) 
 
Price goes on to say that ultimately, in his view, sense-data are neither substances 
nor phases of substances, but should instead be viewed as being in eﬀect kinds of 
event (: ). However, this merely reintroduces the initial puzzle in another 
                                                   
 13 Various expressions of the intuition that sense-data cannot be substances can be found in the 
sense-datum literature. See for example Barnes (—); Paul (); and also Price (: V). 
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form. For it is standard to view events as changes in substances and to view states as 
‘unchanges’. In short, it is common to view events and states as being property-
exemplifications of substances (cf. Kim ; Johnston ). If this is right, how-
ever, then given Price’s view, there must be some substance for sense-data to be 
property-exemplifications of. Yet, just as there is no obvious substance that a sense-
datum could be a phase of, so too there is no obvious substance for a sense-datum to 
be a property-exemplification of (i.e. for sense-data to be changes or unchanges in). 
 Now I believe it is correct to deny that sense-data are substances. There is an in-
tuition as to the insubstantiality of sense-data that I believe we should respect. That 
said, I would also deny that sense-data are events. Instead, I think sense-data should 
be viewed as bundles of what we earlier referred to as sensible quality-instances.  
 According to Price (: ), sense-data are to be viewed as events that, as he 
puts it ‘happen to nothing’ (: ). This view, however, seems hard to make 
sense of, as Price himself () acknowledges. In contrast, the view that I develop, 
while similar to that of Price, is much easier to comprehend. On this view, sense-
data are not events, but rather bundles of quality-instances. They are not events that 
‘happening to nothing’. Rather, they are quality-instances that nothing has. 
 Again, a sensible quality-instance is a kind of particular, with its own qualitative 
nature. Yet these items are not substances. Some are qualitative parts of substances, 
but they are not substances themselves. They are insubstantial items. Accordingly, 
they are well-suited to act as the objects of hallucinatory experience.  
 On this view, when one hallucinates, there is, for each basic visual quality of 
which one seems to be aware, an instance of that quality that one really is aware of. 
This quality-instance, moreover, is a creation of the mind. The multiplicity of quali-
ty-instances one is aware of are combined together by the mind to form the sense-
datum of which one is aware—this being the total object of the current experience. 
So the sense-datum and its parts are quality-instances and complexes thereof. And 
each of these items is equally mind-dependent in the sense that we set out above.  
 There is a potential worry here relating to the insubstantiality of sense-data. For 
on some views, ordinary substances just are bundles of quality-instances. This is the 
so-called ‘trope-bundle-theory’. The trouble is that if a bundle of quality-instances is 
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a substance, then on my view, sense-data turn out to be mental substances after all. 
Yet, this conflicts with the apparent datum that sense-data are insubstantial items. 
 What this really brings out, I think, is a problem for trope-bundle-theories. For 
if tropes are by nature insubstantial items, then it seems to follow that just bundling 
them together is insuﬃcient to make a substance. Just as no amount of unreal items 
could make a real whole, so no amount of insubstantial items can combine to form 
a substance. Thus we cannot treat tropes as our metaphysical atoms from which the 
substances are constructed. Rather, we should take as basic categories both that of 
substance and quality-instance, thus ending up with a two-category ontology, 
whereby quality-instances inhere in substances by acting as their qualitative parts.14 
 Note, however, that not all quality-instances must inhere in a substance. For 
there are certain such instances, and indeed certain sensible instances, that do not 
belong to (that are not qualitative parts of) any substance. Once we recognise this 
fact, we can then dispel the worry that once we countenance both substances and 
tropes, we will have to view all tropes as inhering in some substance, which would 
preclude viewing sense-data as trope-bundles that don’t inhere in any substance.  
 Suppose we grant that in reality there are both substances as well as the various 
tropes they have as qualitative parts. Should we then accept that there can exist 
tropes that are not qualitative parts of any substances? I believe we should, at least 
when it comes to sensible tropes. Johnston (manuscript-c) oﬀers an argument. In 
his view, among the objects of vision we should recognise ‘visual expanses’ (cf. 
..).  And some of these, he thinks, are ‘unowned’. Ganzfeld phenomena provide 
a useful sort of case. Consider Johnston’s example involving a ‘whiteout’:  
 
You can experience a ganzfield by cutting a white ping-pong ball in half and placing 
the halves on your eyes and then looking at a brightish, diﬀuse light. At first you see 
the insides of the ping-pong ball halves, but then a “whiteout” occurs so that you are 
aware of a homogenous expanse of white. (manuscript-c: ) 
 
                                                   
 14 Part of what D. C. Williams aimed to capture in calling tropes ‘abstract existents’ was their 
alleged insubstantiality. Essentially, I am saying that their insubstantiality raises problems for  
Williams’ trope-bundle-theory, for a bundle of insubstantial items seems unable to be a substance. 
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The ‘homogenous expanse of white’ here is plausibly viewed as a sensible quality-
instance, comprised at least partly of an instance of a certain shade of white. The 
phenomenology of seeing this expanse of white, moreover, is what Johnston refers 
to as ‘non-instantial’. As he puts it: ‘Unlike the experience of seeing the inside of a 
ping-pong ball half, the whiteout experience is an experience of an expanse of 
whiteness with nothing presented as being white. (It is not like looking at a white 
sheet close up, an experience in which the sheet is manifest and is manifestly white.)’ 
Thus, in seeing the white expanse, we do not see any substance of which it is a quali-
tative part. Indeed, plausibly, there is no substance that it is a qualitative part of.  
Rather, I submit, what we have here is just one of many cases wherein we see or 
sense a sensible quality-instance that does not belong to any particular substance. 
 The view that we should take, therefore, is that whilst some quality-instances 
inhere in substances—there is the redness of the rose, the brownness of this sur-
face—there are also quality-instances that are ‘unowned’. Given this, my contention 
is that in hallucination it is unowned quality-instances of which we are aware. These 
quality-instances are not parts of any substance. They can form complex items, but 
these are not substances. They are insubstantial particulars. Thus, they are quite ap-
posite play the role of sense-data, so long as they are construed as mind-dependent.15 
 
.. Two Conceptions Combined  
 
Notably, the present account in eﬀect collapses the distinction between two well-
known conceptions of what a sense-datum is, which we can trace to Bertrand Rus-
sell and G. E. Moore. On the one hand, Russell seems to conceive of sense-data as 
individual sensible quality-instances. Consider the following list of examples of 
sense-data that Russell provides in the early pages of his Problems of Philosophy: 
 
                                                   
15 Given my views in chapter , I have to hold that some sensible quality-instances can be mind-
independent, whereas others are mind-dependent. Note, however, that the contrast here is orthogo-
nal to the contrast between ‘owned’ and ‘unowned’ quality-instances; between those that inhere in a  
substance and those that don’t. All mind-dependent quality-instances, on my view, fail to inhere in 
substances; yet I also allow for mind-independent unowned quality-instances (e.g. ganzfeld cases). 
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Let us give the name of ‘sense-data’ to the things that are immediately known in sens-
ation: such things as colours, sounds, smells, hardnesses, roughnesses and so on. 
(: ) 
 
Moore also oﬀers a similar list of sample sense-data in Moore (). First, Moore 
imagines that he sees a particular envelope. He then asks what happened in this par-
ticular case. He goes on to explain that at least part of what happened is that: 
 
I saw a patch of a particular whitish colour, having a certain size, and a certain shape, a 
shape with a rather sharp angles or corners and bounded by fairly straight lines. These 
things: this patch of a whitish colour, and its size and shape I did actually see. And I 
propose to call these things, the colour, size and shape, sense-data, things given or pre-
sented by the senses—given, in this case, by my sense of sight. (: ) 
 
Now here, Moore seems to include as sense-data items that are also qualities or 
quality-instances, just like Russell, e.g. a certain colour, size and shape. On the other 
hand, however, Moore later goes on to say, in a clarificatory footnote, that: 
 
I should now make, and have for many years made, a sharp distinction between what I 
have called the ‘patch’, on the one hand, and the colour, size and shape, of which it is, 
on the other; and should call, and have called, only the patch, not its colour, size or 
shape, a ‘sense-datum’. (: , n. ) 
 
(The paper this quote is from was first given as a lecture by Moore some years before 
being printed. The footnotes in the publication are Moore’s later amendments.) 
 One could characterise the diﬀerence between the Russellian notion of a sense-
datum (which Moore initially shares) and the (later) Moorean notion in this way. 
For Russell, sense-data can be instances of qualities. Whereas for Moore, sense-data 
are particulars that are the bearers of qualities, rather than qualities themselves.  
 With my view we do not have to choose between these conceptions. Take for 
example Moore’s case involving the white visual expanse. This involves a certain 
colour, a certain size, and a certain shape. There is also the patch that has these fea-
tures. The patch, however, on my view of matters, is nothing over and above the 
collection of the particular features in question. For these are particular instances of 
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qualities, particular module tropes, and as such they are self-exemplifying. Thus the 
item that one obtains by bundling these objects together—the patch, that is—
exemplifies the qualities by having self-exemplifying instances thereof as parts.  
 As for the having of qualities by sense-data: in my view, all that it takes for a 
sense-datum to be F, where F is any basic visual quality, is for it to have an instance 
of Fness as a part. So being F is a much simpler aﬀair when it comes to sense-data 
than when it comes to ordinary external things, at least given the account of being F 
and merely looking F set out in chapter . I submit that this diﬀerence is due to the 
fact that sense-data are merely phenomenal objects whilst external items are not. 
 We might refer to sense-data, so conceived, as Berkelean objects. For recall the 
famous characterisation of what an apple is that Berkeley oﬀers in the Principles:  
 
By sight I have the ideas of light and colours with their several degrees and variations. 
By touch I perceive, for example, hard and soft, heat and cold, motion and resistance, 
and all of these more or less as to quantity and degree. Smelling furnishes me with 
odours; the palate with tastes, and hearing conveys sounds to the mind in all their  
variety of tone and composition. And as several of these are observed to accompany 
each other, they come to be marked by one name, and so be reputed as one thing. 
Thus, for example, a certain colour, taste, smell, figure and consistence…go together, 
are accounted one distinct thing, signified by the name apple…(: Part , §)  
 
We might refer to Berkeley’s apple as a purely sensory or phenomenal object. It is 
composed solely of sensory qualities. But we are focused on visual experience. Thus 
in the case of visual hallucination, we need to appeal, not to sensory objects, but to 
purely visual objects. These are Berkelean objects where the qualities are confined to 
those of vision. They have as parts basic visual qualities like colour, size, and shape. 
 By thinking of visual sense-data this way, we can locate a visible ‘common fac-
tor’ that is present in perception and hallucination. Berkeley is wrong, of course, 
about the nature of actual apples (and the like). A real apple is not just a congeries 
of sensible quality-instances—there is the substance of (or better, that is) the apple 
as well as the quality-instances that inhere in it, and only some of those quality-
instances are perceptible. However, we could plausibly isolate those sensible quali-
ties that are proper quality-parts of the apple and refer to the complex thereof as the 
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sensible form of the apple—the elements of the apple that are sensible. We could also 
isolate its visible form by abstracting away from all aspects of the apple besides those 
that are visible qualities. The visible quality-instances comprising the visible form of 
the apple can be perceived via vision. In a matching hallucination, that same com-
plex of qualities will be presented. The quality-instances will be numerically distinct 
but exactly resembling. Thus the visible forms are the same despite involving nu-
merically distinct quality-instances. They involve the same qualities but diﬀerent 
instances thereof. So as to the question: is there anything common to seeing an  
apple and merely hallucinating one? Yes: in both cases one sees the same complex of 
qualities. In the good case, the complex involves certain visual quality-instances that 
are quality-parts of an actual apple. In the bad case, the complex involves mental 
visual quality-instances that exactly resemble certain quality-parts of the apple itself. 
In both cases, then, we are aware of what I am calling the visible form of the apple. 
 It follows that even within a disjunctivist framework, we can recognise sensory 
common factors: the same visual qualities that we can see in perception can be pre-
sented to us in hallucination as well (cf. ..). The instances of the qualities, more-
over, will be numerically distinct, yet exactly resembling, sensible tropes.  
 
.. Sense-Data and Substantiality  
 
At this point, we are in a position to meet a worry that Johnston () raises about 
the existence of sense-data construed as mental objects of awareness. He writes:  
 
As opposed to the categories of mental events, acts and states understood as aspects of 
an embodied person or animal…the category of mental particulars that are not them-
selves events, acts or states, is not a happy category. How can a mental object, some-
thing whose existence is directly dependent on a subject’s awareness of it, be at the 
same time complex and have the internal unity that makes for a complex particular as 
opposed to a complex of properties? The mental object or sense datum has no matter 
constituting it, and it has no capacity to maintain itself through change. So what 
unites its qualitative parts into a particular, re-identifiable over time? The absence of 
any good answer accounts for the silliness of questions concerning the numerical iden-
tity through change of sense data or of mental objects quite generally. (: ) 
 
 
There is a lot that could be said in response here. For example, part of the worry 
seems to be that sense-data are somehow both complex particulars yet also items 
that lack any internal principle of unity that could account for their synchronic uni-
ty and diachronic identity. However, there cannot be a general problem with re-
gards to such particulars. Think, for example, of sets, or complex propositions. The-
se are complex particulars, they exist at specific times and over time. Yet they do not 
have the kind of principle of unity that (for example) organisms have, which  
accounts for the unity of their parts at a given time and that explains how these 
items can continue to exist over time. Since, however, we do not for this reason de-
ny that sets or propositions exist, I do not see why this is a problem for sense-data.  
 Perhaps Johnston is conflating here the notion of a particular existent with that 
of a substance. A substance has to have the sort of ‘principle of unity’ that Johnston 
has in mind: after all, substances are self-sustaining in a rather demanding way. 
However, the same is not true of all particular items. Again, as Price pointed out in 
the passage above, whilst all substances are particular existents, not all particular ex-
istents are substances. Accordingly, once we recognise sense-data as particular exist-
ents that are not substances, much of the force of Johnston’s objection dissipates.  
 There is, however, at least one further thing worth saying here. For a further part 
of Johnston’s worry concerns how a mental object, something dependent on a state of 
awareness, could have the kind of unity necessary for being a particular existent that 
is composed of parts unified at a time and that is able to persist over time. On our 
conception, however, sense-data are not experience-dependent in this way, but are 
instead mind-dependent proper. Thus a complex sense-datum is a bundle of percep-
tible quality-instances. Each individual quality-instance is created by the mind, and 
these quality-instances are united together (at a time) by the powers of the mind. 
The complex sense-datum then persists over time thanks to continued exercise of 
these mental powers. Thus, we can account for the unity and persistence of mental 
particulars, conceived as complexes of quality-instances (but not properties) after all.  
 There are, therefore, two mistakes in the above passage, which lend the objection 
much of its apparent force. The first conflates being a particular existent with being 
a substance. The second mixes up experience-dependence with mind-dependence. 
Sense-data are not experience-dependent substances but rather mind-dependent 
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items that are insubstantial particular existents. Given this clarification, I submit, 
there is no problem making sense of the synchronic unity of sense-data, nor of their 
diachronic identity, contra what Johnston claims in the passage above. 
 
.. Sense-Data and Mental Space 
 
At this point, I want to say something about the location of sense-data. For, in my 
view, we have to treat sense-data as having some location or other. After all, these 
items manifest various qualities, including colour, shape, and size. Any item with 
shape and size, however, must be extended. Yet extension entails location in space. 
Accordingly, there must be some space or other in which sense-data are located.   
 Along with philosophical tradition, I think that mental sense-data should be 
conceived as located in mental space. However, I would also deny that commitment 
to mental space is an extra commitment beyond the commitment to mind-
dependent sense-data themselves. This is because the mental spaces that sense-data 
are located in can be thought of as Leibnizean. Whenever a subject is aware of vari-
ous sense-data, those data will stand in various spatial relations to one another.16 
And I submit that what it is for the sense-data one is now aware of to be located in a 
mental space (or more accurately perhaps, that what it is for there to be a mental 
space in which those sense-data are now co-located), is simply for the sense-data one 
is now aware of to exist and to be spatially related to one another in various ways. 
The upshot is that once we have the various sense-data standing the relevant rela-
tions, we have the mental space in which they are located. For each hallucinator, 
there will be a distinct mental space in which the sense-data they are aware of will be 
located. That mental space will be posterior to the sense-data themselves and to the 
spatio-temporal relations that they stand in to each other. Thus mental space is not 
independent: it is dependent on sense-data and their spatio-temporal relations. 
                                                   
 16 These relations will in eﬀect be the phenomenal analogues of the external spatial relations that 
we perceive external things as standing in to one another. (Compare Johnston : n.  on the 
‘qualitative-surrogates of the actual spatio-temporal relations’ which he takes to be present to us in 
hallucination. According to Johnston, these might be thought of as the ‘a priori forms of sensible 
intuition’, i.e. as ‘the aspects of spatial and temporal organization – being here, being there, being 
adjacent, being engulfed, being bounded (and thus being shaped thus and so), being now, being 
then, being after, overlapping, occluding etc. – with which hallucination could acquaint a subject’.) 
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 Thinking of mental space as Leibnizean (or relational) helps to dissolve certain 
worries that one might have about countenancing mental space.17 For instance, I 
think the world is a wholly physical place: we have the sparse ground floor of being 
that is comprised by the basic physical items and their fundamental properties and 
relations, and all other items are metaphysically grounded therein. However, if for 
each subject there was a distinct substantival mental space, one might wonder if this 
kind of physicalist picture could be maintained. For, this picture seems to entail that 
external, physical space is, so to speak, complete; that there is nothing more to the 
world than physical space and the physical objects located therein. What’s hard to 
see is how this could be so if we countenance a plurality of distinct mental spaces. 
 Yet, once mental space is viewed as Leibnizean, the problem of making sense of 
mental space—the placement problem of seeing how all of our mental spaces fit in-
to the external world—dissolves. For, as I will explain in the next section, there is no 
barrier to viewing the sense-data that one person senses as grounded in the sparse 
physical base comprising the metaphysical ground floor. But once the sparse physi-
cal basis has generated sense-data, we then get the relevant mental spaces ‘for free’, 
at least if individual mental spaces are nothing over and above the sense-data and 
their (phenomenal) spatio-temporal relations which constitute that space. 
 The notion of Leibnizean mental space also helps us to make sense of the intui-
tive idea that hallucinatory sense-data are ‘private’ to each hallucinator. Plausibly, 
you cannot sense the sense-data I am now hallucinating, in just the same way as I 
cannot sense yours. We can make sense of this, I submit, by viewing my sense-data 
as being located in one mental space (constituted by their spatial relations) and of 
your sense-data as located in a distinct mental space (constituted by their spatial rela-
tions). On this picture, the privacy of my sense-data simply reduces to the fact that 
the sense-data that I am now aware of are (phenomenally) spatially related to each 
other but not to any of your sense-data. The key point is that my sense-data are lo-
cated in a Leibnizean mental space that none of your sense-data are located in (and 
vice versa). 
 
                                                   
 17 Perhaps not all worries concerning mental space can be dissolved in this way. For instance, 
Johnston (b) raises various further concerns which need to be addressed elsewhere.  
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. A Dual-Component View  
 
Thus far, I have set out a specific theory of sense-data. On that theory, sense-data 
can only have basic visual qualities, such as colour, shape, size, depth. However, the 
objects we hallucinate often appear, in our experiences, to have further qualities be-
sides basic qualities. The question is how this is to be explained. My answer involves 
making the claim that there is an intentional element in hallucinatory experience. 
 
.. Primary/Secondary Objects 
 
We can begin by drawing a distinction between primary and secondary objects of a 
given hallucinatory event (Johnston ). The primary object of a given hallucina-
tory experience is the objective-constituent of that experience. It is the item that is 
presented to the subject and whose presentation partly constitutes the experience. 
The secondary object, by contrast, does not enter into the structure of the hallucina-
tory experience and hence does not partly constitute it. When we speak of the pri-
mary object of an hallucination, we are speaking about a genuine item that partly 
constitutes the hallucinatory experience. Whereas in speaking of the secondary ob-
ject of an hallucination, we are merely capturing the way that the subject takes the 
primary object of hallucination to be. Accordingly, all talk of secondary objects is, at 
bottom, just a useful, yet metaphysically innocent, way of talking about the way the 
subject takes the primary object to be. 
 We are presupposing a presentationalist conception of hallucinatory experience. 
So when you hallucinate, there is a genuine item with which you are presented. This 
item will be the primary object of the hallucination. But in addition to the primary 
object of the hallucination, we can speak about the secondary object. If, for in-
stance, I hallucinate my mother, or a pink elephant, then my mother, or the pink 
elephant, is the secondary object of my hallucination. Crucially, however, unlike 
primary objects, secondary objects of hallucination need not exist. To talk about the 
secondary object of an hallucination is really just to describe how the subject of the 
hallucination takes the primary object to be. If, in hallucinating a pink elephant, I 
am presented with a certain pink sense-datum, this will be the primary object of my 
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hallucinatory experience. But we can also speak of the pink elephant that I am hal-
lucinating, despite the fact that there need not be any pink elephant in the vicinity. 
For, what makes it true to say that I am hallucinating a pink elephant (and that the 
pink elephant I am hallucinating is the secondary object of my hallucination) is 
simply that I am presented with some primary object (a sense-datum) that I take to 
be a certain way, (i.e. as a pink elephant, at least in this particular case). 
 When Johnston () introduces this important distinction, he oﬀers no ac-
count of what it is for a subject to take the primary object of an hallucination to be a 
certain way. However, this leaves an important aspect of the metaphysics of halluci-
nation unaccounted for. This is because taking the primary object of an hallucina-
tion to be a certain way would seem to require an analysis. One way of making 
sense of matters here, I want to say, is to suppose that hallucination involves an in-
tentional element, with a de re content directed at the primary object. 
 To make sense of a subject taking the primary object of an hallucination to be a 
certain way—whereby taking the primary object to be that way is what acts as the 
ground of reports involving secondary objects such as “I am hallucinating an  
elephant” or “I am hallucinating my mother”—we must think of hallucinations as 
involving a representational or an intentional component. In the first instance, we 
have the hallucinatory experience which is presentational in nature. But in addition, 
we have a derivative intentional state—derivative because it could not exist were the 
presentational experience itself not to exist—whereby the content of that state is 
directed at the primary object of the hallucination. Hallucinating an elephant, for 
example, is, metaphysically speaking, just a matter of being presented with a certain 
sense-datum (a bundle of basic sensible quality-instances) whilst also being in a de-
rivative intentional state with a de re content directed at the sense-datum, such that 
in virtue of being in this intentional state, you thereby ‘take’ the sense-datum to be 
an elephant. The de re content thus ‘attributes’ a property to the sense-datum that in 
reality it lacks. Thus, it is correct for the subject to say that S is hallucinating an ele-
phant, for that is how S takes the primary object of his hallucinatory experience (i.e. 
the sense-datum) to be, and this is so regardless of whether there is any elephant 
there. The same is true if S is hallucinating his mother. Though she exists, her being 
the secondary object of the hallucinatory experience would simply be a matter of the 
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subject construing the primary object as his mother; the fact that she happens to 
exist plays no role in making it the case that she is the secondary object.18 
 At the metaphysical level, then, we have two components in play. There is, first, 
the sensory state proper, which involves the visual presentation of the sense-datum; 
this item manifests various basic visual qualities (and basic visual qualities only) and 
its nature is responsible for grounding the core phenomenology of the experience. 
But there is also the intentional state that the subject is in, which involves the sub-
ject entertaining a de re content aimed at the sense-datum itself. This is a derivative 
intentional state that ontologically depends on the prior, more fundamental state of 
sensing. By virtue of being in this state the subject takes the primary object to be a 
certain way. The combination of these states is then the hallucinatory experience.19 
 
.. An Objection Forestalled 
 
That the intentional state is derivative helps to forestall an objection that might be 
raised. Consider first a criticism of Johnston due to Crane (a). Here is how 
Crane raises the objection (for a reminder of Johnston’s view see .. above):  
 
Johnston…proposes an act-object account of hallucination, where the relata of the 
hallucinatory acts are…collections of uninstantiated properties. He also claims that 
uninstantiated properties exist. [Thus proponents of this view] have to answer the 
question of how [these] uninstantiated properties can have the apparent spatial loca-
tion which the objects of hallucination can have. The natural thing to say is that an 
experience represents these collections of properties as having spatial location. But once 
we appeal to representation to explain apparent spatial location, then what is stopping 
us from saying that an experience can represent an apparent particular object at such a 
location, even if there is no existing object there? (a: ) 
                                                   
18 In general, whether or not x exists is irrelevant to whether it is the secondary object of an hal-
lucination, since for x to be the secondary object of an hallucination is just for the subject to repre-
sent the primary object as being a certain way. Compare the notion of an intentional object within 
an intentionalist framework. An item x is the intentional object of my experience just in case my 
experience represents me as being aware of x. Thus, x may or may not exist, but whether it does is 
just not relevant to whether it is the intentional object of my experience or not (cf. Crane ). 
19 The resulting view is rather like the dual-component view of perceptual experience that H. H. 
Price () advocated, and that Gomes () has recently developed in the context of developing a 
broadly Kantian form of naïve realism. (Cf. also the mixed view developed in Phillips ). Unlike 
the views of these philosophers, however, my view is limited to the case of hallucination only. 
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In short, Johnston has to explain why his property-clusters seem to be located. The 
natural answer is that the mind represents those properties as being located (and 
indeed instantiated) at a certain region. But once representation is appealed to, what 
need have we to appeal to the presentation of properties? Why not simply appeal to 
the representational powers of the mind, and give a thoroughgoing representational-
ist or intentionalist account? Hallucinating, on this view, would simply be a matter 
of representing things to be a certain way; but nothing need be presented to the sub-
ject in order for this act of mental representation to take place.20 
 As regards our own account, one might press a similar style of objection. For 
one might well ask: if I can take a red round sense-datum to be a tomato by virtue 
of representing the sense-datum to have that property, what need is there to appeal 
here to sense-data or to their presentation at all? Why not simply appeal to the rep-
resentational powers of the mind? If all that we need to say is that the subject is rep-
resenting reality to be such that there is a red tomato before her, then we can do 
without the notion of a mind-dependent sense-datum being visually presented. 
(This would then achieve both an ideological and an ontological economy.) 
 In reply, we should insist that it is only once the sense-datum is presented that 
we have an experience with a phenomenal character of the relevant sort. The idea 
would be that this is a necessary condition for the subject to be in the relevant de-
rivative intentional state. After all, it is thanks to having the sense-datum as its pri-
mary object that one can be in the kind of intentional state whereby one takes that 
sense-datum to be a tomato (cf. Johnston : ). Without the presentation of 
the sense-datum, there would be no de re intentional state whereby the sense-datum 
is taken to be a tomato. Therefore, one could not be under the impression that there 
is a tomato present without the prior presentation of the relevant sense-datum. 
 This last connects to the final issue I want to address. The question is whether 
the intentional aspect of the hallucinatory experience can contribute to the phe-
nomenology of the event? My answer is yes, but in a quite specific way. There are 
two elements to the hallucinatory experience: the sensory state whereby the sense-
data are presented and the intentional state whereby the sense-data are taken to be 
                                                   
20 There are perhaps things Johnston can say here. See his (: ) and also Conduct (). 
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thus-and-so. Yet the items with a phenomenology are not these two components. 
Rather, one of the parts, the sensory element, has a phenomenology, which is 
grounded solely by the sense-data that are presented. And there is also the total hal-
lucinatory experience, with a distinct phenomenology. For the phenomenology of 
the overall event is not unaltered by the presence of the intentional state. Rather, 
since the nature of the intentional state aﬀects how the sense-datum is taken to be, 
it thereby aﬀects what it is like to have the hallucinatory experience. Thus, there is 
the sensory element of the hallucinatory experience which is phenomenologically 
unchanged by the intentional element. And there is the compound hallucinatory 
experience itself whose phenomenology is altered by the presence of the intentional 
state. The intentional state, however, does not act as a partial ground of the phe-
nomenology of the hallucination. (Nor does it have any phenomenology itself.)  
Rather it acts as a sensory modifier. That is, it modifies the way in which the sense-
data ground the phenomenology of the compound hallucinatory experience, since it 
aﬀects how those sense-data are taken by the subject of the hallucinatory experience 
to be. In short, the way in which I perceptually take the sense-data to be modifies 
the way in which those sense-data make it the case that my overall hallucinatory  
experience has the character it does. If I take the sense-data to be a duck rather than 
a rabbit, say, we have a diﬀerent overall phenomenology to the converse case. What 
changes here, moreover, is the manner in which the sense-data perform their 
grounding work in generating the phenomenology of the total experience, due to 
the way that I take the sense-data to be. But again, the sensory element of the com-
pound state remains unmodified, with an unmodified phenomenal character.21  
                                                   
21 Note that on this view, we end up with two events with a phenomenology: the sensory part of 
the hallucinatory experience and the total compound hallucinatory experience itself (which is made 
of the sensory and the intentional elements combined). Note also that this fits with the entire 
‘grounds and modifiers’ framework I am borrowing here from Bader (). In Bader’s case the ex-
ample is that of a reason. We have the ground of a reason g, that which makes a given x a reason, but 
there are also modifiers, whose role is to aﬀect the way in which the ground of the reason, g, makes x 
a reason in the first place, thereby aﬀecting its weight as a reason. Thus as Bader writes, when modifi-
cation occurs in this kind of case, ‘there are two distinct (though…not disjoint) reasons. On the one 
hand, there is the unmodified reason and, on the other, the modified reason. These reasons are dis-
tinct and play diﬀerent roles. The unmodified reason can be evaluated by abstracting from the con-
text, whereas the modified reason is the one that we identify when assessing the consideration in 
question within the context in which it is to be found.’ I quote at length, since we can draw an anal-
ogy here between abstracting from the modified reason and abstracting from the modified hallucina-
tory experience. In the latter case, we are in eﬀect abstracting from how we take the sense-data to be, 
and are focusing simply on the sense-data themselves and their basic visual qualities, and the experi-
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 Obviously, this last element of the view needs further work, and I hope to de-
velop it in more detail on another occasion. That said, I hope to have done enough 
to set out a coherent view, one that is interesting and worthy of further discussion. 
   
. Austinian Disjunctivism Defended 
 
By way of closing the thesis, this final section aims to bring everything together. In 
chapter , I introduced naïve realism, a theory of perceptual experience. I said I 
wanted to defend Austinian Disjunctivism, conceived, roughly, as the view that we 
are presented with external things in good cases and sense-data in bad cases. How-
ever, we can now be more specific. In chapter , I argued for a presentationalist the-
ory of experience. Then, in chapter , I explained how we can combine this kind of 
view with naïve realism even given that there are perceptual illusions. Having set 
aside the screening oﬀ problem in chapter , I then developed a sense-datum theory 
of hallucinatory experience in this final chapter. The view I call ‘Austinian Disjunc-
tivism’ however should really be conceived as the combination of the main claims of 
this thesis, so that it combines naïve realism about veridical perceptual experience, 
my specific view of illusory experience that brings sensible quality-instances into the 
picture, and my sense-datum view of hallucinatory experience (cf. chapter , fn. ). 
This is a thoroughly presentational view experience, which, I claim, should be taken 
just as seriously as other views of experience discussed in the perception literature. 
 After all, the theory has great explanatory power. We have seen this already in 
the thesis, for we have seen that it can account for how we can gain novel depictive 
knowledge in visual experience (.), as well as accounting in a natural way for why 
our experiences have the characters that they do (..). The view also allows us to 
accept the intuition that actual items are present in hallucination, and then to ex-
plain many features of hallucination in terms of the presence of such items (..). 
                                                                                                                                        
ence that their presentation constitutes. We are concentrating, as it were, on the pure, unadulterated 
given. Note also that we do not get screening oﬀ worries here, since there is a need for both of the 
experiences with their distinct phenomenologies; they perform distinct theoretical roles and this jus-
tifies positing both. (If they had the same phenomenology, then worries might arise; but they do not. 
The derivative nature of the modified state is also a further safeguard against screening oﬀ worries.) 
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 There are also further reasons to accept the theory, as I set out below (..).  
Having set out these reasons, I then close by considering some objections to my 
view, with a specific focus on the fact that I have appealed to sense-data (..). 
 
.. Explanatory Power 
 
Thus far, I have mentioned some of the ways in which Austinian Disjunctivism is an 
explanatory powerful theory. It can explain the capacity of experience to bestow 
novel depictive knowledge on its subjects of at least certain qualities; it can explain 
in a simple yet compelling manner why our experiences have the phenomenological 
characters that they do, and it can explain our intuition that something is presented 
in hallucinatory cases—as well as our related intuition that in illusion, when x looks 
F but isn’t, there is an actual instance of Fness present, at least where ‘F’ holds place 
for a restricted range of qualities. Essentially, we get all of the benefits that tradi-
tional presentationalist theories of experience give, but we also get to be naïve real-
ists and hence we can respect our intuitions about the fully veridical cases as well. 
 I want to mention two further ways in which the view is explanatorily powerful. 
The first point to note is that one could have a veridical perception, an illusion, and 
an hallucination, whereby the experiences involved are all phenomenally alike. One 
could, for example, veridically perceive a red tomato as the red tomato that it is, 
have an illusion as of a green tomato as a red one due to the abnormal lighting, or 
have an hallucination as of a red tomato when none is present. These experiences 
would all have the same phenomenology. They would all be experiences ‘as of a red 
and round tomato’. Moreover, the fact that all these experiences can all have the 
same phenomenology needs explaining. Of course, conjunctivists will oﬀer the same 
explanation in all cases—of veridical perception, illusion, and hallucination—since 
they believe that the experiences involved in all these cases have the same nature. 
Disjunctivists, however, on the face of it at least, need to work harder. For they do 
not say that all these experiences have the same nature, and hence cannot explain 
the sameness of phenomenology in terms of a common kind of mental event. 
 
  Austinian Disjunctivists, however, have an easy answer here. In the fully veridi-
cal case, we are simply presented with a red and round tomato, and the phenomenal 
character of the experience is inherited therefrom. In the illusory case, we are pre-
sented with a green tomato whose greenness and ovality are not manifest but whose 
other qualities are manifest and apt to ground phenomenology; moreover, an in-
stance of redness is present as a temporary qualitative part of the tomato. Hence, we 
can again ground the phenomenology of the experience in what is present. As for 
the hallucinatory case, we are presented here with a red round bulgy item that we 
could mistake for a tomato. Thus, the character of the experience would once again 
be grounded in the items presented. We can account, therefore, for phenomenally 
matching experiences, even when they present diﬀerent objects.22 
 There is a related point to make. For, as Johnston () points out, one thing 
that every philosophical theory of experience should do is explain how experientially 
seamless transitions between perceptual and hallucinatory experiences are possible. As 
an example of such a ‘transition’, Johnston () sketches the following case: 
 
[Suppose you] are undergoing an operation for an aneurysm in your occipital lobe. 
The surgeon…reduces all significant discomfort with local anaesthetic while he opens 
your skull. He then darkens the operating theatre, takes oﬀ your blindfold, and applies 
electrical stimulation to a well-chosen point on your visual cortex. As a result, you hal-
lucinate dimly illuminated spotlights in a ceiling…While [making you] hallucinate 
lights on in a ceiling, the surgeon goes on to do something a little perverse. He turns 
on the spotlights in the ceiling, leaving them dim enough so that you notice no diﬀer-
ence. You are now having what some call a ‘veridical hallucination’. You are still hav-
ing a hallucination for you are not yet seeing the lights on in the ceiling, the explana-
tion being that they still play no causal role in the generation of your experience. Yet 
your hallucination is veridical or in a certain way true to the scene before you; there 
are indeed dim lights on in a ceiling in front of you. 
 In the third stage of the experiment the surgeon stops stimulating your brain. You 
now genuinely see the dimly lit spotlights in the ceiling. From your vantage point 
                                                   
22 There would also be a derivative intentional state involved in the hallucination whereby we 
perceptually take the item to be a red tomato. This would aﬀect the overall phenomenology by way 
of modifying how the sense-data ground the hallucinatory experience’s character, and thus not by 
somehow acting as a ground, as on intentionalist models of experience whereby intentional states can 
act as grounds of the phenomenology of an experience (which is an idea I myself find problematic).  
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there on the operating table these dim lights are indistinguishable from the dim lights 
you were hallucinating. The transition from the first stage of simple hallucination 
through the second stage of veridical hallucination to the third stage of veridical per-
ception could be experientially seamless. Try as you might, you would not notice any 
diﬀerence, however closely you attend to your visual experience. (: ) 
 
As this brings out, a subject could, in principle at least, move seamlessly from hav-
ing hallucinatory experience, h, as certain number of lights on a ceiling, to having 
perceptual experience, p, i.e. to veridically perceiving that number of lights on an 
ceiling. The reverse, of course, is also quite possible. Surely, however, we need a 
philosophical account, i.e. some explanation, of how this could be so, as to how the-
se experientially seamless transitions between these diﬀerent cases could occur. 
 We ought to note that one could also move seamlessly from a case of veridical 
perception to a case of illusion, or vice versa, without noticing any diﬀerence from 
the inside, and so in principle without having any knowledge that one has under-
gone the transition in question. It follows that the main line of argument in this 
sub-section could easily be extended to show what I am anyway assuming, namely, 
that naïve realists cannot just give an account of veridical perception, but must also 
give an account of illusory perception to go alongside it. (Imagine, for example, start-
ing out by having a veridical perceptual experience of a genuine black bead. Then, 
imagine that, whilst having this experience, some magician expertly swaps the black 
bead for a blue one, whilst also changing the lighting to pink, so that the ball one 
sees is blue but yet looks black, meaning that you end up having a distinct, illusory 
experience. Clearly the transition would once again be experientially seamless. Try 
as you might, you just couldn’t tell, ‘from the inside’, the point at which you 
‘switch’ from seeing a black bead in normal conditions to seeing a blue bead in pink 
light. Moreover, this would once again require a philosophical explanation.) 
 Fortunately, however, we can explain this in light of being able to explain the 
fact that the relevant experiences have the same phenomenology. Yes, they have 
diﬀerent natures, due to presenting diﬀerent objects.23 But the experiences that are 
                                                   
23 N.b. strictly speaking my view is that naïve realists should view veridical and illusory perceptu-
al experiences as being of the same kind—i.e. as having the same nature—despite the fact that illu-
sions can present objects that veridical perceptions can’t, namely unowned quality-instances. After 
all, in both cases, what is given to the subject is just what is out there in the environs to be seen. 
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experientially seamless would be phenomenologically alike. Hence, one would not 
be able to tell them apart from the inside, due to this experiential similarity, and this 
is why the transitions from one to the other would be experientially seamless.24 
 Being able to account for the potential phenomenal sameness of three kinds of 
experience, as well as seamless transitions between them, is no small feat. It is also a 
requirement on any adequate theory of experience. It is a requirement that Austini-
an Disjunctivism meets. So this is one further respect in which the theory is  
explanatory powerful. 
 
..  Objections Considered 
 
Being explanatory powerful, however, will be no good if the theory does not stand 
up to scrutiny. Again, my aim here has been to develop a general theory of experi-
ence; but one result of this is that there will be more objections to consider than I 
possibly can here.25 Thus I will limit myself to objections to sense-data. For it is per-
haps the appeal to sense-data that philosophers are most likely to baulk at. 
 We can divide the traditional worries about sense-data into three categories. 
There are phenomenological worries, which seem to show that somehow sense-data 
are incoherent or contradictory items. There are Occamite worries, to the eﬀect that 
                                                                                                                                        
Thus, naïve realists should hold that there are just two basic kinds of experience, perceptual and hal-
lucinatory. (They should be PI/H disjunctivists, in the helpful terminology of Byrne & Logue ). 
24 Price (: ) and  Ayer (: ) say that it would be impossible to move from sensing one 
kind of object to another if they are qualitatively identical. Indeed, Price says that there ought to be 
at least a ‘flicker’ or a ‘jerk’; some sign, that is, that one is moving from sensing one kind of object to 
another. This seems to me misguided, however. Just as one can move from perceiving to hallucinat-
ing without knowing, so too, one can move from sensing an external thing to a sense-datum without 
knowing. The deeper issue here concerns the relation between the basic visual qualities that ordinary 
external things can have and their physical counterparts. A reductive physicalist, for example, might 
want to identify a manifest colour like red with its underlying physical counterpart; however, this 
identity claim will fail if Austinian Disjunctivism is true, for the corresponding sense-datum will have 
the manifest quality but not the underlying physical feature that it is said to be identical to by the 
reductive physicalist. The right reply here, it seems to me, is just to move from reductive to non-
reductive physicalism. We can then say that, when the external object has the manifest quality, it has 
some underlying physical property as its constituting base, whereas when it is had by a sense-datum 
it is grounded in some other way (say by the mind, or, perhaps, that it is not even grounded at all).  
25 Recall here my remarks at the end of (..). This work is a project in systematic metaphysics, 
whose principal aim has been to sketch out a wrongly neglected theory of visual experience. As I not-
ed there, given the nature of the project here, many of the details of the theory will have to be filled 
in elsewhere. Much emphasis is to be placed on the explanatory power of the theory developed, on 
the work that it can do. While I would prefer it otherwise, to develop a systematic view of experience 
here, much has to wait to be said, in terms of dealing with objections, for elsewhere. 
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positing sense-data is ontologically profligate. And there is the worry that perhaps 
moves contemporary philosophers the most: that sense-data and physicalism do not 
sit well together. However, it seems to me that none of these objections is decisive. 
First, I will tackle one version of the phenomenological objection. Then the second 
two objections will be dealt with in one manoeuvre, by appealing at once to (i)  
a neo-Aristotelian kind of physicalism as well as (ii) an idea from Schaﬀer () to 
the eﬀect that we should want to endorse, not the most minimal ontology, but ra-
ther the most maximal ontology so long as all the items can be grounded fully and 
properly in a sparse and, if we are physicalists, physical fundamental base. 
 The phenomenological worry I want to consider, involving the infamous speck-
led hen was first raised by Ryle, it was then discussed in Ayer (: ). (We find 
later discussions in Price ; Chisholm ; and Armstrong .) Here I will 
focus on Price’s version involving a case where I see the blue sky as blue but fail to 
see it as sky-blue. More exactly, let us imagine that I have an hallucination that is 
phenomenally just like this. The question is: does the sense-datum have the specific 
quality of being sky-blue? The trouble is that both answers seem problematic: 
 First Horn: We can claim that the sense-datum is blue but not sky-blue and 
hence just as it visually appears. However, we then violate the plausible maxim that 
objects do not have indeterminate characteristics. In general, we tend to think that 
if x has some determinable property F, x has F in virtue of having some determinate 
of that determinable, until we eventually reach some super-determinate of F, name-
ly G, such that x has F in virtue of having G (cf. Crane ; Funkhouser ).  
 Second Horn: We can say that while the sense-datum does not appear sky-blue, 
only blue, nevertheless it is sky-blue. The trouble here, however, to take Armstrong’s 
way of putting matters, is that this view has ‘the paradoxical consequence that ob-
jects specially postulated to do phenomenological justice to [the phenomenology of 
experience]’ end up having ‘features that lie quite outside perceptual awareness’ 
(: —). The thought is that since sense-data are postulated (or so it is 
assumed) to account for the phenomenal character of our experiences, it would be 
strange if they had features that they were not sensed as having. In short, sense-data 
are not supposed to have ‘transcendent’ features’; rather, their sensible qualities are 
 
meant to be ‘immanent’ to the acts of awareness they are presented in. A sense-
datum cannot have features it fails to manifest in the experience in which it is given. 
 This dilemma is meant to be fatal to the sense-datum theorist. There are, howev-
er, ways of replying. Ayer () grasps the first horn. In his view, sense-data are the 
kinds of thing that can be indeterminate (or so sense-datum theorists should say). 
Whereas Jackson (: ) grasps the second horn. According to Jackson, with 
the above complaint, Armstrong in eﬀect mixes up a suﬃciency claim with a neces-
sity claim. For, when arguing against the second horn, Armstrong argues that sense-
data can only have those properties that are needed to account for the phenomenal 
character of an experience. The sense-datum theorist can reply, however, that while 
sense-data need to have suﬃcient qualities to ground the phenomenal character of 
our experiences, that doesn’t mean they cannot have further qualities. For instance, 
it might be that in saying that there is a blue sense-datum, in order to account for 
why my experience has the bluish character that it does, we are then given a further 
reason, say from pure logic or from metaphysics (e.g. that nothing can be indeter-
minate or have a determinable without some corresponding super-determinate), to 
claim that the sense-datum must be some specific shade of red also. As Jackson 
writes, when discussing the original case, due to Ryle, of the speckled hen: 
 
If sensory items are postulated to do justice to the [phenomenology] we must give 
then enough properties to do this. However, this does not prevent us giving [them] 
more than enough properties to do this, if these extra properties are required by con-
siderations other than that of doing justice to the phenomenology…Thus to take the 
case in question, a sensory item theorist must, on phenomenological grounds, attrib-
ute the property of having many speckles to the sensory item. But also he must, on the 
metaphysical ground that to be is to be determinate, attribute the property of having 
some definite number of speckles to this…item. (: ) 
 
There is a worry concerning this reply, however, pertaining to arbitrariness, that we 
should perhaps mention. For suppose that I hallucinate a red sense-datum. Logic 
might then dictate that the sense-datum must instantiate some particular shade of 
red. But which particular shade of red must the sense-datum have? What decides this? 
Surely this cannot simply be arbitrary. We need a principled reason why the sense-
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datum should be crimson, say, if that is the specific shade of red it has, rather than 
vermillion. It cannot simply be a brute fact that it is one way and not the other. The 
trouble is that if the only reason we have for thinking the sense-datum must have 
some determinate shade of red is the argument that (i) the sense-datum is red and 
(ii) anything that is red also has some fully determinate shade of red, then it is left 
undecided which particular shade of red the sense-datum will have. It might be, 
therefore, that Ayer’s reply involving indeterminacy is better than Jackson’s.  
 I believe, however, that there is a better reply still. This is the reply that Price 
() suggests; a similar view is pre-empted by Broad (). The point is that the 
‘dilemma’ overlooks an important third option. For it ignores the possibility that 
the subject simply fails to notice the full range of qualities that the sense-datum has. 
 The key here is to recognise that in cases wherein some object visually appears to 
us as being some indeterminate way—bluish without being some specific shade of 
blue, say, or speckled without having a specific number of speckles—we do not have 
to choose between grasping the first or the second horn. That is, we need not say 
either that we are presented with an indeterminate sense-datum or with a sense-
datum that possesses more visual qualities than those that it manifests in one’s expe-
rience of it. Instead, we can say that the sense-datum is fully determinate but that in 
certain cases, we notice only that it has certain determinable features without notic-
ing that it has the corresponding determinate features. Take, for instance, the case 
that Price discusses involving a person having an hallucinatory experience of an item 
but where ‘it is perfectly good to say “It looked sky-bluish”, but I only noticed that 
it was bluish’ (: ). Price maintains that in such a case, we can analyse the 
experience as involving the presentation of a sense-datum that really is sky-bluish—
but adds that we will only notice that it has the determinable feature of being blue. 
 The key to solving this phenomenological problem, then, it seems to me, would 
seem to lie in realising that sense-data can have more properties, and can manifest in 
our experience more properties, than we will necessarily notice them as having at a 
given time. As Broad puts it, while it is true that sense-data ‘cannot appear to have 
properties which they do not really have…there is no reason why they should not 
have more properties than we do or can notice in them…’ (: ). Ultimately, 
then, we can and should respond to the dilemma here by denying that there is a 
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genuine dilemma. When a person hallucinates an object as merely being some inde-
terminable way, what happens is just this: the subject is aware of a fully determinate 
sense-datum, manifesting certain visual qualities that we fail to notice that it has. All 
of the qualities it has it manifests in the experience; but we will not necessarily at-
tend to or notice all of the qualities that it manifests on a given occasion.26 
 It seems to me, therefore, that we need not be too troubled by the phenomeno-
logical worries about sense-data. Therefore, instead, let us look to the other con-
cerns. According to Chisholm, in avoiding postulating sense-data, we avoid postu-
lating entities ‘beyond necessity’ (: , cf. Chisholm : , : —
). Many others have argued, moreover, that sense-data are problematic due to be-
ing incompatible with physicalism (cf. Armstrong : XII). I want to try, in this 
concluding part of the thesis, to deal with both objections in one fell swoop. To do 
this I will sketch a schematic view on which sense-data can be part of the physical 
world and also classify as an ‘ontological free lunch’. On this view, they are indeed a 
genuine ‘addition to being’, but they do not ‘cost’ anything extra, for they are 
grounded in what’s fundamental (thus I do not conflate coming for free, ontologi-
cally speaking, with failing to be a genuine addition to reality, as many writers do). 
 My view depends upon a broadly neo-Aristotelian kind of physicalism that has 
two elements. The first is that reality is hierarchical: we can distinguish between the 
fundamental base, the ground floor of being, and the various derivative levels 
grounded therein. The second is that what we take as fundamental is entirely physi-
cal, in our most stringent sense; presumably, to echo Lewis, the content of the fun-
damental base will come from our best physics or some approximation to it. The 
view is then that reality in fact contains the whole range of items that we pre-
theoretically take it to contain; it is just that they are hierarchically arranged. We 
                                                   
26 This worry does not deal with the concern a sense-datum theory of hallucination will generate 
impossible objects (for a forceful version of this worry see Pautz ). Note first that it is possible to 
have an experience in perception as of an object with seemingly contradictory properties. With the 
‘waterfall illusion’, for example, I can see an object that looks both like it is moving and like it is still 
(cf. Crane ). Now imagine that I were to have an hallucinatory experience that is phenomenally 
just like a normal experience of the waterfall illusion. Does that mean that I am aware of a sense-
datum that is both moving and not? If not, how is the phenomenology of the situation to be ac-
counted for? But if so, we end up with a seemingly impossible object, something that is both F and 
G where F and G are incompatible properties (moving and being still). I don’t claim to have a full 
answer to this objection. The idea that there is an intentional element in hallucinatory experience 
may help, however. Perhaps what happens in this case is that we represent a coherent and determi-
nate sense-datum to have contradictory properties, such as moving and being still, at the same time. 
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have the mental and the moral, the biological and chemical, but these are all 
grounded in and dependent on the fundamental physical base. The derivative things 
are physical in a derivative sense: they are physical things insofar as they derive their 
being from what is physical in the most basic sense. Moreover, all items are equally 
real: being fundamental is not a way of being more real than anything else.27 
 It is also a part of this view that if an item is fully grounded in the fundamental 
base, then that item is ‘an ontological free lunch’. It is no less parsimonious to be-
lieve in that item, because we ‘get it for free’ just by believing in the items compris-
ing the sparse physical base. This kind of ontology thus makes a welcome change 
from the ‘desert landscapes’ of the Quinean, who would have us believe only in the 
sparse fundamental base. After all, why believe only in the base if we can also believe 
in all that it can ground? Surely it would be better if we could integrate the manifest 
world into a view that preserves the fundamentality and primacy of the physical (cf. 
Schaﬀer : VII: Johnston : —; and Maudlin : )? But that is 
precisely what the present proposal aims to do. 
 I leave the reader, then, with a schematic picture, on which sense-data are not 
‘entities postulated without necessity’, and which also perfectly well into a physical-
ist view of the world; the kind of view that, according to Armstrong (: ), 
‘we all cherish in our hearts’. Indeed, sense-data fit in just well as experiences them-
selves: for mental events and objects alike are derivative items grounded in in the 
fundamental physical base or ‘metaphysical ground floor’ (Bennett : ). 
 
 
                                                   
27 This kind of physicalist view has recently been discussed by Dasgupta (); Loewer (); 
and Schaﬀer ().  
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